State v. Morgan

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KRISTOPHER MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-35709

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

September 13, 2018

This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY

Fred T. Van Soelen, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1} Defendant Kristopher Morgan appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (Methamphetamine) in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(E) (2011). Defendant contends that his rights to a speedy trial and to confront a witness were violated, and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and of drug paraphernalia after police discovered both items of contraband in Defendant's hotel room on February 10, 2013. That day, Officers Chris McCasland and Amber Salter of the Clovis Police Department responded to a report of a high volume of traffic, and therefore possible narcotics activity, to and from a hotel room registered in Defendant's name. The officers arrived at the room, knocked on the door, and asked Defendant, who was alone in the room, if they could enter. Once permitted inside, Officer McCasland smelled an odor of marijuana and asked Defendant if he "had any dope." In response, Defendant looked at the table and said that it was "all gone." Officer McCasland then asked Defendant if other people had been in his hotel room, to which Defendant responded that some of his friends had been there previously.

{3} After running Defendant's identifiers through dispatch, the officers discovered warrants for his arrest and placed him under arrest. While still insidethe hotel room, Officer McCasland observed a metal pipe, hypodermic needles, and a crystal-like substance that, based on his training and experience, he recognized to be methamphetamine. Officer McCasland field tested the substance and confirmed that it was methamphetamine.

{4} Based on the foregoing facts, Defendant was arrested and on February 21, 2013, and was indicted for possession of both the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. On March 11, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Three days later the district court held a hearing on Defendant's motion and ruled that the State had not violated Defendant's right to a speedy trial. Defendant's trial began on March 17, 2016, after which he was convicted of both counts with which he was charged. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we discuss additional procedural history as necessary in our discussion of Defendant's speedy trial argument.

{5} At trial, the State called two witnesses: Officer McCasland and Samuel Titone. Mr. Titone, a forensic scientist with the Department of Public Safety, testified regarding the results of a drug analysis he did not personally conduct and that was detailed in a report he did not personally generate. Outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Titone testified that based upon his review of the report, his conclusion matched that of Randall Rees, the prior forensic scientist who actually evaluated the drug evidence but did not testify at trial. Upon being permitted to doso and with the jury back in the courtroom, Mr. Titone testified that, based on his review of the raw data contained in the report, the testing instrument Mr. Rees used was clean and the substance seized from Defendant's hotel room and tested by Mr. Rees was methamphetamine.

II. DISCUSSION

{6} Appealing only his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, Defendant argues that (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (2) Mr. Titone's testimony violated his right to confront and cross-examine Mr. Rees, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We address each of Defendant's arguments in turn.

A. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial Grounds

{7} Criminal defendants in New Mexico are entitled to a speedy and public trial under both the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]"); N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to . . . a speedy public trial[.]"). "Whether a defendant has been deprived of the right requires a case-by-case analysis." State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 20, 370 P.3d 771. In analyzing a defendant's speedy trial claim, we must assess "(1) the length of delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) the actual prejudice to thedefendant." State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Each of these factors is weighed either in favor of or against the state or the defendant, and then balanced to determine if a defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated." State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 13, 396 P.3d 171 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), cert. granted, 2018-NMCERT-___ (No. S-1-SC-36385, April 26, 2017). No single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to a finding of a violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial, and all must be considered together with other relevant circumstances. Id. We defer to the district court's factual findings and weigh the four speedy trial factors de novo. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 20.

1. Length of Delay

{8} The "length of delay" factor helps us determine whether the delay in a defendant's case is "presumptively prejudicial" and would therefore require further analysis of the remaining factors. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A delay of trial of twelve months is presumptively prejudicial in simple cases[.]" State v. Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 5, 355 P.3d 81. The "long[er] the delay extends beyond this presumptively prejudicial period, . . . the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the state." Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). "We calculate thelength of delay from the time the defendant becomes an accused, that is, by a filing of a formal indictment or information or arrest and holding to answer." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{9} Both Defendant and the State agree that February 10, 2013—the date of Defendant's arrest—was the point at which Defendant's speedy trial right attached. Additionally, both parties concede that this case was simple under our precedent. The case was brought to trial on March 17, 2016. The length of delay was therefore thirty-seven months and seven days. There being a twenty-five month delay past the presumptively prejudicial threshold, we initially conclude that the delay was presumptively prejudicial and weigh the length of delay heavily against the state. See State v. Gallegos, 2016-NMCA-076, ¶ 8, 387 P.3d 296 (concluding that a delay of approximately twenty months past the one-year threshold for a simple case is weighed heavily against the state). We thus proceed to analyze the remaining factors.

2. Reasons for Delay

{10} Closely related to the length of delay, the State's justification for the delay "may either heighten or temper the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There are four types of delay: (1) "intentional delay" is the state's deliberate attempt to delay a case in order to hamper the defense and weighsheavily against the state; (2) "negligent or administrative delay" weighs more lightly against the state, but weighs more heavily against the state as the length of delay increases; (3) delay justified for valid reasons, such as periods of time when the case is moving toward trial with customary promptness, is neutral and does not weigh against either party; and (4) delay caused by the defendant is weighed against the defendant. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶¶ 18, 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

{11} Our review of the record here reveals that the reasons for the trial delay appear to have been attributable to both Defendant and the State. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence three days prior to the initial jury selection scheduled for December 19, 2013. Consequently, jury selection and trial were continued. On January 8, 2014, Defendant, citing the pendency of his motion to suppress, filed a stipulated motion for a continuance which also purported to "waive[] time completely." In its ruling on Defendant's speedy trial motion, the district court ruled that Defendant was responsible for the delay attributable to his motion to suppress up until the motion hearing on May 30, 2014. Ultimately, the district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress on June 10, 2014. For purposes of speedy trial analysis, this period of time is attributable to Defendant. See State v. O'Neal, 2009-NMCA-020, ¶ 21, 145 N.M. 604, 203 P.3d 135 (concluding that the delay caused by the defendant's motions is weighed against the defendant).

{12} Following the district court's granting of Defendant's motion to suppress, the State appealed to this Court, which reversed. The State appealed from the district court's ruling on October 8, 2014, and this Court reversed on May 27, 2015, and...