State v. Miller

289 Or.App. 353

413 P.3d 999

STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Michael Edward MILLER, aka Michael Miller, Defendant-Appellant.

A160386 (Control), A160387

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted March 29, 2017.

December 13, 2017

Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.

Lauren P. Robertson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Lagesen, Judge.

LAGESEN, J.

This is a consolidated appeal of two judgments of conviction for multiple counts of violation of a court's stalking protective order (SPO), ORS 163.750. In case number A160387, defendant was convicted in a bench trial of two counts of violating a court's SPO. In that case, defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the count in which defendant was charged with "unlawfully and recklessly coming within 25 feet" of the Coliseum Theater in Tillamook (Count 2), in violation of the SPO to which defendant was subject. He also assigns error to the trial court's imposition of supervision fees in connection with his sentence on Count 1, arguing that the court erred in imposing the fees after it found that defendant had no ability to pay fees. In case number A160386, defendant was convicted in a bench trial of one count of violating the SPO, and acquitted on the remaining count. In that case, he again assigns error to the trial court's imposition of supervision fees. We conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction on Count 2 in the first case (case number A160387) and therefore reverse the conviction on that count and remand for entry of judgment of acquittal on that count. And, accepting a concession of error by the state, we also reverse the trial court's imposition of supervision fees in both matters.

By way of background, defendant is subject to an SPO that generally prohibits him from being within 25 feet of the Tillamook Coliseum Theater, although defendant lives in an apartment above an antique store that is in the same block as the theater and is permitted under the terms of the SPO to be within 25 feet of the theater for the purpose of using the staircase to access his residence. The conviction at issue in this appeal arose from defendant's act of parking his car on the street in front of the antique store, and near the theater, following a trip to the grocery store with another person, Sims. One of the theater owners contacted police after noticing the parked car, which she knew belonged to defendant. The state charged defendant with violating the SPO on the theory that defendant's car was within 25 feet of the theater.

At trial, the state's case lacked any direct evidence of the distance between the theater and defendant's car and lacked any direct evidence that defendant personally had been within 25 feet of the theater. The theater owner testified that she had not seen defendant drive and park the car. The officer who investigated the matter testified that defendant did not go within 25 feet of the theater in the officer's presence. The officer also testified that he did not measure the distance between the theater and defendant's car. Instead, using a rolling tape measure, he measured out a 25-foot-long line "directly down the sidewalk" from the property line of the theatre in the direction of defendant's car. That line ran parallel to defendant's parked car; the officer estimated that it was about 10 feet from defendant's car. The line's endpoint, which the officer marked on the sidewalk and photographed, appeared to the officer to be about six inches behind defendant's front tires. Described differently, according to the officer's estimates, a 10-foot-long perpendicular line through the endpoint of the 25-foot line measured by the officer would intersect defendant's car at a point approximately six inches behind the front passenger tire.

Following the state's case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant was within 25 feet of the theater. The court denied the motion and ultimately found defendant guilty of being within 25 feet of the theater. The court reasoned that defendant would have been within 25 feet of the theater if he had either walked in front of his car or if he had walked around the back side and then helped Sims out of the car. The court further reasoned that it "defies common sense" to think that defendant had walked the way that he needed to walk to avoid violating the restraining order, although the court acknowledged that defendant could have walked from his vehicle in a way that did not bring him within 25 feet of the theater.

On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal. He reiterates his argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that either he or his car was within 25 feet of the theater. The state responds that the officer's testimony regarding his measurement process would permit an inference that defendant's car was parked within 25 feet of the theater. Alternatively, the state argues that the evidence is sufficient to support an inference, as the trial court found, that, after defendant got out of his car, he at some point walked in a way that put him within 25 feet of the theater.

"[W]e review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal for legal error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Rivera-Ortiz , 288 Or.App. 284, 285, 406 P.3d 96 (2017). Applying that standard here, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support defendant's conviction because it is insufficient to support a finding that either defendant or his car was within 25 feet of the theater.

Before we address the evidence, the nature of defendant's alleged violation bears some emphasis. The SPO prohibited defendant from being within 25 feet of the theater. If defendant remained only slightly more than 25 feet away from the theater, he did not violate the SPO. Under those circumstances, it was incumbent upon the state to demonstrate with precision that defendant crossed that 25-foot line; it is not good enough to demonstrate that he came close to the line. Close to the line is not a crime; at or over the line is.

Turning to the evidence, the trial court found that defendant violated the SPO by inferring that defendant must have walked around the car in a way that brought him within 25 feet of the theater. But that inference is entirely speculative on this record. The state presented no evidence about what path defendant took when he got out of his car, and, as the trial court recognized, there are paths that defendant could have taken that would not have brought him within 25 feet of the theater in a way that violated the restraining order.¹ Although the trial court thought that it would "def[y] common sense" for defendant to walk in a way that did not come within 25 feet of the theater, the record indicates otherwise. That is, if defendant simply walked around the back of the car rather than the front of the car, he would not be within 25 feet of the theater. It would be just a...