State v. Melo-Fernandez

1

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCO MELO-FERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-40885

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

November 21, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY Lucy Solimon District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General Emily Bowen, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, for Appellee

Sitterly Law Firm, LLC Nick Sitterly for Appellant

OPINION

GERALD E. BACA, JUDGE

{¶1} Defendant Marco Melo-Fernandez pleaded no contest to a charge of knowingly leaving the scene of an accident where the accident results in great bodily harm or death, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-201(C) (1989). The district court sentenced Defendant to a six-year term of imprisonment pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15(A)(8) (2016)^[1] as a "third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being." On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in imposing the six-year basic sentence of imprisonment of Section 31-18-15(A)(8) to his conviction under Section 66-7-201(C), as opposed to the three year basic sentence of imprisonment of Section 31-18-15(A)(11). Concluding that the district court erred by sentencing Defendant, pursuant to Section 31-18-15(A)(8) rather than Section 31-18-15(A)(11), we reverse and remand to the district court for resentencing.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} Defendant was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of homicide by vehicle (reckless driving), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-101(A) (2016); and one count of knowingly leaving the scene of an accident where the accident results in great bodily harm or death, contrary to Section 66-7-201(C), following an automobile accident between an Infiniti G37 that Defendant was driving and a GMC Safari minivan, whose driver (Victim) died. Defendant pleaded no contest only to the charge of knowingly leaving the scene of an accident where the accident results in great bodily harm or death in violation of Section 66-7-201(C). In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to the following facts:

1. Defendant was the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident, which resulted in the death of [Victim];

2. Defendant knew there was an accident;

3. Defendant knowingly failed to stop his motor vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close as possible without obstructing traffic more than necessary, or Defendant knowingly failed to immediately return to the scene of the accident;

4. Defendant knowingly failed to comply with the requirements of [NMSA 1978,] Section 66-7-203 [(1978)] by not giving his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he was driving to the person struck or driver or occupant of or any person attending to the vehicle which was collided with and Defendant knowingly failed to render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance; and

5. This happened, in Albuquerque, Bernalillo County, New Mexico on or about May 29, 2017.

{¶3} Before sentencing, the district court allowed the parties to brief the issue of whether the sentencing provision of Section 31-18-15(A)(8) was applicable to knowingly leaving the scene of an accident in violation of Section 66-7-201(C). At the sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that the six-year term of imprisonment provided for by Section 31-18-15(A)(8) was applicable. Defendant, in the plea agreement, preserved his right to appeal the district court's finding related to Section 31-18-15(A)(8). This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

{¶4} The issue before us is whether the district court erred in sentencing Defendant to a six-year term of imprisonment "for a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being," pursuant to Section 31-18-15(A)(8), rather than sentencing Defendant to a three-year term of imprisonment as a third degree felony pursuant to Section 31-18-15(A)(11), based on Defendant's conviction for knowingly leaving the scene of an accident where the accident results in the death of a human being, contrary to Section 66-7-201(C). This is an issue of first impression. The State suggests that because we are reviewing a district court's sentencing decision the applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion. See State v. Bonilla 2000-NMSC-037, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 1, 15 P.3d 491 ("A [district] court's sentencing is reviewed for abuse of discretion."). Although generally that may be true, because our review of the sentencing decision of the district court involves a question of statutory construction, our review is de novo. See State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 36-37, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314.

{¶5} "The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and effectuate the intent of the [L]egislature using the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent." Id. ¶ 37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[W]here the meaning of the statutory language is plain, and where the words used by the Legislature are free from ambiguity, there is no basis for interpreting the statute." State v. Shije, 1998-NMCA-102, ¶ 6, 125 N.M. 581, 964 P.2d 142 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The plain meaning rule requires that statutes be given effect as written without room for construction unless the language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, in which case the statute is to be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason." State v. Boyse, 2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 9, 303 P.3d 830 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With this in mind, we begin with a review of Section 31-18-15(A).

{¶6} Section 31-18-15(A) provides in relevant part:

A. If a person is convicted of a noncapital felony, the basic sentence of imprisonment is as follows:

....

(8) for a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, six years imprisonment; .....

{11} for a third degree felony, three years imprisonment."

{¶7} We next review Section 66-7-201, generally. Section 66-7-201 provides in relevant part that:

A. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until [they] ha[ve] fulfilled the requirements of Section 667-203 . . . . Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

B. Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 . . . where the accident results in great bodily harm or death is guilty of a fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 . . . .

C. Any person who knowingly fails to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 . . . where the accident results in great bodily harm or death is guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 . . . .

D. Any person failing to stop or comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 . . . where the accident does not result in great bodily harm or death is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Subsection A of [NMSA 1978,] Section 31-19-1 [(1984)].

{¶8} Because Section 66-7-201 mandates compliance with the requirements of Section 66-7-203, we consider, as well, Section 66-7-203. Section 66-7-203 provides:

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give [their] name, address and the registration number of the vehicle [they are] driving and shall upon request exhibit [their] driver's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.

{¶9} Here, there is no dispute that knowingly leaving the scene of an accident where the accident results in great bodily harm or death is a third degree felony. See § 66-7-201(C). Accordingly, the sole issue before this Court is whether this third degree felony is punishable as a third degree felony that resulted in the death of a human being, pursuant to Section 31-18-15(A)(8). As we explain, under the present circumstances, we answer in the negative and first consider the plain language of the statutes.

{¶10} The plain language of the statutes does not establish as a matter of law that a violation of Section 66-7-201(C) satisfies the requirement under Section 31-18-15(A)(8), that the person be convicted of a third degree felony "resulting in the death of a human being." As can be readily discerned from a review of Section 66-7-201, set forth above, the plain language of Section 66-7-201 makes clear that the crime it proscribes is leaving the scene of an accident without complying with the requirements of Section 66-7-203. See State v. Montelongo Esparza 2020-NMCA-050, ¶¶ 12-13, 475 P.3d 815 (stating that the purposes of our hit-and-run statutes, including Section 66-7-201, are "to prohibit drivers from evading criminal or civil...