State v. Melina

1

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John Kevin Melina, Appellant.

No. A22-0835

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

May 13, 2024

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Wright County District Court File No. 86-CR-19-5687

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Craig E. Cascarano, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Segal Chief Judge; and Smith, John, Judge. ^[*]

COCHRAN, Judge

On appeal from his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to question him about his prior convictions, limiting the scope of his cross-examination of a witness, and determining that he waived his right to be present when the jury was polled. Appellant further contends that the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.

FACTS

On June 6, 2019, police received a report that appellant John Kevin Melina had sexually assaulted his daughter, A.M. The report was made by K.M., the child's mother, the day after A.M first revealed the alleged abuse to her mother. According to K.M., A.M. brought it up by saying that she wanted to talk about "something." Later that evening, A.M. asked her mother if she could sit under a blanket next to her and communicate via text message. In her ensuing text messages with her mother, A.M. disclosed that Melina had sexually abused her.

After K.M. reported the alleged abuse to police, K.M. took A.M. to Cornerhouse for a forensic interview. At the forensic interview, A.M. told the interviewer that, in 2017, Melina forced her onto a bed, pulled down her pants, and touched her vagina.

A.M.'s parents were never married and A.M., who was born in February 2009, lived mostly with K.M. In May 2017, Melina was granted physical custody of A.M., and she lived with Melina for a short period of time beginning in May 2017 before returning to live with K.M. The alleged abuse occurred when A.M. was living with Melina in 2017.

In October 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged Melina with one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(a) (2016), arising from his alleged sexual assault of A.M. in 2017. The matter proceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, A.M. testified about the alleged sexual assault. A.M. testified that she was playing a game on her phone when Melina entered her bedroom, grabbed her, and placed her into a "praying position," with her "knees on the floor and [her] stomach on the bed." According to A.M., Melina then pulled down A.M.'s pants and underwear and touched her vagina with his hand. She testified that she was eight years old at the time.

K.M. testified about how her daughter revealed to her in 2019 that Melina had sexually abused her. A copy of the text messages from A.M. to her mother were admitted into evidence. K.M. also testified that she and Melina had been involved in "extensive civil proceedings" regarding custody of A.M. and other matters.

The detective who investigated A.M.'s allegations testified that he interviewed Melina in 2019 shortly after A.M.'s initial disclosure. The detective testified that Melina denied A.M.'s allegations, but that Melina also harbored "vague suspicions" that A.M. had been sexually abused elsewhere. Melina told the detective that A.M.'s abuse may have happened at a camp or foster home. The detective added that Melina also provided law enforcement with recordings of various conversations between Melina and A.M. Melina testified in his own defense and denied the allegations. In addition, Melina testified that he recorded all of his conversations with A.M. and that in one recorded conversation, A.M. told Melina that she was going to lie to the police in order "to be with her mom." But, at trial, Melina did not introduce the recordings into evidence even though his attorney told the jury, during opening statements, that they would hear some of the recordings.

Upon questioning by his attorney, Melina admitted that he had been convicted of "too many [crimes] to count," although they were "[m]ostly traffic." He also noted that "he had no record at the time" that he was awarded custody of his daughter in 2017. During cross-examination, the state questioned Melina about his prior convictions of felony fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in 2018 and of domestic assault by strangulation in 2020.

The jury found Melina guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. While the verdict was being read, Melina used a sharp object to cut his own neck. Melina drew the object across his neck multiple times. Melina then abruptly stood up with the sharp object in his hand. At that point, it was not clear to the judge whether Melina intended to harm others in the courtroom or engage in further self-harm. Multiple bailiffs attempted to subdue him. After Melina actively resisted the bailiffs' attempts, they intervened with chemical irritants and a taser. Melina was then taken by ambulance to a hospital for treatment due to his injuries and bleeding. The courtroom was rendered unusable because "there was a significant amount of blood." The district court determined that the trial could not proceed until a later date.

A few days later, the district court held a hearing with the parties to determine if there were any further proceedings in the case that required the presence of the jury. Melina requested jury polling, which would require the jury's presence. The state did not contest Melina's request to poll the jury, but argued that Melina, through his conduct, waived his right to attend the jury polling. The district court agreed with the state. The court ordered a "remote hearing" to conduct polling with counsel present but specified that Melina would not be permitted to attend because he had "waived his right to be present." At the remote hearing, each juror affirmed their verdict of guilty as true and correct.

Following a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Melina to 72-month's imprisonment. Melina appealed, and this court stayed his appeal while he pursued postconviction relief. We reinstated Melina's appeal after the postconviction court summarily denied Melina's petition.

DECISION

Melina makes four arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state to impeach him with his prior felony convictions. Second, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion by limiting the scope of his cross-examination of K.M. at trial. Third, Melina contends that the district court erred by excluding him from the district court's polling of the jury after he was disruptive in the courtroom. Finally Melina argues the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying his petition for postconviction relief. We address Melina's arguments in turn.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the state to impeach Melina with evidence of his prior felony convictions.

We review a district court's ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior convictions for "a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We will not reverse a district court's evidentiary ruling unless the appellant demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion and that the appellant "was thereby prejudiced." State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 162 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).

The rules of evidence provide that a district court may permit a party to use evidence of a prior conviction to impeach a witness when the prior crime is punishable by more than a year in prison and the court determines that the prior conviction's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). In exercising discretion under this evidentiary rule, district courts are required to balance five factors commonly referred to as the Jones factors:

(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant's subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant's testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.

State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 654 (Minn. 2006) (quoting State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978)). A district court errs when it rules on the admissibility of a prior conviction without demonstrating "on the record that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors." Id. at 655. But such error is harmless if appellate review demonstrates that the conviction could have been admitted for impeachment purposes after a proper application of the Jones factors. Id.

Prior to trial, Melina filed a motion seeking to exclude any evidence of his criminal history. The state responded that, if Melina chose to testify at trial, the state should be allowed to impeach Melina with his prior felony convictions of domestic assault by strangulation and felony fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The district court "reserve[d] ruling on" the admissibility of the prior convictions until Melina "made the decision about whether or not [he] wish[ed] to testify."

At trial, Melina chose to testify in his own defense. Melina's attorney asked him on direct if he had been charged and convicted of any crimes, to which Melina responded, "Too many to count."...