State v. Meeks

399 Mont. 553

459 P.3d 1288 (Table)

2020 MT 67 N

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Chad E. MEEKS, Defendant and Appellee.

DA 19-0151

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: January 22, 2020

Decided: March 24, 2020

For Appellant: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Brett D. Linneweber, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana

For Appellee: Gregory D. Birdsong, Birdsong Law Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Plaintiff and Appellant the State of Montana appeals the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial issued by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, on February 22, 2019. We affirm.

¶3 On August 24, 2017, an arrest warrant for Defendant and Appellee Chad E. Meeks (Meeks) was issued. Meeks was arrested on the warrant on August 28, 2017, and charged with a single count of felony sexual assault for allegedly touching a young girl, K.H. On September 1, 2017, Meeks had an initial appearance on the charge in the Yellowstone County Justice Court and bond was set at $150,000. Bond was reduced to $100,000 at the arraignment on September 6, 2017, and trial set for January 2, 2018. Meeks was unable to post bond and remained incarcerated during the pendency of the matter.

¶4 On November 2, 2017, the District Court reset trial for January 3, 2018. In the Omnibus Hearing Memorandum, filed on November 6, 2017, Meeks noted his intention to file a formal, written motion to continue the trial. Meeks did not file a motion to continue, however, and the January 3, 2018 trial date passed with no resolution. On January 10, 2018, the District Court noted the January 3 trial date had passed and re-set trial for April 3, 2018. Trial did not occur on April 3, 2018, and the State thereafter filed an unopposed motion for a "retroactive continuance" of the April 3 trial date. On April 23, 2018, the District Court held a status hearing, at which Meeks advised the court he waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial, "[a]s long as it's not waiving my speedy trial rights."

¶5 On April 24, 2018, the District Court issued an Order Resetting Jury [sic] Trial, which re-set the matter for a bench trial on August 13, 2018. On July 6, 2018, Meeks filed a motion in limine, seeking to determine the scope of testimony from a guardian ad litem appointed for K.H. in a civil proceeding. On July 13, 2018, Meeks filed an uncontested motion to continue trial due to an unrelated federal matter. On July 31, 2018, after a scheduling conference, the District Court issued an order resetting trial for December 17, 2018. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Meeks from introducing expert testimony regarding the credibility of K.H., and to preclude Meeks from introducing a psychosexual evaluation of Meeks performed in an abuse and neglect proceeding, prior to Meeks being charged in this case, and to obtain a new psychosexual examination by a qualified psychiatrist of the State's choice. On December 14, 2018, the District Court issued an Order to Seal State's Motion in Limine #1, Order Vacating Trial Setting, and Order Setting Hearing on State's Motion in Limine #1, which vacated the December 17, 2018 trial date and instead set a hearing on the State's motion in limine for that date. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the exclusion of opinion testimony regarding the truthfulness of K.H. The District Court asked the parties if they wished to set a new trial date, but counsel for Meeks noted that, if the District Court were to grant the State's request for a new psychosexual examination, a new trial date would be "superficial." The District Court did not a set a new trial date and indicated it would try to issue a decision on the State's motion in limine "as soon as [it could]." On December 17, 2018, the State filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Independent Evaluation Request, advising it no longer wished to pursue a second psychosexual evaluation if the court ruled the counselor who performed the previous psychosexual examination could testify at trial.

¶6 On January 18, 2019, with no decision yet issued by the District Court on the State's motion in limine, Meeks filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial and Brief in Support, seeking an order of dismissal for violation of his right to speedy trial. Meeks did not request an evidentiary hearing in his opening brief. On January 30, 2019, the District Court issued an Order Denying State's Motion in Limine, and thereafter issued an Amended Order Denying State's Motion in Limine on January 31, 2019, sealing the orders due to the confidential matters discussed therein. On February 1, 2019, the State filed the State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The State did not request an evidentiary hearing in its response brief. On February 12, 2019, Meeks filed the Defendant's Reply to the State's Response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial and Brief in Support and Request for a Hearing, which did request a hearing on the motion. On February 22, 2019, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued an Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial.

¶7 The State appeals, asserting the District Court abused its discretion by dismissing the case on speedy trial grounds without first holding an evidentiary hearing and this Court must remand for a hearing as there is an insufficient record to review on appeal. Meeks argues the District Court's decision is supported by substantial facts from the record and it was within the District Court's discretion to issue the order without holding the hearing which only he had requested.

¶8 "Except where mandated by Title 46, the court has discretion to conduct a hearing on the merits of a motion." Section 46-13-104(2), MCA. We review a district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Terronez , 2017 MT 296, ¶ 19, 389 Mont. 421, 406 P.3d 947 (citing State v. Schulke , 2005 MT 77, ¶ 10, 326 Mont. 390, 109 P.3d 744 ).

¶9 In this case, Meeks did not request an evidentiary hearing in his opening brief nor did the State in its response brief. While Meeks requested an evidentiary hearing in his reply brief, the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and granted Meeks's motion shortly after Meeks filed his reply. The State argues the District Court abused its discretion by not holding a hearing as the parties disputed facts, but concedes this Court has "not expressly held a speedy trial hearing is required[.]" In light of there being no requirement to hold a hearing on a speedy trial motion, together with the record in this cause as well as that of the child dependency and dissolution proceedings, the District Court's decision to not hold a hearing in this case was not a clear abuse of discretion. The District Court could, at any time, simply take judicial notice of the proceedings before it in this case, as well as both the abuse and neglect proceedings and Meeks's divorce proceedings. See M. R. Evid. 201. The record created below was sufficient for both the District Court to issue its Order and for this Court to review that Order on appeal. See State v. Stops , 2013 MT 131, ¶¶ 21-22, 370 Mont. 226, 301 P.3d 811.

¶10 "On appeal of a speedy trial ruling, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error." State v. Kurtz , 2019 MT 127, ¶ 6, 396 Mont. 80, 443 P.3d 479 (citing State v. Ariegwe , 2007 MT 204, ¶ 119, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815 ). The district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Snider , 2018 MT 258, ¶ 9, 393 Mont. 166, 429 P.3d 268 (citing Ariegwe , ¶ 119 ). We review whether the factual circumstances establish a speedy trial violation de novo as a question of constitutional law. Ariegwe , ¶ 119.

¶11 A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution. If the delay between accusation and trial exceeds 200 days, we examine speedy trial violations under the Ariegwe balancing test. Kurtz , ¶ 7 (citing Ariegwe , ¶ 41 ). Asserted speedy trial violations are analyzed by balancing four factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused's response to the delay; and (4) the prejudice to the accused. Ariegwe , ¶ 34. "No one factor is dispositive by itself; rather, the factors are related and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Ariegwe , ¶ 112.

Factor One: Length of the Delay

¶12 An arrest warrant for Meeks was issued on August 24, 2017, and at the time the District Court granted his speedy trial motion there was no set trial date. The District Court calculated the length of delay based on the time between accusation and Meeks's reply brief in support of his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. In this respect, the District Court erred by undercounting the length of delay in this case, as with no set trial date the District Court should have counted each day until it ultimately issued its order of dismissal. The length of the delay between Meeks becoming an accused and the...