State v. Meiser

551 P.3d 349

372 Or. 438

STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review,

v.Erik John MEISER, Petitioner on Review.

(CC CR1201547) (SC S070059)

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted September 14, 2023

June 13, 2024

On review from the Court of Appeals.^* (CA A166534)

Daniel J. Casey, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.

Joanna R. Hershey, Assistant Attorney General, Salerp, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, Bushong, James and Masih, Justices, and Nakamoto, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore.^**

DUNCAN, J.

₄₄₀This criminal case requires us to construe ORS 161.295, which defines the "guilty except for insanity" (GEI) defense. Subsection (1) of ORS 161.295 provides that

"[a] person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law."

By its terms, ORS 161.295(1) requires a connection between the person’s lack of capacity and the person’s mental disease or defect: The lack of capacity must be "a result of’ the mental disease or defect. The issue in this case concerns the meaning of "as a result of."

For the reasons explained below, we conclude that "as a result of’ must be given its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning, and, therefore, to prove the GEI defense, a defendant must show that their lack of capacity was a "consequence" or "effect" of their mental disease or defect. The defendant’s mental disease or defect may combine with another condition to cause the lack of capacity, and the mental disease or defect need not be sufficient on its own to cause the lack of capacity. Because the Court of Appeals held otherwise, we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

This is the second time that this case is before this court. The historical facts of the case are recounted in the earlier decisions of both the Court of Appeals and this court. State v. Meiser, 308 Or App 570, 572-76, 481 P.3d 375 (2021), rev'd, 369 Or. 347, 506 P.3d 402 (2022) (Meiser I); State v. Meiser, 369 Or. 347, 350-52, 506 P.3d 402 (2022) (Meiser II); State v. Meiser, 323 Or App 674, 676-77, 524 P.3d 130 (2023) (Meiser III). For the purposes of this decision, a summary of the trial and appellate proceedings is sufficient.

A. Trial Court Proceedings

Based on an incident in 2012, defendant was charged with multiple crimes, including several counts of ₄₄₁aggravated murder and burglary. The aggravated murder charges were based on the killing of one person, FH.

The trial court repeatedly found defendant unfit to stand trial by reason of incapacity. See ORS 161.360 (providing that a defendant may be found incapacitated if unable to understand the nature of the proceedings, to assist and cooperate with defense counsel, or to participate in the defense). Defendant spent nearly four years confined at the Oregon State Hospital before the trial court found him fit to stand trial.

Defendant waived his right to a jury, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. Defendant did not dispute that he had committed the charged acts, but he raised a GEI defense. As mentioned, the GEI defense is defined by ORS 161.295, which provides, in full:

"(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law.

"(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality mani- fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder."

ORS 161.295 (2011), amended by Or. Laws 2017, ch. 634, § 3.¹

₄₄₂The GEI defense is an affirmative defense. ORS 161.305. A defendant bears the burden of proving the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. ORS 161.055(2). As ORS 161.295(1) provides, to prove the GEI defense, a defendant must prove three elements:

(1) they suffered from a mental disease or defect

(2) that resulted in

(3) a lack of substantial capacity either (a) to appreciate the criminality of their conduct or (b) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.

In addition, as ORS 161.295(2) provides, a mental disease or defect does not include two types of abnormalities, specifically, (1) those manifested only by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct and (2) those constituting solely a personality disorder.

At trial, defendant called four mental health professionals to testify in support of his GEI defense. As we recounted in our prior decision, defendant

"offered the testimony of a psychologist and three psychiatrists, all of whom opined that defendant was suffering from schizophrenia but recognized that he had a cooccurring diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. One of the psychiatrists explained that, as a symptom of defendant’s schizophrenia, defendant experienced ‘command auditory hallucinations’—voices that defendant believed to be telepathic communications from unseen entities—although defendant did not experience ‘the kind of overwhelming command auditory hallucinations some other psychotic individuals have.’

"Two of the experts addressed the other elements of the GEI defense. Bo th testified that, at the time of the crimes, defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. And both testified that, if not for the psychosis, defendant would not have committed the crimes. One of the experts specifically rejected the suggestion that defendant’s ‘conduct [was] a result of antisocial personality disorder rather than schizophrenia.’ The other opined that both of defendant’s conditions were ‘active’ at the time of the murder but that defendant’s psychosis associated with his schizophrenia ‘was more the predominant driver of his behaviors.’ "

₄₄₃Meiser II, 369 Or. at 351-52, 506 P.3d 402 (brackets in Meiser II). The state did not offer any contrary expert testimony; instead, it raised arguments about the applicable legal tests for the defense and the sufficiency of defendant’s evidence.

Sitting as the factfinder, the trial court found that defendant had proved the GEI defense for some counts, but not for the aggravated murder counts or for one of the burglary counts. On the aggravated murder counts, the trial court found defendant guilty of murder as a lesser-included offense and merged the guilty verdicts into a single conviction. On the burglary count, the trial court found defendant guilty of second-degree burglary as charged.

The trial court did not address either the parties’ disputes regarding what defendant was required to show to prove the elements of the GEI defense or their disputes regarding whether defendant’s evidence was suffi- cient to prove those elements. Instead, the trial court stated its verdicts without elaboration, as a jury does in the absence of a special verdict form.

B. Meiser I

Defendant appealed, raising several assignments of error, including one asserting that the trial court had erred by rejecting his GEI defense to the murder charge.² Because the trial court had not expressed the basis for its rejection of the defense, defendant addressed all three elements of the defense. The first element—that defendant suffered from a qualifying mental disease or defect at the time of the murder, specifically, schizophrenia—was not disputed. The second and third elements—whether, as a result of his schizophrenia, defendant lacked the requisite capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law—were disputed. As to each of those elements, the parties disagreed about what a defendant must show to prove the element and whether defendant’s evidence compelled a finding that he had made that showing.

₄₄₄Regarding the second element—that a defendant’s lack of capacity must be "a result of’ a mental disease or defect—defendant asserted that, as a legal matter, a defendant’s lack of capacity is "a result of’ a mental disease or defect if the mental disease or defect is a cause of the lack of capacity, even if it combines with other causes. Therefore, if his schizophrenia was a cause of his lack of capacity, he could establish the second element, even if his personality disorder was also a cause of his lack of capacity. The state, on the other hand, argued that a defendant’s lack of capacity must be solely attributable to the defendant’s mental disease or defect. So, the state urged, if defendant’s schizophrenia combined with his personality disorder to cause his lack of capacity, defendant could not prove the second element. The Court of Appeals agreed with the state, ruling that, to prove the second element of the GEI defense, a defendant must show that their lack of capacity resulted solely from a mental disease or defect. Meiser I, 308 Or App at 582, 481 P.3d 375. Therefore, the court concluded, the GEI defense is not available to a defendant if the defendant’s lack of capacity resulted from a combination of a mental disease or defect and a personality disorder. Id.

The Court of Appeals then applied its understanding of the GEI defense to the evidence in the case. Id. at 582-86, 481 P.3d 375. Because the GEI defense is an affirmative defense and the trial court had determined that defendant had failed to carry his burden in proving it, the question for the court was whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, compelled a conclusion that defendant had proved that his asserted lack of capacity at the time of the murder was solely attributable to...