State v. Melton

901 S.E.2d 853

STATE of North Carolina

v.Stephon Denard MELTON, Defendant.

No. COA23-411

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed May 21, 2024

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 15 September 2022 by Judge Steve R. Warren in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 February 2024. Forsyth County, Nos. 19 CRS 60259; 20 CRS 96

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jessica V. Sutton, for the State.

Caryn Strickland, for Defendant.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Defendant Stephon Denard Melton appeals from judgment entered upon a jury’s verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant contends the trial court committed a structural error in denying his court-appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and further erred in failing to exercise its discretion to reconsider the denial of the motion. We hold the trial court did not err.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from an incident which occurred on 26 September 2019. The relevant facts are as follows:

On 7 February 2022, Defendant was indicted for felony possession of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine on the premises of Forsyth County Jail, and having attained habitual felon status. On 8 July 2022, Defendant, represented by court-appointed counsel, requested a trial. The matter was calendared for trial at the 12 September 2022 Session of Forsyth County Superior Court.

On 23 August 2022, the State provided notice of trial ready status. On 5 September 2022, Defendant indicated, in an administrative hearing, he was also prepared to proceed to trial.

On 9 September 2022, an attorney, who was not Defendant’s court-appointed counsel and had not yet been retained as private counsel, contacted the State without notice to Defendant’s court-appointed counsel. The attorney requested, on behalf of Defendant, a plea deal or continuance in Defendant’s case to allow her to prepare to defend him. The State denied the request for a continuance but did offer a plea deal, which Defendant rejected. Defendant’s court-appointed counsel was not immediately informed of the other attorney’s requests.

On Sunday, 11 September 2022, Defendant’s court-appointed counsel, after hearing of the attorney’s request, notified the State he would be filing a motion to withdraw. On Monday, 12 September 2022, Defendant’s court-appointed counsel filed the motion, which was heard later that day before Judge Stanley L. Allen in Forsyth Couty Superior Court. Upon hearing arguments from all parties, Judge Allen denied the motion.

On 13 September 2022, Defendant’s case came on for trial before Judge Steve R. Warren in Forsyth Couty Superior Court. Prior to jury selection, Judge Warren acknowledged there was a motion to withdraw in the file. Defendant’s court-appointed counsel noted the motion had been denied but stated Defendant wished to be heard on the motion again. Judge Warren allowed the parties to be heard on the motion, then repronounced the denial of the motion.

The trial proceeded, and on 15 September 2022, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of felony possession of methamphetamine and of having attained habitual felon status. Defendant was found not guilty of possession of methamphetamine on the premises of Forsyth County Jail. Defendant was sentenced to 42 to 63 months’ imprisonment.

On 16 September 2022, Defendant timely filed notice of appeal.

II. Analysis

Defendant contends the trial court committed a structural error in denying his court-appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and further erred in failing to exercise its discretion to reconsider the denial of the motion.

A. Motion to Withdraw

Defendant argues the trial court committed a structural error in denying his court-appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw where it erroneously applied the ineffective assistance of counsel standard in considering the motion. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

[1] While we generally review a trial court’s decision to either grant or deny a motion to withdraw for abuse of discretion, State v. Warren, 244 N.C. App. 134, 142, 780 S.E.2d 835, 841 (2015), our Courts have repeatedly recognized "when [a] motion is based on a right guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions, the question presented is one of law and not of discretion[.]" State v. Little, 56 N.C. App. 765, 767, 290 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1982) (internal marks and citation omitted); see also State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 611, 234 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1977). Thus, where, as here, the defendant’s motion concerns his "right to be defended in all criminal prosecutions by counsel whom he selects and retains[,]" we must review the trial court’s decision concerning that motion, de novo. Little, 56 N.C. App. at 767, 290 S.E.2d at 395 (internal marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 351, 53 S.E.2d 294, 298 (1949) ("Both the State and Federal Constitutions secure to every man the right to be defended in all criminal prosecutions by counsel whom he selects and retains." (citation omitted)).

[2] Moreover, Defendant argues the trial court committed a structural error—a rare constitutional error, of which this Court reviews de novo. See State v. Blake, 275 N.C. App. 699, 705, 853 S.E.2d 838, 843 (2020). See also United. States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006); State v. Goodwin, 267 N.C. App. 437, 438, 833 S.E.2d 379, 380 (2019) (explaining the United States Supreme Court and our State Courts, alike, recognize the erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s right to counsel of choice, qualifies as a structural error).

2. Application of the proper standard on a motion to withdraw

[3, 4] The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, the right to have the assistance of counsel in making his defense. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, § 23 ("In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the right to … have counsel for defense[.]"). Where the accused is found to be indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless he understandingly and voluntarily waives that right. State v. Pickens, 20 N.C. App. 63, 65, 200 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1973) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 57, 165 S.E.2d 245, 249 (1969)).

[5] While an indigent defendant has the right to court-appointed counsel, his right is not unlimited. Specifically, our Courts have placed certain limitations on an indigent defendant’s right to substitute his court-appointed counsel. However, these limitations differ based on whether an indigent defendant seeks to replace his court-appointed counsel with other court-appointed counsel or whether he, no longer being indigent, seeks to replace his court-appointed counsel with private counsel of his choice.

[6, 7] Our precedent is clear when it comes to substituting court-appointed counsel with court-appointed counsel. Our Courts have explicitly recognized, the right to court-appointed counsel "does not include the privilege to insist that counsel be removed and replaced with other [court-appointed] counsel merely because [the] defendant becomes dissatisfied with his attorney’s services." State v. Holloman, 231 N.C. App. 426, 429, 751 S.E.2d 638, 641 (2013) (quoting State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 371, 230 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1976) (internal marks omitted)). However, where it appears "representation by counsel originally appointed would amount to denial of [the] defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel[,]" the trial court is required to appoint substitute counsel. State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 352, 271 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1980). Thus, upon a defendant’s request to substitute his court-appointed counsel with other court-appointed counsel, "[t]he trial court’s sole obligation … is to make sufficient inquiry into [the] defendant’s reasons to the extent necessary to determine whether [the] defendant will receive effective assistance of counsel." State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 312, 289 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1982).

Less clear, however, is the standard by which the trial court is to determine whether to allow a defendant, previously found to be indigent, the right to substitute his court-appointed counsel with private counsel of his choice.

[8, 9] A defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment includes the right of a non-indigent defendant to be defended by counsel of his choice. See N.C. Const., art. I; U. S. Const. amend. XIV; see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ("It is hardly necessary to say that the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice."). Still, this right is not unrestricted. See State v. Gant, 153 N.C. App. 136, 142, 568 S.E.2d 909, 913 (2002) ("A defendant’s right to be defended by chosen counsel is not absolute." (internal marks and citation omitted)).

Our Court recently contemplated this issue in State v. Goodwin, 267 N.C. App. 437, 833 S.E.2d 379. In Goodwin, the defendant, prior to jury selection, requested new counsel, stating he wished to fire his court-appointed defense counsel and hire a private attorney. Id. at 438–39, 833 S.E.2d at 381. The defendant explained he believed his defense counsel "was not competent to represent him because they could not agree on which witness to call and could not properly communicate." Id. In response to this statement, the defendant’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw. Id. at 439, 833 S.E.2d at 381. The trial court denied the defendant’s request and his counsel’s motions stating, "[t]he [trial] [c]ourt deems there not to be an absolute impasse in regards to this case so far." Id. The defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, "the trial court committed a structural error when it denied his request for new, chosen counsel." Id. The ...