State v. Morris

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Cory Clifford Morris, Appellant.

A17-1580

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

October 29, 2018

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

Affirmed

Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-16-21659

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

REILLY, Judge

On appeal from his conviction of second-degree intentional murder, appellant Cory Clifford Morris argues that the evidence presented during the second phase of a bifurcated trial was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty by reason of mental illness. Because we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by determining that appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proof, we affirm.

FACTS

On August 13, 2016, appellant was arrested for killing his four-month-old daughter. Three days later, the state charged him with second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016). Based on his behavior while in custody, the district court ordered a Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01 competency examination to consider appellant's competency to proceed to trial.¹ The district court appointed Dr. Lawrence Panciera, a court psychologist, to conduct the examination. On August 23, Dr. Panciera concluded that appellant was not competent to proceed. The district court found that appellant was not competent to proceed to trial on the basis of this report. The Hennepin County Medical Center initiated a petition for civil commitment and began emergency treatment. On September 15, appellant was civilly committed as mentally ill. The district court held a review hearing on September 20 and determined that appellant was responding to the treatment and was competent to proceed.

On October 31, Dr. Panciera filed a Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.02 mental-examination report opining that appellant was suffering from schizoaffectivedisorder at the time of the offense and was "laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of the act constituting the offense or that it was wrong because of mental illness." Appellant was also examined by Dr. Shane Wernsing, a forensic psychiatrist, who diagnosed appellant with schizoaffective disorder and agreed that appellant had a mental illness that was "likely active (or symptomatic)" when he killed his daughter. However, Dr. Wernsing did not agree that appellant failed to understand the wrongfulness of his act at the time he killed his daughter.

On April 3, 2017, appellant waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded to a bifurcated trial, with the first phase considering appellant's guilt and the second phase considering whether appellant was not legally responsible for his criminal actions due to mental illness. During the first phase of the bifurcated trial, the district court found that the state proved each element of second-degree intentional murder beyond a reasonable doubt. During the second phase of the trial, appellant presented a defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness. The district court heard testimony from Drs. Panciera and Wernsing. The experts agreed that appellant suffered from active symptoms of a mental illness at the time of the crime, but offered conflicting opinions concerning whether appellant knew that his actions were wrong. The district court weighed the evidence and the conflicting expert testimony and determined that appellant failed to establish the mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The court determined that appellant knew the nature of his act—that is, he knew that he was striking his daughter, and he knew that striking her could cause her harm. The court further determined thatappellant knew his actions were morally wrong. The district court imposed the presumptive sentence of 306 months in prison, and this appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellant argues that the district court clearly erred by rejecting his mental-illness defense during the second phase of his bifurcated court trial for second-degree intentional murder. "A criminal defendant is presumed sane and responsible for his acts," and "bears the burden of proving a mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. 2016); see also Minn. Stat. § 611.025 (2016); State v. Linder, 304 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. 1981). The mental-illness defense is a question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder and "a finding that a defendant failed to meet his or her burden to prove a mental-illness defense should not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous." Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868. "A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it does not have evidentiary support in the record or if it was induced by an erroneous view of the law." Id.

Minnesota follows the test articulated in Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), and codified in statute as follows:

No person having a mental illness or cognitive impairment so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making a defense shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime; but the person shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act the person was laboring under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes, as not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.

Minn. Stat. § 611.026 (2016). The word "wrong" means that a criminal defendant "must know that his act was wrong in a moral sense and not merely know that he has violated a statute." Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868 (citations omitted).

On review, this court conducts "a rigorous review of the record to determine whether the evidence, direct and circumstantial, viewed most favorably to support a finding of guilt, was sufficient to permit the [district] court to reach its conclusion." State v. Odell, 676 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). The issue of mental illness is one for the factfinder to resolve, State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. 1990), and a reviewing court therefore gives "broad deference" to the factfinder's determination as to the appropriate weight assigned to various testimony, State v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Minn. 2009). In particular, we afford broad deference "to the fact-finder in determining the appropriate weight to assign expert psychiatric testimony" and, moreover, "the factfinder is not bound by expert psychiatric testimony and may reject it entirely, even when the only experts who testify support the defendant's assertion of a mental-illness defense." Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868 (citations omitted).

Appellant does not challenge the district court's determination that appellant knew the nature of the act constituting the offense. Thus, the only issue raised in this appeal is whether the greater weight of the evidence established that, at the time of the offense, appellant knew his actions were wrong. The district court found that appellant failed to establish his mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Sufficient evidence in the record supports the district court's decision. During the second phase of the bifurcated trial, the district court heard testimony from two expertwitnesses, Dr. Panciera and Dr. Wernsing. The district court acknowledged that there were conflicting expert opinions concerning whether appellant knew that his actions were wrong when he killed his daughter. Dr. Panciera appeared for the defense and testified that he believed appellant was "very confused and psychotic" when he killed his daughter. However, the doctor agreed that a person who is suffering from mental illness may retain the ability to know right from wrong. Dr. Wernsing appeared as a witness for the state and testified that, in his opinion, appellant's delusions did not impact his ability to think rationally. The doctor noted that appellant appeared to be "doing most of the regular day-to-day events in his life without great impairment" leading up to August 13, and further testified that it's possible for an individual experiencing auditory hallucinations to still engage in rational thought and decision-making. Dr. Wernsing testified that, in his opinion, appellant understood what he was doing when he killed his daughter and understood the wrongfulness of his act. The prosecutor asked, "[W]as [appellant] laboring under such a defective reasoning from his mental illness that he didn't know that his act was wrong?" Dr. Wernsing, replied, "Again, no."

Roberts provides that the district court is "free to reject" aspects of an expert's testimony, particularly when the expert's testimony is contradicted by other competent evidence. 876 N.W.2d at 870-71; see also DeMars v. State, 352 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 1984) (...