State v. Munoz

474 S.W.3d 8

The State of Texas, Appellant,

v.Vicente Munoz, Appellee.

No. 08–13–00164–CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

July 31, 2015

Discretionary Review Refused February 22, 2016

Jaime E. Esparza, District Attorney, El Paso, TX, for State.

Matthew DeKoatz, Attorney at Law, El Paso, TX, for Appellee.

Before McClure, C. J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.

OPINION

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Vicente Munoz was charged by indictment of Felony driving while intoxicated. The State of Texas appeals the trial court's order granting Vicente Munoz's motion to suppress his blood test result that was obtained as a result of his arrest for DWI. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect the sole basis for suppression of the blood test result was the State's failure to show exigent circumstances to support the warrantless, non-consensual blood draw. Finding the State failed to establish a valid exception to the warrant requirement, we affirm the trial court's suppression order.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On September 5, 2009, about 8:17 p.m., El Paso Police Officer Jordan was on patrol when she was dispatched to a call involving a suspicious vehicle. The reporter had observed a red pickup truck sitting in the street, with the engine off and the headlights on. Officer Jordan arrived at approximately 8:20 p.m. and spoke with the reporter. Officer Jordan approached the truck on the driver's side. The officer discovered Munoz asleep in the front seat with a can of beer between his legs, the keys in the ignition, the engine off, and the headlights on. Officer Jordan woke Munoz up and smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. When Munoz exited the truck, the officer observed him to have an unsteady balance, red blood-shot eyes, and exhibit slurred speech. Munoz refused to submit to a breath test. Munoz was transported to the station at 9:13 p.m. The station is about five to six blocks away and it takes a couple of minutes from Munoz's vehicle to arrive there.

On the way to the station, Officer Jordan passed the Municipal Court building which houses a magistrate on duty from 9:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. every night. Officer Jordan stated that to get a warrant, she would have to go before the magistrate, "get it signed and get the warrant." She acknowledged she did not attempt to get a warrant nor was she prevented from getting one. Officer Jordan testified that she was aware that she could have obtained a warrant had she wanted. Officer Jordan explained to the court that she did not get a warrant because at that time the law allowed a mandatory blood draw if an individual had two prior convictions. She stated the only reason she failed to obtain the warrant was because she relied on the mandatory blood draw statute.

After Munoz was placed in custody, it was determined he had seven prior convictions for DWI. Based on Munoz's prior convictions, he was immediately taken to the hospital for a mandatory blood draw.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2012, the trial court, after a hearing on a motion to suppress statements, evidence, and the blood test result, orally denied the motion. On May 2, 2013, Munoz filed a second motion to suppress the blood test result relying on Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). On May 6, 2013, the trial court heard argument of counsel regarding Munoz's second motion to suppress and denied it again. On the day of Munoz's jury trial, May 14, 2013, the trial court heard additional testimony from Officer Jordan and suppressed the blood test result.¹ Munoz argued that no exigent circumstances were shown and a warrantless blood draw could not be permitted under McNeely. The State argued McNeely did not apply in states which had legislatively-mandated blood draws for repeat offenders such as Texas. Next, the State contended the blood test result should not be excluded because the officers were acting in good-faith reliance upon the law.

The trial court entered thirty-six findings of fact and six conclusions of law. The relevant Findings of Fact are as follows:

5. At 8:22 p.m., Detective Jordan arrived at the scene.²

...

18. Defendant declined to submit to Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) and the breath test.

...

26. Approximately 10 minutes elapsed from the time Detective arrived at the scene to the time Detective arrested the Defendant.

...

28. At 9:15 p.m., Defendant arrived at the station.

29. At the station, EPPD Officer Art Senclair discovered that the Defendant had at least two prior Driving While Intoxicated convictions.

30. EPPD did not acquire a warrant to draw blood from the Defendant.

31. On September 5, 2009, Detective Jordan could have acquired a warrant for a blood draw, if she wanted to get one on that date.

32. On September 5, 2009, nothing prevented Detective Jordan from acquiring a warrant for a blood draw.

33. There is a magistrate on duty every night from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. at the Municipal Court building which was closer to the location where Defendant was arrested than the Police station where Defendant was transported.

34. At 10:25 p.m., Officer Art Senclair followed Texas Transportation Code section 724.012(b)(3)(B), and transported Defendant to Las Palmas hospital for a blood draw.

35. Registered nurse Michael Windham drew Defendant's blood at Las Palmas hospital.

36. The lab result revealed that Defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.23.

The relevant Conclusions of Law are as follows:

1. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 requires exigent circumstances in order to conduct a warrantless blood draw.

...

3. The State did not present any evidence that constituted exigent circumstances.

...

5. Texas Transportation Code, section 724.012(b)(3)(B) allows for a warrantless blood draw on an individual with two or more previous DWI convictions.

6. Pursuant to McNeely, this governmental interest does not justify a departure from obtaining a warrant, unless there are exigent circumstances present.

DISCUSSION

The State in a single point of error raises two sub-issues. First, the State contends that the trial court erred by relying on Missouri v. McNeely in suppressing the warrantless blood test result obtained pursuant to the implied-consent and mandatory-blood-draw provisions in the Texas Transportation Code § 724.012(b).³

See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (West 2011). According to the State, McNeely decided the narrow issue of whether the dissipation of alcohol constituted a per se exigency that allowed for a warrantless blood draw in DWI cases. Therefore, the State concludes McNeely is inapplicable here given that the State relied on the Texas Transportation Code for implied consent of a warrantless blood-draw in DWI cases involving an accident or prior convictions. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 724.011, 724.012(b).

Second, even if McNeely applies, the State posits, the officers acted in objective reasonable reliance upon then-binding precedent and Section 724.012(b), so therefore, the blood test result are not subject to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. The State further argues Munoz's 2009 blood test result was not obtained in violation of the law, because the blood draw occurred prior to the issuance of McNeely in April 2013. The State asserts that in 2009, the officers acted in "objective reasonable reliance" under existing precedent and Munoz's warrantless blood draw was proper and therefore, not subject to exclusion under the Fourth Amendment.

Munoz responds that under McNeely, a warrantless blood draw is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Munoz contends, under these facts, the State has failed to secure a warrant or prove any permissible constitutional exception applies.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) ; State v. Terrazas, 406 S.W.3d 689, 692 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2013, no pet.). We afford almost total deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact that are supported by the record, and to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an assessment of a witnesses' credibility or demeanor. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) ; Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) ; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The trial court's determination of legal questions and its application of the law to facts that do not turn upon a determination of witness credibility and demeanor are reviewed de novo. See Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447 ; Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 ; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62–63 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) ; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.

When, as here, the trial judge makes express findings of fact, we must first determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447 ; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). We review a trial court's legal ruling de novo. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548–49 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). Furthermore, we must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. White, 306 S.W.3d 753, 757 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). "This principal holds true even when the trial judge gives the wrong reason for his decision, and is especially true with regard to admission of evidence." State v. Esparza, 353 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2011, pet. granted), aff'd State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81 (Tex.Crim.App.2013), quoting Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

"The evident purpose of this rule is to ensure that a trial court ruling will be upheld if the appellate court has assurance that the ruling was just and lawful." Esparza, 353 S.W.3d at 282, quoting White, 306 S.W.3d at 757 n. 10.

SUPPRESSION OF BLOOD TEST RESULT

In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, ...