State v. Moses

982 N.W.2d 321

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Kengi Sabanaya MOSES, Jr., Defendant and Appellant

No. 20220101

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Filed November 23, 2022

Nicholas S. Samuelson (argued) and SheraLynn Ternes (on brief), Assistant State's Attorneys, Fargo, North Dakota, for plaintiff and appellee.

Alexis L. Madlom (argued), Moorhead, Minnesota, and Stormy R. Vickers (appeared), Fargo, North Dakota, for defendant and appellant.

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Kengi Moses appeals from an amended order deferring imposition of sentence entered upon a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. We affirm, concluding that Moses’ prior juvenile adjudication qualifies as a predicate conviction under the statute prohibiting possession of a firearm following a criminal conviction and that he received due process under the law.

I

[¶2] In December 2015, the juvenile court entered an order finding Moses committed the delinquent act of theft of a dirt bike, which "would be a Class C Felony if committed by an adult." In September 2020, Moses possessed a firearm at a Fargo shooting range. The State charged him with unlawfully possessing a firearm within five years after a felony conviction. Moses moved to dismiss, asserting that the 2015 juvenile adjudication was not a "conviction" and thus did not prohibit him from possessing a firearm and that the firearm prohibition statute violated his due process rights. The district court denied the motions to dismiss. Moses conditionally pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal. The court entered an amended order deferring imposition of sentence.

II

A

[¶3] Moses argues his prior juvenile adjudication does not qualify as a predicate felony conviction under the firearm prohibition statute. Construction of a criminal statute is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Laib , 2002 ND 95, ¶ 13, 644 N.W.2d 878. "Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the legislation, as expressed in its statutory language." In re Estate of Hall , 2019 ND 196, ¶ 8, 931 N.W.2d 482. In ascertaining the intended meaning of legislation, we first look to the statutory language and give the language its plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. "We interpret statutes to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence, and do not adopt a construction which would render part of the statute mere surplusage." Laib , at ¶ 13.

[¶4] Under the statute at issue here, a person is prohibited from possessing a firearm for five years following conviction of a felony or certain misdemeanors:

A person who has been convicted anywhere of a felony offense of this or another state or the federal government not provided for in subdivision a or who has been convicted of a class A misdemeanor offense involving violence or intimidation in violation of chapters 12.1-16 through 12.1-25 or an equivalent offense of another state or the federal government and the offense was committed while using or possessing a firearm , a dangerous weapon, or, as defined in section 12.1-01-04, a destructive device or an explosive, is prohibited from owning a firearm or having one in possession or under control from the date of conviction and continuing for a period of five years after the date of conviction or the date of release from incarceration, parole, or probation, whichever is latest.

N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b) (emphasis added). Under a prior version of this statute, we construed a similar "and" clause (italicized above) to limit only the class A misdemeanor provision, not felonies. State v. Eldred , 1997 ND 112, ¶ 21, 564 N.W.2d 283.¹ Accordingly, under our prior interpretation, a person need not be convicted of a felony "committed while using or possessing a firearm" to be prohibited from possessing a firearm. Any felony conviction will serve as a predicate. Moses does not argue that the current version of the statute should be interpreted differently from the prior statute or that the reasoning underlying our prior interpretation should be revisited in this case. We therefore take guidance from our past interpretation and conclude a person convicted of any felony is prohibited from possessing a firearm under N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b).

[¶5] The statute provides a broad definition of "conviction":

2. For the purposes of this section, "conviction" means a determination that the person committed one of the above-mentioned crimes upon a verdict of guilt, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere even though:

....

f. The person committed an offense equivalent to an offense described in subdivision a or b of subsection 1 when that person was subject to juvenile adjudication or proceedings and a determination of a court under chapter 27-20 or of a court of another state or the federal government was made that the person committed the delinquent act or offense.

N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2)(f) (2020).² Read together with N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b), these provisions allow a juvenile adjudication of a delinquent act equivalent to a felony to qualify as a predicate felony conviction prohibiting the possession of a firearm for five years.

[¶6] Moses argues that because N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2) requires a finding of guilt—a verdict of guilt, plea of guilty, or plea of nolo contendere—a finding of delinquency in a juvenile adjudication does not satisfy the statute. The juvenile court "found by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or admission that the child committed the following delinquent act" of theft, which "would be a Class C Felony if committed by an adult." If we were to construe N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2) as Moses asserts—a "verdict of guilt" or "plea of guilty" means only a verdict or plea in a criminal case, not a juvenile case—subdivision (f) of N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2) would be mere surplusage. See State v. Buchholz , 2005 ND 30, ¶ 9, 692 N.W.2d 105 (construing what is now subdivision (d), N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2), to avoid "render[ing] part of the statute mere surplusage"). To avoid rendering N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2)(f) mere surplusage, we conclude that a juvenile court determination that a juvenile has committed a delinquent act equivalent to a felony satisfies N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2)(f). Accordingly, Moses’ juvenile adjudication qualifies as a predicate "conviction" under the firearm prohibition statute.

B

[¶7] Moses asserts N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2)(f) conflicts with several provisions of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, ch. 27-20.

[¶8] First, Moses argues N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2)(f) conflicts with N.D.C.C. § 27-20-33 (repealed eff. July 1, 2021),³ which provided:

1. An order of disposition or other adjudication in a proceeding under this chapter is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction ....

2. The disposition of a child and evidence adduced in a hearing in juvenile court may not be used against the child in any proceeding in any court other than a juvenile court, whether before or after reaching majority, except for impeachment or in dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence investigation and report.

[¶9] The State contends N.D.C.C. §§ 62.1-02-01(2)(f) and 27-20-33 can be reconciled under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, which states:

Whenever a general provision in a statute is in conflict with a special provision in the same or in another statute, the two must be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both provisions, but if the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable the special provision must prevail and must be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is enacted later and it is the manifest legislative intent that such general provision shall prevail.

See also State v. Beilke , 489 N.W.2d 589, 593 (N.D. 1992) ("We construe statutes to harmonize them and avoid conflicts."); State v. Woytassek , 491 N.W.2d 709, 712 (N.D. 1992) ("If two or more statutes relating to the same subject matter conflict, we attempt to give meaningful effect to each without rendering one or the other useless.").

[¶10] Although N.D.C.C. §§ 62.1-02-01(2)(f) and 27-20-33 conflict on the surface, they can be harmonized and construed to give effect to both statutes. Specifically, N.D.C.C. § 27-20-33 provides a general rule that a juvenile adjudication "is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction." Subdivision (f) of N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2), however, provides an exception "[f]or the purposes of [the firearm prohibition] section" and broadly defines "conviction" to include a juvenile adjudication of a delinquent act equivalent to a felony. Thus, to harmonize the statutes and avoid conflict, subdivision (f) considers a juvenile adjudication to be a conviction only for the limited purpose of deciding whether a person is prohibited from possessing a firearm. This is consistent with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, which requires effect be given to both, but if they are irreconcilable, the special provision, N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2)(f), must prevail and be construed as an exception to the general provision, N.D.C.C. § 27-20-33.

[¶11] Washington has a similar juvenile statute preventing juvenile adjudications from being deemed a "conviction," which states: "An order of court adjudging a child a juvenile offender or dependent under the provisions of this chapter [Basic Juvenile Court Act] shall in no case be deemed a conviction of crime." Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.240. In United States v. Mendez , 765 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether a juvenile adjudication could serve as the predicate felony conviction under the federal firearm statute in light of Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.240. The court noted that the federal firearm statute requires looking to state law to determine what constitutes a "conviction" of a "crime." Mendez , at...