State v. Oden

1

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM NATHANIEL ODEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-40545

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

April 23, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY Dustin K. Hunter District Court Judge

Raul Torrez, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Charles J. Gutierrez Assistant Solicitor General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Mallory E. Harwood, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

{¶1} Defendant William Oden entered a conditional plea agreement in which he entered a plea of no contest to aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (fourth offense), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(D)(1) (2016). Defendant argues (1) the denial of his motion to suppress was error because the arresting deputies either lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop or alternatively stopped Defendant on the basis of pretext; (2) if this Court determines he did not preserve a pretextual stop claim, his counsel was ineffective for not making one; and (3) the denial of his motion to dismiss was error because the State's purported discovery violation warranted dismissal. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

{¶2} Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the procedural history and facts on appeal, we discuss the facts only as they become necessary to our analysis.

I. Motion to Suppress

{¶3} Defendant argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop, whether in connection to a gunshot the arresting deputies heard, or for speeding. Alternatively, Defendant argues that speeding was a pretext for an investigation into the gunshot, for which there was no reasonable suspicion to suspect Defendant's involvement.

{¶4} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. We review factual determinations for substantial evidence and legal determinations de novo." State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 357 P.3d 958 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Our review of a district court's determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed is de novo based on the totality of the circumstances." State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. When reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we "must avoid reweighing individual factors in isolation." State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 12, 410 P.3d 186. In doing so, we view the facts "in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party," indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the court's decision, and disregard all inferences or evidence to the contrary. State v. Werner, 1994-NMSC-025, ¶ 10, 117 N.M. 315, 871 P.2d 971 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶5} An officer may develop reasonable suspicion based on "specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring." State v. Simpson, 2016-NMCA-070, ¶ 11, 388 P.3d 277 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The level of suspicion required for an investigatory stop is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶6} The district court concluded that the arresting deputies had "reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant may have fired a gun from his vehicle" because they saw him speeding in an otherwise unoccupied area immediately after hearing a gunshot. The district court further concluded, "the gunshot caused the [d]eputies to focus their attention on the only other person/vehicle on the road at the time the shot was fired. Deputies then followed Defendant . . . . During the time that L[ieutenant James] Mason was behind Defendant . . ., L[ieutenant] Mason personally observed Defendant exceeding the posted speed limit, providing another basis to stop Defendant based upon the reasonable suspicion that he was violating the traffic laws of the State of New Mexico."

{¶7} Defendant contests the district court's factual findings regarding the geographical area in which the events took place and claims that the evidence presented demonstrates that Defendant could not have fired the shot. As such, Defendant claims the district court did not have substantial evidence to conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant had fired a gun from his vehicle. Defendant otherwise claims the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because there was no objective proof that he was, in fact, speeding.

{¶8} At the hearing on the motion to suppress, two officers testified that they heard a single gunshot in close proximity. Deputy Padilla testified that immediately after the gunshot, she heard Lieutenant Mason over the radio stating that a vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed in the area. Deputy Padilla looked up and saw the same vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed westbound. Lieutenant Mason testified that within seconds of hearing a gunshot he immediately saw a vehicle heading west, that aside from other officers, there were no other vehicles in the area, that he pursued the vehicle but had a difficult time catching up to the vehicle, which was being driven "absolutely over the speed limit."

{¶9} The evidence set forth above supports the arresting deputies' reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have just fired a shot from his vehicle. Each of the testifying deputies confirmed they heard a single gunshot nearby and saw Defendant speeding past immediately thereafter in an otherwise unoccupied area. Cf. State v. Wing, 2022-NMCA-016, ¶ 12, 505 P.3d 905 ("When viewed in conjunction with all the circumstances known to an officer, proximity to the scene of a recent crime may prove significant in determining the reasonableness of a suspicion."); State v. Lovato, 1991-NMCA-083, ¶ 12, 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251 (concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle that matched the description of a car involved in a shooting in the same vicinity, at a time when there were no other vehicles driving in the area); State v. Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-006, ¶¶ 14-15, 387 P.3d 323 (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant where, notwithstanding the lack of suspect's description, the defendant was the only person in the vicinity of a recent report of suspicious activity).

{¶10} Defendant challenges the district court's factual findings regarding the geography of the area and argues that the direction from which the gunshot and the vehicle came, with a proper understanding of the geography, Defendant necessarily could not have fired the shot. The district court did not find that the deputies believed Defendant to be coming from the direction of the shot-just that the shot that they heard was close by and saw Defendant drive by immediately at a high rate of speed thereafter when no other vehicles were in the area. Given the timing and deserted area, the deputies had reason to believe that the vehicle they saw speeding away was connected to the gunshot they had just heard.

{¶11} Further, the deputies had independent reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant had committed a traffic offense-traveling above the speed limit. Cf. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 7, 21, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car for "traveling at an unsafe speed, 35 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour construction zone"). Although Defendant appears to question the deputies' testimony because they did not have objective proof that he was speeding, the district court, acting as fact-finder, properly relied on the deputies' physical observations. See State v. Sanders, 1994-NMSC-043, ¶ 13, 117 N.M. 452, 872 P.2d 870 (concluding that we will only reject testimony that a fact-finder believed "if there is a physical impossibility that the statements are true or the falsity of the statement is apparent without resort to inferences or deductions"). We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress because the officers had reasonable suspicion to pull him over either in connection with the first gunshot and/or for speeding.

{¶12} Defendant offers the alternative argument that the district court should have granted the motion to suppress because speeding was a pretext for an investigation into the gunshot. "A pretextual traffic stop is a detention supportable by reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred, but is executed as a pretense to pursue a hunch, a different more serious investigative agenda for which there is no reasonable suspicion or probable cause." State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 25, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143 (internal quotation marks omitted). Preservation is routinely required for claims of pretext. See Schuster v. N.M. Dep't of Tax'n &Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶ 33, 283 P.3d 288 (addressing whether the appellant preserved his pretext argument); State v. Scharff, 2012-NMCA-087, ¶ 19, 284 P.3d 447 (determining the defendant's pretext argument was not adequately preserved because no testimony was elicited indicating that...