State v. Ouellette

314 A.3d 253

2024 ME 29

STATE of Maine

v.Roger OUELLETTE

Docket: Ken-23-12

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: October 5, 2023

Decided: April 18, 2024

Jamesa J. Drake, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, Auburn, for appellant Roger Ouellette

Jacob Demosthenes, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.^*

STANFILL, C.J.

[¶1] Roger Ouellette appeals from a judgment of conviction of OUI entered in the trial court (Kennebec County, Cashman, J.) upon a conditional guilty plea. Ouellette entered the plea after the court (Stokes, J.) denied his motion to suppress evidence the police obtained after stopping him in his driveway. On appeal, Ouellette raises an argument he did not present to the suppression court: that the stop was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it occurred within the curtilage of his home without a warrant and without any applicable exception to the warrant requirement. We affirm the judgment because we conclude that the court’s failure to grant Ouellette’s motion on that ground did not constitute obvious error and because the court did not err in determining that the stop was otherwise justified.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The suppression court found the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence in the record and which we view in the light most favorable to the court’s decision. See State v. McNaughton, 2017 ME 173, ¶¶ 10, 28, 168 A.3d 807; State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 1003. During the evening of February 1, 2020, a police officer was patrolling Route 126 in Litchfield, looking for impaired drivers coming from a local restaurant that he had heard was overserving alcohol. As the officer was heading west toward the restaurant, he observed a vehicle driving east toward him. The vehicle crossed over the center yellow double line and traveled partially in the officer’s lane, enough so that the officer needed to move over in his lane to pass the vehicle safely. The officer considered that the driver’s operation was a violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2051(1) (2023).

[¶3] The officer continued driving west until he lost sight of the vehicle’s lights and then turned his cruiser around. After heading east for a short distance, he regained sight of the vehicle and saw that it was parked, with its lights still on, near a building that looked like a residence. The officer pulled over and watched the vehicle for a few minutes to see if it would move. He then continued driving east, past the vehicle, and pulled over at a side road and waited again. After about ten minutes, he drove west past the vehicle again, which was still parked with its lights on, and then turned around, parked, and continued to watch.

[¶4] At some point, the officer saw the vehicle drive quickly across Route 126 onto an icy "camp road" that was directly across from where the vehicle had been parked. The officer followed the vehicle onto that road, and he thought that it was driving faster than he would have expected, given the conditions. He saw the vehicle turn into a driveway, and he then saw the driver’s side door open and the driver, Ouellette, get out and slip on the icy surface. He pulled into the driveway behind Ouellette’s vehicle, activated his cruiser’s blue emergency lights, and then "approached [Ouellette] in the driveway and questioned him."

[¶5] Based on evidence obtained as a result of the stop, the State charged Ouellette by complaint with OUI (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A), (5)(A)(3)(a)(i) (2023). After pleading not guilty, Ouellette filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing only that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to justify the stop under the United States and Maine Constitutions. See State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984 (describing the objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that must exist to justify a brief, warrantless, investigatory vehicle stop).

[¶6] The court held an evidentiary hearing on Ouellette’s motion. During the hearing, the parties and the court discussed, at some length, the legal basis for Ouellette’s motion. Ouellette ultimately stated that his argument was "twofold": "the lack of [reasonable articulable suspicion], but it’s also a lack of probable cause for … this seizure … [, which] turns into a de facto arrest with . . how the conversation unfolds." The parties did not present oral closing arguments; instead, they agreed to submit written memoranda after the hearing.

[¶7] In his memorandum, Ouellette first argued that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion of either OUI or a traffic violation to support the stop. He then argued that the stop was not one that could be justified absent reasonable articulable suspicion because the severity of the officer’s "interference with [his] liberty interests" outweighed the "gravity of the public interest served by the investigatory stop." In making this second argument, Ouellette cited a line of cases in which we and the United States Supreme Court have held that "that even in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, a seizure for information-seeking purposes" may still be reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. State v. LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, ¶ 8, 26 A.3d 337 (emphasis added); see State v. Whitney, 2012 ME 105, ¶ 10, 54 A.3d 1284 ("[S]pecial law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without individualized suspicion." (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004))); Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424-27, 124 S.Ct. 885. Ouellette did not argue at any time in the trial court that the seizure was unlawful even if it was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause because it had occurred within the curtilage of his home without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.

[¶8] The court denied Ouellette’s motion in a written order. The court concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred because the stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that Ouellette had violated the motor vehicle statute requiring vehicles to be "operated as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane" on a divided, two-lane public way, 29-A M.R.S. § 2051(1). Addressing Ouellette’s second argument, the court determined that it therefore did not need to examine whether the stop would have been justified even absent reasonable articulable suspicion of any wrongdoing. The court did not make findings relevant to whether the stop was within the curtilage of the home or to any exceptions to the warrant requirement, and Ouellette did not move for further findings. Cf. M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d); State v. Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶¶ 18-19, 143 A.3d 124.

[¶9] Ouellette entered a conditional plea of guilty, and the court (Cashman, J.) entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a sentence (stayed pending appeal) of twenty days in jail, a $500 fine, and a license suspension. Ouellette appeals. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2023).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶10] Before us, Ouellette argues that the officer’s seizure of him was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it took place in an area that was part of his home’s curtilage without a warrant and that no exception to the warrant requirement applied.¹ The State argues that Ouellette’s argument is unpreserved, that the trial court’s failure to grant Ouellette’s motion on these grounds did not amount to obvious error, and that the court correctly concluded that the stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

A. Standards of Review

[1–3] [¶11] "We will uphold the court’s denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court’s decision." State v. Wai Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 13, 236 A.3d 471 (quotation marks omitted). Generally, "we review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo." Id. Absent a motion for further findings, we assume the court found the facts necessary to support its judgment as long as the record contains evidence that would support those assumed findings. Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶ 19, 143 A.3d 124; see State v. Cefalo, 396 A.2d 233, 239 n.12 (Me. 1979); M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d).

[4–7] [¶12] "An issue is preserved for appellate review if there is a sufficient basis in the record to alert the trial court and the opposing party to the existence of the issue." State v. Reeves, 2022 ME 10, ¶ 35, 268 A.3d 281. "[T]he suppression movant must articulate in his motion with sufficient particularity the specific reason on which he bases his claim that the seizure without warrant was illegal, so that the court will recognize the issue to be decided."² State v. Desjardins, 401 A.2d 165, 169 (Me. 1979); see M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(a), (c). Issues that are unpreserved for appeal are reviewed only for obvious error, State v. True, 2017 ME 2, ¶ 15 & n.6, 153 A.3d 106; see M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b), which is an error that "is plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings," Reeves, 2022 ME 10, ¶ 37, 268 A.3d 281 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). "An error cannot be plain unless the error is so clear under current law that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it." Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

B. Curtilage

1. Preservation

[8] [¶13] As we have discussed, the central argument that Ouellette raises on appeal is that he was seized within the curtilage of his home, an area afforded special protection under the Fourth Amendment, and that therefore a warrant supported by probable cause (or an exception to the warrant requirement) was required for the intrusion to be lawful. Ouellette did not discuss any of the critical...