State v. Nguyen

1

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAC NGUYEN, Defendant-Appellant

No. CAAP-19-0000061

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii

April 28, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CASE NO 1DTA-18-01758)

On the briefs:

Alen M. Kaneshiro

for Defendant-Appellant

Stephen K. Tsushima

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

for Plaintiff-Appellee

Lisa M. Ginoza Chief Judge, Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge, JJ.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Mac Nguyen (Nguyen) appeals from the (1) October 31, 2018 "Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment," and (2) January 3, 2019 "Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment," both filed and entered by the District Court of the First Circuit (District Court).^[1] After a consolidated bench trial and hearing, the District Court convicted Nguyen of Operating A Vehicle Under The Influence Of An Intoxicant (OVUII), in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1).

On appeal, Nguyen raises three points of error,^[2] contending that (1) the District Court "erred in denying Nguyen's motion to suppress his 'statements,'" which included Nguyen's admission of drinking, "his responses to medical rule-out [(MRO)] questions," and "his performance [on] the [standardized field sobriety test (SFST)]"; (2) the dismissal of the case is required "pursuant to State v. Thompson where the complaint did not meet the requirements of HRS § 805-1"; and (3) the "arraignment on the fatally defective Complaint was a nullity and violated [Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)] Rules 5(b) and 10(a)."

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Nguyen's points of error as follows, and affirm.

The pertinent background is as follows. On May 8, 2018, Nguyen was stopped by Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Jared Spiker (Officer Spiker) after the officer observed Nguyen driving "at a high rate of speed" and fail to stop at two stop signs. Upon approach of Nguyen's vehicle, Officer Spiker noticed a "strong odor of an alcoholic type beverage coming from [Nguyen's] breath and red, watery, glassy eyes." Nguyen's face was flushed and he had "slurred speech." Officer Spiker informed Nguyen that he planned to ask Nguyen to participate in a SFST, to which Nguyen responded that "he just drank 30 minutes ago." Officer Spiker asked Nguyen to exit his vehicle. HPD Officer Richard Townsend (Officer Townsend) arrived to cover Officer Spiker and administer the SFST. When asked by Officer Townsend, Nguyen assented to submitting to the SFST.

Prior to the SFST, Officer Townsend asked Nguyen MRO questions, including whether Nguyen was "on any kind of medication"; "under the care of a doctor or dentist"; "under the care of an eye doctor"; "epileptic or diabetic"; "wearing contacts"; "blind in any of his eyes, or ha[d] an artificial or glass eye"; and whether he "ha[d] any physical defects or speech impediments[.]" Nguyen answered "no" to the medical rule-out questions, and, based on Nguyen's responses, Officer Townsend believed that there was nothing that would physically affect Nguyen's ability to perform the SFST.

Officer Townsend administered the SFST and determined that Nguyen was unable to safely operate his vehicle. Nguyen was placed under arrest and charged with OVUII, in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3).

Nguyen filed a Motion to Suppress Statements (Motion to Suppress), specifically requesting suppression of the following:

1. Any statements made by [Nguyen] to [HPD] Officers or other governmental personnel.

2. Any and all evidence seized or information gained by the [HPD] after [Nguyen] was placed under arrest, was not read his/her Miranda rights or was instructed that he/she did not have a right to have an attorney.

Nguyen principally argued what is the subject matter of the instant appeal -- that he was in custody and subject to interrogation in violation of his Miranda rights when he was stopped by Officer Spiker.

A consolidated hearing on the Motion to Suppress and a bench trial on the OVUII charge was held on October 31, 2018. The State confirmed that it would proceed under HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) and not subsection (a)(3). The District Court denied Nguyen's motion as to his statement that he "just drank thirty minutes ago" because,

[I]t does appear that that [sic] was a spontaneous utterance. It was not in response to any particular question. It was something that was said by the defendant as the officer was conducting his further investigation, you know, in this matter.

As to the SFST, the court denied suppression because "[t]here's nothing to indicate that -- that the field sobriety test was in any way a result of any custodial interrogation under the facts of this case."

At the conclusion of trial on October 31, 2018, the District Court found Nguyen guilty of OVUII, citing Nguyen's speeding, disregard of two stop signs, and performance on the SFST, as evidence that Nguyen "was impaired."^[3] Nguyen timely appealed.

(1) Nguyen argues that because he was never advised of his Miranda^[4] rights when he was pulled over, his "statements," including his admission that he had been drinking, his responses to the MRO questions, and his performance on the SFST, were the product of a custodial interrogation and should all be suppressed.

Questions of constitutional law, such as the District Court's ruling on the motion to suppress, are reviewed "de novo to determine whether the ruling was 'right' or 'wrong.'" State v. Manion, 151 Hawai'i 267, 271-72, 511 P.3d 766, 770-71 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting State v. Lee, 149 Hawai'i 45, 49, 481 P.3d 52, 56 (2021)).

Denial of suppression of Nguyen's admission of drinking was correct.

Nguyen argues that under State v. Tsujimura, 140 Hawai'i 299, 400 P.3d 500 (2017), Nguyen was "seized at the moment that Officer Spiker detained him for the alleged traffic violations" because Nguyen was not free to leave; Nguyen's "prearrest" right to remain silent under the Hawai'i Constitution had attached; and "any post-seizure verbal or non-verbal communicative acts" including the "spontaneous utterance" and SFST performance - - should be suppressed.

In State v. Uchima, 147 Hawai'i 64, 83, 464 P.3d 852, 871 (2020), the Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected this same argument, where Uchima contended that "he had a pre-arrest right to remain silent pursuant to Tsujimura, [and] that his verbal and non-verbal responses should therefore have been suppressed." The Uchima court explained that Tsujimura applies to cases involving a defendant's pre-arrest right to remain silent after being detained, where the State seeks to introduce and use evidence of the defendant's silence against him. Id. Here, as in Uchima, the State did not seek to use evidence of Nguyen's pre-arrest silence against Nguyen; thus, Tsujimura is inapposite.

Nguyen does not present any argument challenging the District Court's finding in its oral ruling that Nguyen's statement that he "just drank thirty minutes ago" was a "spontaneous utterance" that "was not in response to any particular question." An unchallenged finding of fact is binding. State v. Rodrigues, 145 Hawai'i 487, 494, 454 P.3d 428, 435 (citation omitted). As Nguyen's spontaneous admission was not made in response to any express questioning by the officer, and there is no argument that the officer's words or actions otherwise constituted illegal interrogation, there was no Miranda violation. See Uchima, 147 Hawai'i at 84, 464 P.3d at 872 ("[I]nterrogation encompasses not only express questioning, but also any words or actions . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.") (citations omitted). Thus, the District Court was correct in denying the suppression of Nguyen's admission of drinking. See Manion, 151 Hawai'i at 271-72, 511 P.3d at 770-71.

Denial of suppression of Nguyen's responses to the MRO questions was wrong.

Nguyen argues that the MRO questions constituted "interrogation" because they "were specifically designed to rule out any possible causes for irregularities on the SFST other than intoxication." The District Court made no specific findings as to the MRO questions and ruled only that Nguyen was not subject to custodial interrogation. In its Answering Brief, the State did not provide any counter-argument specifically addressing whether the MRO questions constituted interrogation or not. The State did not dispute that Nguyen was in custody or subjected to interrogation, and only raised arguments regarding the admission of Nguyen's SFST performance, which we discuss infra.

"[T]he requirement of Miranda warnings is triggered by two criteria: (1) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the defendant must be in custody." State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i 207, 210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). The State does not challenge Nguyen's contention on appeal that Nguyen was in "custody." In State v. Skapinok, 151 Hawai'i 170, 185, 510 P.3d 599, 614 (2022), the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that "all of the [MRO] questions are interrogation" because "[a]lthough the 'incriminating inference' may be indirect, the questions nevertheless adduce evidence to establish that intoxication caused any poor performance on the SFST."^[5] Thus, Miranda warnings were required prior to the officer asking these questions. See id. Here, no Miranda questions were given, and Nguyen's...