State v. Ortiz

498 P.3d 264

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Nicholas ORTIZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. S-1-SC-38151

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: August 2, 2021

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Kimberly M. Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

THOMSON, Justice

{1} Defendant Nicholas Ortiz was sixteen at the time he committed first-degree, felony murder. The New Mexico Legislature has established three categories of juvenile offenders that govern the sentencing of a "person who is less than eighteen years old." NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-4(B) (1993, as amended through 2019). The Delinquency Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-2-1 to -33 (1993, as amended through 2019), identifies these categories as "delinquent offender[s]," "youthful offender[s]," and "serious youthful offender[s]." See § 32A-2-3(C), (H), (J). We address whether it is constitutionally permissible for the Legislature to exclude serious youthful offenders convicted of first-degree, felony murder from receiving an amenability hearing while providing it to other categories of juvenile offenders.

{2} Delinquent offenders and youthful offenders are sentenced under the Delinquency Act, which provides for a determination of whether a defendant is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile prior to sentencing. See § 32A-2-19(B); § 32A-2-20(B)(1). This "special proceeding" is "known as an amenability hearing." State v. Jones , 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 13, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474 ; see § 32A-2-19(B) (requiring a court in its "[d]isposition of an adjudicated delinquent offender" to determine whether "treatment is likely to be beneficial"); § 32A-2-20(B)(1) (requiring a court in its "[d]isposition of a youthful offender" to "invoke an adult sentence [if] the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities"). However, serious youthful offenders convicted of first-degree murder are not juveniles within the meaning of the Delinquency Act and are therefore sentenced as adults under the Criminal Sentencing Act. See NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15.3(D) (1993) (establishing the sentencing procedure when a "serious youthful offender is found guilty of first degree murder"); but see § 31-18-15.3(F) (requiring that the court's disposition shall be "pursuant to the provisions of Section ... 32A-2-19 or 32A-2-20" when a "serious youthful offender is convicted of a lesser offense than first degree murder"). Like Defendant, serious youthful offenders are sentenced without an opportunity for an amenability hearing. Section § 31-18-15.3(D).

{3} Defendant appeals his criminal sentence on two grounds. First, he argues that his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution was violated because he was not afforded an amenability hearing. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII ; N.M. Const., art. II, § 13. Second, he argues that he was denied equal protection under the law because he was statutorily excluded from receiving an amenability hearing, a process that is guaranteed to youthful offenders who share his requisite criminal intent. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; N.M. Const. art. II, § 18 ; see also § 32A-2-20(B) (providing for an amenability hearing for youthful offenders).

{4} We conclude that the sentencing procedure applied to Defendant that did not afford him an amenability hearing does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We further conclude that a rational basis exists for the Legislature's decision to establish the separate categories that govern the procedure afforded to disparate offenders under the Delinquency Act. Because the facial constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme fails, our inquiry ends there. Reviewing juvenile sentencing procedures for consistency with our society's evolving standards of decency is a laudable endeavor. However, as in this case, such matters of public policy are best addressed by the Legislature. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson , 1998-NMSC-015, ¶ 21, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768 ("It is the particular domain of the [L]egislature, as the voice of the people, to make public policy." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

I. BACKGROUND

{5} On June 19, 2011, New Mexico State Police officers responded to a call from Cherie Rios stating that she had found her mother (Dixie), father (Lloyd), and brother (Steven) (collectively, "Ortiz family") deceased in their home. All three were killed by blows from a pickaxe. Nearly four years later, Defendant was arrested and charged with three counts of first-degree murder, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and one count of tampering with evidence related to the deaths of the Ortiz family.

{6} Cousins Ashley Roybal and Jose Roybal were with Defendant throughout the night and early morning when the murders took place. They provided most of the details of the events through a series of interviews with police and testimony at trial. Although their accounts of who came up with the plan and who procured the weapon were sometimes inconsistent, both identify Defendant as the only one who entered the Ortiz home on the night in question.

{7} Jose testified that he, Ashley, and Defendant decided to burglarize the Ortiz home because they were "[t]rying to figure out how to get money," and that Defendant, having spent time in the Ortiz home, "knew there was money there." Ashley maintained that she was not involved in planning the burglary, while Jose identified Ashley as the one who urged him and Defendant to kill the Ortiz family. The plan was for Defendant to "enter the house [and] murder the family," and for Jose to follow "and help him collect everything that was to be t[a]ken." With the plan devised and the materials procured, Ashley drove Jose and Defendant to a location near the Ortiz house and dropped them off in the early hours of the morning.

{8} Jose testified that once they arrived at the home, he refused to go inside to assist with the murders and pleaded with Defendant not to go through with the plan. Defendant became frustrated with Jose, told him to wait, and proceeded towards the Ortiz home as Jose fled the scene on foot. Less than an hour later, Defendant called Ashley and told her that he needed to be picked up near the Ortiz home. When Ashley picked up Defendant, she described him as having a plastic bag around one of his feet and what appeared to be blood on his clothes. While driving back to her grandparents’ house, Ashley and Defendant passed Jose. Jose asked Defendant if he did it, and Defendant responded, "yea[h] and I fucked up. I didn't get the money."

{9} The three met up again at Jose and Ashley's grandparents’ house where Jose described Defendant as "extremely shooken [sic] up," "extremely terrified, scared," and "[not] like I had seen him before." On Ashley's suggestion, Defendant showered, where, according to testimony, he was heard crying. Ashley then gave Defendant a change of clothes and drove him home, and "[Defendant] cried the entire way."

{10} The next day, Defendant told Ashley that he killed "them" with a pickaxe, but did not specify to whom he was referring. He also stated that Jose was supposed to help but "punked out," so he went into the house by himself. He threatened Ashley, telling her to not say anything, and she believed that he would kill her if she came forward. Defendant eventually was arrested for the murders and convicted of three counts of felony murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary.¹

{11} Prior to sentencing, Defendant filed a motion arguing that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the constitutional guarantee of equal protection require "an amenability hearing in conjunction with this Court's sentencing." The district court held a hearing on the motion. However, due to a weather-related flight delay, Defendant's primary expert in support of his motion was unable to appear in person and was not allowed to appear by telephone. The hearing went on without the expert. Defendant filed an additional request for a hearing on the motion, which the district court denied.

{12} The district court entered its Judgment and Order of Commitment, sentencing Defendant to three counts of first-degree, felony murder and one count of conspiracy. The stand-alone charge for aggravated burglary was vacated. In his sentencing memorandum, Defendant requested that the district court "utilize its sentencing authority under [ Section] 31-18-15.3 [and NMSA 1978, Section] 31-18-15.1(G) [(2009)] to sentence him as a serious youthful offender to less than the mandatory sentence," which the court did. While the district court could have sentenced Defendant to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, it instead ran all of his sentences concurrently for a total of twenty-five years. See NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A) (1994) (first-degree murder is a capital felony); NMSA 1978, § 31-18-14 (2009) (the sentence for conviction of a capital felony is life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole). Defendant appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Categories of Child Offenders

{13} Determining how juvenile offenders are treated for purposes of sentencing requires an analysis of the interplay between the Delinquency Act and the Criminal Sentencing Act. The State's sentencing structure provides varying degrees of procedural protections for three categories of juvenile offenders: delinquent offenders,² youthful offenders, and serious youthful offenders. As we discuss, the serious youthful offenders category is the only category of juvenile offenders not guaranteed an amenability hearing before being sentenced.

{14} Under the Delinquency Act, a...