State v. Patterson

196 Wash.App. 451

389 P.3d 612

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Dennis Wallace PATTERSON, Appellant.

No. 33814-2-III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

October 20, 2016

Stephanie C. Cunningham, Attorney at Law, 4616 25th Ave. N.E., # 552, Seattle, WA, 98105-4183, for Appellant.

Lech Radzimski, Jessica Taylor Reeves, Stevens County Prosecutor's Office, 215 S. Oak St., Ste. 114, Colville, WA, 99114-2836, for Respondent.

OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART

Lawrence-Berrey, J.¶1 Dennis Patterson appeals his convictions for disorderly conduct and interference with a court. He argues a provision of the disorderly conduct statute, RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b), is unconstitutionally overbroad and infringes on protected speech. He also argues the State presented insufficient evidence of his intent to disrupt or interfere with court proceedings.

¶2 In the published part of this opinion, we conclude the challenged provision of the disorderly conduct statute does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, and therefore is not overbroad. In the unpublished part of this opinion, we reject his second argument and his argument contained in his statement of additional grounds for review (SAG). We therefore affirm.

FACTS

¶3 Mr. Patterson believes that several elected Stevens County officials, including judges, are not authorized to perform the duties of their offices because they have not complied with state laws relating to taking, filing, and bonding their oaths of office. Although he has brought his concerns to the attention of county and state officials, his concerns have not been addressed to his satisfaction. Believing that certain county officials, including District Court Judge Gina Tveit, were acting outside of the law, Mr. Patterson believed his only option was to present his grievance in person to Judge Tveit in her courtroom before she called a session to order.

¶4 On the morning of January 5, 2015, Mr. Patterson and several others who shared his beliefs gathered in the gallery of Judge Tveit's courtroom. Judge Tveit hears the traffic infraction docket on Monday mornings, and her courtroom was full that morning with people waiting to have their infractions considered by her. As Judge Tveit entered the courtroom, Mr. Patterson remained standing and began to loudly read his prepared statement. Judge Tveit told Mr. Patterson that court was in session, but he interrupted her and continued explaining why she lacked authority to judge anyone. Judge Tveit, trying to speak over Mr. Patterson, said a court rule prohibited persons in the audience from speaking. Continuing, she explained court proceedings were recorded, and the reason audience members were prohibited from speaking was to preserve the full record. Judge Tveit, still attempting to speak over Mr. Patterson, said his loud speaking was disrupting court proceedings. She then declared court was in recess, and ordered him to leave. Mr. Patterson continued to question the judge's authority.

¶5 A deputy sheriff stationed in the courtroom approached Mr. Patterson and told him he was trespassing. Mr. Patterson did not leave. The deputy physically removed Mr. Patterson from the courtroom and placed him under arrest. As this was happening, another man in the courtroom began to loudly read a prepared statement. He, too, was removed.

¶6 Judge Tveit returned to the courtroom. Proceedings were immediately interrupted again by a third person loudly reading a statement. Once this third person was removed from the courtroom, order was restored and Judge Tveit was able to proceed with the morning infraction docket. The interruptions delayed court proceedings by 20 minutes.

¶7 The State charged Mr. Patterson with disorderly conduct and interference with a court. At the trial, Judge Tveit testified she has a duty to maintain control of the courtroom, and order is important for effective and efficient administration of court business. She testified she recessed court that Monday morning because Mr. Patterson would not stop talking loudly, and his actions prevented her from hearing cases. Judge Tveit acknowledged there is no procedure in place for a citizen to directly address a judge if they have a grievance or issue with that judge. And a sign posted outside the courtroom informs the public that contact or conversation with a judge outside of the courtroom is prohibited.

¶8 A jury found Mr. Patterson guilty of both counts. He appeals his convictions.

ANALYSIS

A. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO PROVISION OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT STATUTE

¶9 Mr. Patterson first argues the provision of the disorderly conduct statute under which he was convicted is overbroad and infringes on constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution.

¶10 The interpretation of constitutional provisions and legislative enactments presents a question of law reviewed de novo. City of Spokane v. Rothwell , 166 Wash.2d 872, 876, 215 P.3d 162 (2009) ; Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State , 167 Wash.2d 514, 523, 219 P.3d 941 (2009). Generally, legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. State v. Bahl , 164 Wash.2d 739, 753, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). The party challenging an enactment has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Voters Educ. Comm. v. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n , 161 Wash.2d 470, 481, 166 P.3d 1174 (2007). But in the free speech context, " ‘the State usually bears the burden of justifying a restriction on speech.’ " State v. Immelt , 173 Wash.2d 1, 6, 267 P.3d 305 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Voters Educ. Comm. , 161 Wash.2d at 482, 166 P.3d 1174 ).

¶11 The disorderly conduct statute, RCW 9A.84.030, makes it a misdemeanor to engage in four proscribed forms of speech and/or conduct. The provision at issue here is RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b). It provides that:

(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if the person:

....(b) Intentionally disrupts any lawful assembly or meeting of persons without lawful authority.

RCW 9A.84.030.

¶12 Mr. Patterson makes a facial overbreadth challenge to this provision. In a facial challenge, a person may argue the statute is overbroad without first demonstrating that his or her own conduct could not be regulated by a sufficiently specific statute. Immelt , 173 Wash.2d at 7, 267 P.3d 305. Such a challenge is permitted because

First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is largely prophylactic, aimed at preventing any "chilling" of constitutionally protected expression. As a result, courts will permit facial overbreadth challenges when the statute in question chills or burdens constitutionally protected conduct. Overbreadth doctrine also has a constitutionally mandated "core", in which a defendant has a right not to be sanctioned except under a constitutionally valid rule of law. When a defendant convicted under a criminal statute challenges the statute as overbroad, he or she is asserting that the conviction rests on an unconstitutional law. Application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine, however, and should be employed by a court sparingly and only as a last resort.

State v. Halstien , 122 Wash.2d 109, 122, 857 P.2d 270 (1993) (citations omitted).

¶13 "[O]ur article I, section 5 analysis of overbreadth follows the analysis under the First Amendment." Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg'l Library Dist. , 168 Wash.2d 789, 804, 231 P.3d 166 (2010). A court's first task in an overbreadth challenge is to determine whether the enactment at issue reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech or expressive conduct. Immelt , 173 Wash.2d at 7, 267 P.3d 305 ; City of Houston v. Hill , 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). An enactment is overbroad if it " ‘sweeps within its prohibitions' " a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Immelt , 173 Wash.2d at 6, 267 P.3d 305 (quoting City of Tacoma v. Luvene , 118 Wash.2d 826, 839, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992) ). Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with "particular care," and those that make a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech unlawful may be held facially invalid even if there is also a legitimate application. Hill , 482 U.S. at 459, 107 S.Ct. 2502. But "[a] statute or ordinance will be overturned only if the court is unable to place a sufficiently limiting construction on a standardless sweep of legislation." Luvene , 118 Wash.2d at 840, 827 P.2d 1374.

¶14 To determine whether a statute sweeps too broadly, we must first construe it. We will abstain from declaring a statute unconstitutional if we can fairly give the statute a narrow construction. "In cases involving a facial challenge to a statute, the pivotal question in determining whether abstention is appropriate is whether the statute is ‘fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the ... constitutional question.’ " Hill , 482 U.S. at 468, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius , 380 U.S. 528, 534–35, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965) ).

¶15 The provision here is short and direct, with few words or phrases subject to judicial construction. One word that requires judicial construction is "disrupt." That word can be construed to mean a slight disruption or to mean a substantial disruption. One phrase that requires judicial construction is the exception, "without lawful authority." The lawful authority exception can refer to law enforcement or it can refer to any specific recognized authority—such as a principal in a school or a teacher in a classroom. So to render RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b) constitutional, we give the scope of the statute a narrow reading, and the exception a broad reading. Therefore, we hold RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b) requires the State to prove the intentional disruption was substantial, meaning that it reasonably caused the meeting to be delayed or canceled. We also hold that the State must prove the disrupter did not have...