State v. Newton

689 S.W.3d 397

The STATE of Texas, Appellant,

v.Christopher Lynn NEWTON, Appellee.

NUMBERS 13-22-00616-CR, 13-22-00617-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

Delivered and filed April 18, 2024.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF NAVARRO COUNTY, TEXAS, HON. H. M. DAVENPORT, COUNTY JUDGE

ATTORNEYS OF RECORD FOR THE APPELLANT: William Thompson, Criminal District Attorney, 300 W. 3rd Ave., Suite 801, Corsicana, TX 75110, Aaron Lilly, Navarro Co. District Attorney’s Office, 300 W. 3rd Ave., Suite 301, Corsicana, TX 75110.

ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR THE APPELLEE: Stan Schwieger, Law Office of Stan Schwieger, 600 Austin Ave., Suite 12, Waco, TX 76701.

Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Silva

OPINION

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Appellant the State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting appellee Christopher Lynn Newton’s motion to suppress evidence acquired after his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and duty on striking a fixture. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5) (permitting the State to appeal orders granting a motion to suppress). By four issues, which we construe as one with four subissues, the State argues that the trial court erred because (1) probable cause existed for Newton’s arrest; (2) Newton’s residence, where he was found and arrested, constituted a suspicious place; (3) Newton breached the peace by driving while intoxicated, causing a collision with a roadside fixture with his motor vehicle, and subsequently fleeing the scene; and (4) Newton was intoxicated in his front yard and presented a danger to himself or others, subjecting him to arrest for public intoxication. We reverse and remand.

I. Background¹

Newton was charged by information and complaint with DWI with a prior conviction, a Class A misdemeanor, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (DWI); id. § 49.09(a) (enhancing a DWI to a Class A misdemeanor when a defendant has been previously convicted of the offense), and failure to meet his duty on striking a fixture, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.025(a), (b)(2). Newton moved to suppress his arrest and the evidence obtained thereafter, arguing that his arrest was unlawful. The trial court heard Newton’s motion at a hearing where the following evidence was adduced.

Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Matthew Ochoa testified that at 8:47 p.m. on May 28, 2022, while on duty, he was dispatched to investigate a single vehicle accident. Upon arriving at the scene of the crash, Trooper Ochoa identified and followed skid marks from the scene to a nearby home where he discovered Newton’s damaged truck.² According to Trooper Ochoa, the truck’s "back end was pretty torn up" and the "rear axle had been twisted pretty significantly." Trooper Ochoa then approached the home to speak with the residents, making contact with Newton and his stepmother at 9:12 p.m.

Trooper Ochoa testified that Newton admitted to driving and while speaking with him, Trooper Ochoa noticed signs of intoxication; specifically, "[t]he odor of alcohol coming from his breath, slurred speech, [and] his eyes were dilated, bloodshot, [and] glassy." Newton initially denied drinking any alcohol but then stated that he had a glass of wine with his stepmother. This prompted Trooper Ochoa to perform the standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs), to which Newton initially consented. However, after performing the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Newton declined to participate any further. Trooper Ochoa then arrested Newton. Trooper Ochoa testified that he believed he had probable cause to arrest Newton.

On cross examination, Trooper Ochoa confirmed that there was nothing suspicious about Newton’s presence at the home. Trooper Ochoa acknowledged that he did not witness Newton commit either of the charged offenses. However, Trooper Ochoa subsequently testified that Newton’s presence at the home was suspicious, considering the totality of the circumstances.

Trooper Ochoa’s body camera footage was admitted into evidence. The footage, by and large, corroborates Trooper Ochoa’s testimony. Following Newton’s arrest, Trooper Ochoa inspected Newton’s truck, documented the damage from the accident, searched the bed of his truck, and looked through the windows with his flashlight. Trooper Ochoa also returned to the scene of the accident with Newton, where Newton explained to him how the accident occurred. Trooper Ochoa transported Newton to the local hospital where, upon arrival, Trooper Ochoa radioed to dispatch to call a magistrate to request a blood draw warrant. While awaiting the magistrate’s arrival, Trooper Ochoa filled out the warrant, but the magistrate arrived before Trooper Ochoa could complete the warrant. Approximately fifteen minutes elapsed between the time the trooper radioed for the magistrate to be called and the time the magistrate handed the signed warrant back to Trooper Ochoa, A hospital nurse drew Newton’s blood for testing and then Trooper Ochoa transported him to the Navarro County Jail, where he was booked.

The trial court granted Newton’s motion to suppress, thereby excluding "[a]ll evidence … obtained by law enforcement after the arrest of [Newton]" as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5).

II. Standard of Review

[1] We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion, using a bifurcated standard. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 48, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give "almost total deference" to the trial court’s findings of historical fact that are supported by the record and to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo the trial court’s determination of the law and its application of law to facts that do not turn upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.

[2–4] When the trial court grants a motion to suppress and files accompanying findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing is the arresting officer, the only question before us is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts it found. See State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 467, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 86–87, 89. Therefore, although due weight "should be given to the inferences drawn by trial judges and law enforcement officers," probable cause determinations are reviewed de novo on appeal. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). "We will uphold the trial judge’s ruling if it is reasonably grounded in the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case." Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

III. Applicable Law

Warrantless arrests are governed by Article 14.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03. As relevant here, a peace officer may arrest a person "found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of … [a] breach of the peace." Id. art. 14.03(a)(1).

[5–10] Few places, if any, are inherently suspicious. LeCourias v. State, 341 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). "A key element in determining whether a site is a suspicious place is the time frame between the alleged offense and the apprehension of the suspect." Id. However, "[a]ny ‘place’ may become suspicious when a person at that location and the accompanying circumstances raise a reasonable belief that the person has committed a crime and exigent circumstances call for immediate action or detention by police." Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Factors that may be considered [for exigent circumstances] include (1) whether the subject of probable cause is likely to leave the scene, (2) whether evidence of criminality is likely to be destroyed, degraded, or lost, and (3) whether the subject of probable cause poses a continuing and present danger to others.

State v. McGuire, No. PD-0984-19, — S.W.3d —, —, 2024 WL 695765, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2024) (plurality op.) (citing Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460, 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (Cochran, J., concurring)). We may also consider how difficult or time-consuming it is to obtain a warrant in relation to the other factors. See id. The natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency but it does not do so categorically. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013); see State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 797–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

To establish probable cause to arrest, the evidence must show that at that moment of the arrest the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense.

Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (cleaned up). "Probable cause is a ‘fluid concept’ that cannot be ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ " Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003)). "Though the concept evades precise definition, it involves ‘a reasonable ground for belief of guilt’ that is ‘particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.’ " Id. (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, 124 S.Ct. 795). Driving while intoxicated constitutes a breach of the peace under Article 14.03(a)(1). Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 42–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Polly v. State, 533 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) ...