State v. La Paz

899 S.E.2d 447

The STATE

v.DE LA PAZ.

A23A1769

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 8, 2024

Carlton Todd Hayes, David Martin McElyea, for Appellant.

Jeffery L. Dickerson, for Appellee.

Land, Judge.

The State appeals from the trial court’s grant of defendant Jesus de la Paz’s motion to suppress the results of a blood test for drugs. The trial court held that a warrant authorizing the drawing and testing of de la Paz’s blood for alcohol did not also authorize the testing of that same blood for drugs. The State argues that the trial court erred because it did not read the affidavit and application for the search warrant in pari materia with the search warrant itself and conflated the drawing of de la Paz’s blood with the analysis of that blood. The State also argues that the testing of de la Paz’s blood for drugs was reasonable under the circumstances. Because the warrant in this case was specifically limited to the drawing and testing of de la Paz’s blood for alcohol (with no mention made of testing for drugs), we disagree with the State and affirm the ruling of the trial court.

[1–3] "In reviewing the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress, we apply the well-established principles that the trial court’s findings as to disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous and the trial court's application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Wilson, 315 Ga. 613, 613, 884 S.E.2d 298 (2023). "Moreover, we bear in mind that the State has the burden of proving that evidence challenged in a motion to suppress is admissible." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Boles v. State, 316 Ga. 209, 219 (3), 887 S.E.2d 304 (2023).

So viewed, the record shows that on February 27, 2022, around 3:00 a.m., Cherokee County sheriff’s deputy Shauna Murphey arrived at a traffic stop to assist another deputy with a DUI investigation. During the DUI investigation, de la Paz arrived and told officers he was there to pick up some of the juvenile passengers on the scene. Deputy Murphey spoke with de la Paz, noticed that he smelled of alcohol and had "extremely bloodshot and glassy eyes," and asked whether he had been drinking. De la Paz admitted to consuming alcohol "within several hours of operating the motor vehicle" and agreed to participate in a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety evaluation. De la Paz exhibited four of six clues of impairment but declined to perform the walk-and-turn or one-leg stand evaluation due to a broken foot. Deputy Murphey then placed de la Paz under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-39 (a) (1).

[4] After placing de la Paz under arrest, Deputy Murphey read him the Georgia implied consent notice for suspects age 21 and over¹ and requested that he consent to a blood test. De la Paz declined. Deputy Murphey then completed an affidavit and application for a search warrant, stating that she "detected the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming" from de la Paz, that de la Paz had "extremely blood shot and glassy eyes," and that de la Paz "admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages within several hours" of driving. "Given the totality of the circumstances," Deputy Murphey attested that "there [was] sufficient evidence of the crime of Driving Under the Influence in the blood of the defendant." The affidavit and application "request[ed] two vials of blood to be drawn by qualified medical personnel from the defendant, to be placed in a GBI blood alcohol toxicology kit for evidence" and identified OCGA § 40-6-39 (a) (1), driving under the influence of alcohol, as the suspected crime justifying the warrant. Neither the affidavit nor the application made any reference to suspicion of drug use.² Deputy Murphey’s application was granted by a Cherokee County magistrate judge at 4:39 a.m., and a search warrant was issued for "two vials of blood to be drawn by qualified medical personnel from the defendant, to be placed into a GBI blood alcohol toxicology kit for evidence" of the crime of "[OCGA §] 40-6-391 (a) (1) Dui-Driving Under The Influence Of Alcohol."

The GBI tested de la Paz’s blood for alcohol, and results showed a blood alcohol content under the legal limit of .08%.³ Without the benefit of a warrant authorizing testing for drugs, the blood was later re-tested for substances other than alcohol. Results showed the presence of a muscle relaxer. De la Paz was charged with one count of driving under the influence (less safe) (alcohol), two counts of driving under the influence (less safe) (drugs), one count of driving under the influence (less safe) (combined influence), and one count of failure to maintain lane.

De la Paz then filed a motion to suppress the results of the May 10 blood test for drugs, arguing that the testing of his blood for drugs "exceeded the scope of the search warrant." De la Paz did not challenge the blood draw itself or the test for alcohol. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion based on the fact that both the search warrant application and the search warrant limited the scope of the search to evidence of a violation under OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), driving under the influence of alcohol. This appeal followed.

1. The State argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress because it did not read the affidavit for the search warrant in pari materia with the search warrant itself, and because it conflated the drawing of de la Paz’s blood with the analysis of that blood. We disagree.

[5] OCGA § 40-6-391(a) establishes one crime of driving with impaired ability which may be committed in several alternative ways. See Sapp v. State, 184 Ga. App. 527, 527 (2), 362 S.E.2d 406 (1987). See also Smith v. State, 338 Ga. App. 635, 640 (5), 791 S.E.2d 418 (2016) ("OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) establishes a single crime of driving in a prohibited condition and subsections (1) through (5) merely define different ways of committing that one crime.") (citation omitted). As a result, "different facts are required to prove the alternative methods of committing the crime." Smith v. State, 239 Ga. App. 515, 516 (1), 521 S.E.2d 450 (1999). For example, while subsection (a) (1) prohibits a person from driving "[u]nder the influence of alcohol to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive," subsection (a) (2) prohibits a person from driving "[u]nder the influence of any drug to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive." (Emphasis supplied).

[6–9] "One advantage of blood tests is their ability to detect not just alcohol but also other substances that can impair a driver’s ability to operate a car safely." Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U. S. 438, 474, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). See also Meiklejohn v. State, 281 Ga. App. 712, 714, 637 S.E.2d 117 (2006) (noting that "until the [blood] testing is performed, the state may not know the exact nature of the violation" of OCGA § 40-6-391), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Osterloh, 342 Ga. App. 668, 672 n.16, 804 S.E.2d 696 (2017). An officer's authority to request, at the time of surest, that a driver submit to chemical testing for alcohol or drugs derives from the implied consent provisions of OCGA § 40-5-55 (a). See Massey v. State, 331 Ga. App. 430, 432 (1), 771 S.E.2d 122 (2015). But because blood draws require a physical intrusion into the body, they impact an individual’s privacy interests and, absent consent, require a warrant. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 143, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (motorists have a "privacy interest in preventing a government agent from piercing their skin"). Thus, in the absence of consent, "a suspect’s right under the Fourth Amendment to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the compelled withdrawal of blood, and the extraction of blood is a search within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Bowman, 337 Ga. App. 313, 315, 787 S.E.2d 284 (2016).

[10–15] A search warrant "may issue only upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed." (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Jones v. State, 313 Ga. App. 590, 593 (2), 722 S.E.2d 202 (2012). "The warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized and the search must be limited to that matter described." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Grant v. State, 220 Ga. App. 604, 607 (1), 469 S.E.2d 826 (1996). "Searches unsupported by independent probable cause that extend beyond the descriptions contained in the warrant are illegal." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Dills, 237 Ga. App. 165, 167, 514 S.E.2d 917 (1999). However, "the particularity requirement must be applied with a practical margin of flexibility, depending on the type of property to be seized, and a description of property will be acceptable if it is as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under investigation permit." (Citation omitted.) Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668, 675 (2), 853 S.E.2d 650 (2021); Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 184 (2) (d), 664 S.E.2d 211 (2008) ("the Fourth Amendment’s commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract"). Thus, when determining whether probable cause for a search warrant exists, a magistrate must make "a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Csehy v. State, 346 Ga. App. 747, 754 (2), 816 S.E.2d 833 (2018).

[16] (a) In this case, it is clear that the search warrant is limited to the testing of de la Paz’s blood for alcohol, with no authorization given for the testing for drugs. Similarly, the affidavit and application in support of...