State v. Mouton

384 So.3d 845

2023-00723 (La. 5/10/24)

STATE of Louisiana

v.Kathleen MOUTON (Parish of Jefferson Davis)

2023-KK-00723

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 10, 2024

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Jefferson Davis

G. Paul Marx, Lafayette, Timothy Michael Cassidy, Jennings, for Applicant - Defendant.

Lauren C. Heinen, Jennings, Torrie S. Thibodeaux, Burleigh G. Doga, Baton Rouge, Michael C. Cassidy, for Respondent - State of Louisiana.

CRICHTON, J.

₁We granted the writ application in this case to decide two issues relating to the time limitation to commence a criminal trial pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 578. First, we address whether a motion for preliminary examination filed prior to the institution of prosecution tolls the time limitation to commence trial once charges are formally filed. We hold that the motion did not suspend the limitation period because defendant did not re-urge the motion after the State filed the bill of information. Second, we determine whether the limitation period was interrupted when courts were closed due to Hurricane Laura. We hold that, consistent with the orders issued by this Court addressing the impacts of Hurricane Laura,¹ the storm suspended, but did not interrupt, the limitation period. Based on these conclusions, we find that in this case, the State failed to timely commence trial. Thus, we overturn the court of appeal and reinstate the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to quash.

BACKGROUND

Defendant, Kathleen Mouton, was arrested in Jefferson Davis Parish on a charge of attempted second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27, on August 1, 2018. On August 10, 2018, defense counsel filed a motion for a ₂preliminary examination. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the hearing be held on September 13, 2018. On that date, defense counsel indicated that he had received discovery from the State and, according to the minute entry, "the matter was passed without date" on defense motion. Nine months later, on June 13, 2019, the State filed a bill of information charging defendant with attempted manslaughter in violation of La. R.S. 14:31 and 14:27. The matter was fixed for trial on six occasions but was continued each time. The first time, on June 24, 2020, defendant requested the continuance, but thereafter, the state sought each continuance.

On August 17, 2022, defendant filed a motion to quash based on untimely prosecution. La.C.Cr.P. art. 532(7). The State opposed the motion arguing that the time limit to bring the case to trial had not expired because the period of limitation was suspended by the pending motion for preliminary examination filed by defendant on August 10, 2018. On August 29, 2022, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to quash, reasoning the motion for preliminary examination did not suspend the time limit to commence trial because it was filed before prosecution was formally initiated. That same day, defense counsel noted on the record that he withdrew the motion for preliminary examination.

The court of appeal granted the State’s writ application and reversed the ruling of the trial court. State v. Mouton, 2022-0650 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/21/23) (unpub’d). The court did not address whether the motion for preliminary examination suspended the limitation period. Instead, the court found that on August 27, 2020, the two-year limitation period was interrupted by the court closure in Jefferson Davis Parish due to the impact of Hurricane Laura. The court explained that the limitation period began running anew on August 27, 2020, and thus the State had two years from that date in which to commence trial. As such, the motion to quash filed on August 17, 2022, was premature and should have been denied.

₃DISCUSSION

[1] A motion to quash may be granted if the limitation period for the commencement of trial has expired. La.C.Cr.P. arts. 532(7), 581. For felonies other than capital offenses, trial must commence within two years of instituting the prosecution of the charged offense. La.C.Cr.P. art. 578(A)(2). "Institution of prosecution" is defined as "the finding of an indictment, or the filing of an information, or affidavit, which is designed to serve as the basis of a trial." La.C.Cr.P. art. 934(7). The time to commence trial may be extended by the effect of suspension or interruption. See, e.g., La. C.Cr.P. arts. 579, 580. Once the accused shows that the State has failed to bring her to trial within the time specified by La.C.Cr.P. art. 578, the State bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that either an interruption or a suspension of the time limit extended the time to commence trial. State v. Morris, 99-3235, p. 1 (La. 2/18/00), 755 So.2d 205, 205 (per curiam).

[2] In this case, the State instituted prosecution on June 13, 2019 when it filed the bill of information charging defendant with attempted manslaughter. Absent suspension or interruption, the limitation period for the commencement of trial would have lapsed on June 13, 2021. When the motion to quash was filed on August 17, 2022, trial had not commenced. Thus, on its face, the motion to quash had merit, and the State bore the burden to show that the limitation period had not expired when the motion to quash was filed.

[3, 4] In the trial court, the State argued that defendant’s motion for preliminary examination suspended the limitation period. Article 580 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the controlling provision for suspension of the time limits and provides, in pertinent part,

A. When a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea, the running of the periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but in no case shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to commence trial.

₄A preliminary plea is "any plea filed after the prosecution is instituted and before the trial that causes the trial to be delayed." State v. Elfert, 247 La. 1047, 1052, 175 So.2d 826, 828 (1965). These include "motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for a continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars." State v. Brooks, 2002-0792, p. 6 (La. 2/14/03), 838 So.2d 778, 782. Motions filed before the institution of prosecution cannot suspend the limitation period because the limitation period has not yet begun to run. The issue before the Court is whether a prematurely filed motion, such as the one here, suspends the limitation period once formal prosecution is instituted.

Until the decision by the Third Circuit in the present case, the only court to address this issue was the Second Circuit in a series of three cases over four years all involving the same assistant district attorney and defense attorney. In State v. Duncan, 29,896 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 328 ("Duncan I"), the court of appeal found that since the defendant had not re-urged any of his prematurely filed motions after prosecution was instituted, the limitation period was not suspended. In a subsequent case, coincidentally involving the same defendant, the Second Circuit relied on its prior decision in Duncan I, and held,

Preliminary pleas filed by a defendant prior to the institution of prosecution do not have the effect of suspending prescription under La.C.Cr.P. art. 580. State v. Duncan, [29,896, 702 So.2d 328]. Such preliminary pleas are in fact premature, and to suspend the two-year prescriptive period, the record must reflect that the defendant re-urged them after prosecution was instituted. Id.

State v. Duncan, 33,971, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/3/00), 771 So.2d 254, 257 ("Duncan II"). Following Duncan II, the State sought review in this Court. While that writ application was pending, the Second Circuit issued an en banc opinion abrogating its two Duncan decisions "to the extent that they hold that pending motions to suppress do not become preliminary pleas after prosecution has been instituted." State v. Oliver, 34,292, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/9/01), 786 So.2d 317, 322. ₅Prawing on a principle of civil law that "a prematurely filed motion can be cured by subsequent prerequisite acts," the court concluded that in a case in which the motions have not been withdrawn "when prosecution is instituted by the filing of a bill of information, or by indictment, then the defect of prematurity is cured and the motions become preliminary pleas." Id., 34,292 p. 6, 786 So.2d at 322. Therefore, the premature motions to suppress "became viable preliminary pleas after the bills of information were filed for purposes of La.C.Cr.P. art. 578 and the running of prescription was suspended." Id., 34,292, p. 7, 786 So.2d at 322.²

In this case, the State relied on the reasoning of Oliver to support its argument that the limitation period had not lapsed when defendant filed her motion to quash. The trial court correctly rejected this argument. Like the trial court, we decline to adopt the Second Circuit’s holding in Oliver, 34,292, 786 So.2d 317.

The Oliver court employed a principle announced by this Court to address when a party in a civil case files a motion for appeal before the final judgment is signed. This Court held that the subsequent signing of the judgment cured the prematurity of the otherwise valid motion, thereby permitting its consideration. See Overmier v. Traylor, 475 So.2d 1094 (La. 1985). By applying this "cure" concept to prematurely filed preliminary pleas, Oliver turned limitation principles upside down, leading to the absurd result that, at the moment the limitation period should commence, it is instead suspended.

The Oliver court justified this outcome on the grounds that a defendant would not be denied the opportunity to heard on a prematurely filed motion. However, this reasoning only demonstrates that the prematurity of the filing is not a defect that needs to be cured in order to give the motion effect. Moreover, a defendant’s right ₆to be heard on a motion...