State v. Parrish

1

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JEFFREY RANDALL PARRISH, Appellant.

No. 58805-6-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

December 3, 2024

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Glasgow, J.

Parrish was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine in 2008. The court found that he had the ability or future ability to pay and ordered him to pay $2,350 in various legal financial obligations (LFOs). Parrish asked the court to permit him to satisfy a portion of his LFOs by performing community service. The court granted the request but did not make a finding that Parrish was indigent.

In 2021, the Washington Supreme Court held in State v Blake^[1] that Washington's strict liability drug possession statute^[2] was void because it violated due process. Parrish then moved to vacate his conviction and for an LFO refund under CrR 7.8. He asked the court to refund the cash equivalent of the community service labor that he performed to satisfy his LFOs, in addition to refunding his cash payments. The court granted the motion in part, vacated his conviction, and ordered a refund of $620 in cash payments, but declined to order reimbursement for Parrish's community service.

Parrish appeals the court's partial denial of his CrR 7.8 motion. He argues that refusing to reimburse him for his community service violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He also argues that the trial court erred by treating his CrR 7.8 motion as a civil claim for damages. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

I. Background

In 2008, Parrish pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance under former RCW 69.50.4013(1) (2003). The court considered Parrish's financial resources and found that he had the ability or likely future ability to pay LFOs. The court ordered him to pay $2,350 in LFOs including costs, fees, and restitution. No LFOs were waived or suspended due to indigency. The court also ordered Parrish to perform 240 hours of community service in lieu of jail time.

A. Conversion of LFOs

Parrish continued to perform community service after completing his required community service hours. Parrish asked the court to permit him to satisfy his LFOs by performing community service and to apply his excess community service hours to the balance of his LFOs. The court ordered that Parrish "will be allowed to perform community service work hours and they will be converted at minimum wage [$8.55 per hour] to be applied to defendant's legal financial obligations." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 40. The court also ordered that Parrish's excess community service already performed could be credited toward his nonrestitution LFOs. The court did not find Parrish to be indigent or otherwise discuss its reason for allowing community service in lieu of payment.

B. Satisfaction of LFOs and Subsequent Procedure

Parrish petitioned for discharge after completing 276 hours of community service to be credited toward his LFOs. The State agrees that these hours amounted to about $2,360 in LFO credit and that these hours satisfied all of Parrish's LFOs. The court ordered that Parrish's judgment was satisfied in December of 2010.

Parrish was later arrested twice on pay or appear warrants as the result of an apparent clerical error. Due to the arrests, Parrish paid warrant fees and forfeited cash bail The parties agree that including these payments, Parrish ultimately paid a total of $620 in cash toward LFOs in addition to his community service hours.

II. Post-Blake Procedure

In 2021, the Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Blake that Washington's strict liability drug possession statute, former RCW 69.50.4013(1), was void because it violated due process. 197 Wn.2d at 174.

Parrish moved to vacate his conviction and for an LFO refund under CrR 7.8(b)(4) and (5), because his conviction was void under Blake. Parrish asked the court to refund $620 and to reimburse the remainder of his LFOs that were satisfied through community service. Parrish specified that he was "not seeking damages" and was "not seeking reimbursement for community restitution work done in excess of the total imposed judgment." CP at 22.

Parrish argued that reimbursement of his community service hours was required under the principles of substantive due process, equal protection, and unjust enrichment. Parrish acknowledged that "we don't have a specific order finding the indigence" to show that his indigence was the cause of any disparate treatment. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 5. However, he argued that the court should infer his indigence because he was assigned counsel. The State responded that Parrish's community service benefitted the organizations he volunteered for but did not confer a benefit on the State.

The court granted Parrish's motion in part, vacating his conviction and refunding the $620 in cash payments. The court explained that the State did not directly receive a benefit from Parrish's community service hours and that "in the context of these criminal proceedings," there was not a basis for reimbursement for community service hours. VRP at 22. The court noted that there might be a civil avenue for recovery and that "to the extent that we're operating in a world of restitution," Parrish's labor did not directly benefit the State. Id. The court adopted Parrish's proposed written order but crossed out a paragraph that would have certified a refund of approximately $2,360 for the community service he performed. Parrish appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. Substantive Due Process

Parrish argues that the trial court violated due process when it refused to reimburse him for community service hours worked to satisfy his LFOs. We disagree.

A. Substantive Due Process Framework

The Fourteenth Amendment protects people from deprivations of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause provides substantive and procedural protections. Romero v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 30 Wn.App. 2d 323, 345, 544 P.3d 1083 (2024). The two inquiries are distinct: substantive due process "requires deprivations of life, liberty, or property to be substantively reasonable," whereas procedural due process entitles individuals to "'notice . . . and an opportunity to be heard to guard against erroneous deprivation.'" Id. at 339, 345 (quoting Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208, 216, 143 P.3d 571 (2006)).

We review substantive due process challenges de novo. In re Adoption of K.M.T., 195 Wn.App. 548, 559, 381 P.3d 1210 (2016). Our substantive due process inquiry begins with "'the nature of the right involved.'" Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 689, 451 P.3d 694 (2019) (quoting Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 219). If the government has interfered with a fundamental right, we apply strict scrutiny and ask whether "'the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'" Id. (quoting Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 220). If the "'state action does not affect a fundamental right, the proper standard of review is rational basis.'" Id. (quoting Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 222). The rational basis test asks whether the challenged deprivation was "'rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" Id. (quoting Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 222).

B. Parrish Has Not Identified A Fundamental Right

Parrish asserts that we should apply strict scrutiny, relying on Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 137 S.Ct. 1249, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 (2017), to argue that there is a "fundamental right to restoration" after a conviction is reversed, including reimbursement for work performed in lieu of payment of his LFOs. Br. of Appellant at 6. But Nelson v. Colorado performed a procedural due process analysis, so its reasoning does not support a substantive due process claim. 581 U.S. at 134-35. We agree with the State that Parrish has not identified a fundamental right that would trigger strict scrutiny within our substantive due process analysis.

In Nelson v. Colorado, the Supreme Court addressed procedural due process and applied the Mathews v. Eldridge^[3] balancing test to Colorado's process for obtaining reimbursement of fees paid pursuant to overturned convictions. Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. at 135. Mathews requires courts to balance three factors in a procedural due process challenge: the private interest affected by the challenged procedure; the risk of erroneous deprivation under the challenged procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting the challenged procedure. 424 U.S. at 335.

In addressing the private interests affected by the Colorado law, the Court explained that the petitioners had "an obvious interest in regaining the money they paid to Colorado" because once their "convictions were erased, the presumption of their innocence was restored." Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. at 135. The Court characterized the presumption of innocence as "'[a]xiomatic and elementary'" to the "'foundation of our criminal law.'" Id. at 135-36 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895)). As for the governmental interest in the money, the Court explained, "Colorado has no interest in withholding from [petitioners] money to which the State currently has zero claim of right." Id. at 139. The Court ultimately concluded that the Colorado law was procedurally deficient under the Mathews test. Id.

As a panel of this court recently explained, the Nelson v Colorado Court referred to a foundational principle in criminal law, it did so in the context of weighing the private interest affected by the Colorado law and did not articulate a fundamental right associated with the reimbursement of funds after an overturned...