State v. Peeler

183 Wash.2d 169

349 P.3d 842

STATE of Washington, Petitioner

v.Ryan James PEELER, Respondent.

No. 90068–0.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Jan. 20, 2015.

Decided May 7, 2015.

Erik Pedersen, Attorney at Law, Skagit Co. Prosc. Atty. Ofc., Skagit County Prosecuting Atty., Attorney at Law, Mount Vernon, WA, for Petitioner.

Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Suzanne Lee Elliott, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for amicus counsel for Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Pamela Beth Loginsky, Washington Assoc. of Prosecuting Atty., Olympia, WA, for amicus counsel for Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

Opinion

GORDON McCLOUD, J.

¶ 1 The intrastate detainers act (IDA), chapter 9.98 RCW, requires the State to bring a Washington State prisoner to trial for any untried charge within 120 days of the prisoner's request for a final disposition. RCW 9.98.010. Ryan Peeler was serving a prison sentence on a Snohomish County charge at the Washington Corrections Center (WCC) when he requested a final disposition of an untried charge in Skagit County. By the time that the Skagit County prosecutor received Peeler's final disposition request, however, the Department of Corrections (DOC) had transported him to the King County jail to await trial on unrelated charges. Peeler was not returned to WCC until well after the Skagit County prosecutor received his request.

¶ 2 The State failed to bring Peeler to trial in Skagit County within 120 days of receiving his final disposition request. We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision that even though Peeler was physically located in King County when the State received his final disposition request, his request was valid and the State failed to meet the 120–day deadline to bring him to trial in Skagit County. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3 The parties do not dispute the relevant procedural facts, which we summarize chronologically below:

Jan. 28, 2011	Skagit County charges Peeler by information with second degree assault. At the time, Peeler is in Snohomish County Jail on an unrelated charge.
Sept. 12, 2011	Peeler is sentenced to a term of imprisonment on the Snohomish County charge.
Sept. 20, 2011	Peeler commences his prison term at the WCC in Shelton.
Oct. 7, 2011	While at the WCC, Peeler initiates his first request for speedy disposition of the untried Skagit County charge under chapter 9.98 RCW.
Oct. 18, 2011	WCC transports Peeler to King County pursuant to a September 28, 2011 transport order.
Oct. 24, 2011	A WCC official signs a certificate of inmate status attesting that Peeler is a prisoner at that institution.
Oct. 26, 2011	The Skagit County prosecuting attorney and superior court receive Peeler's request and the certificate of inmate status.
Oct. 27, 2011	The Skagit County Superior Court orders the DOC to transport Peeler to Skagit County Jail “as soon as possible.” Between October 27, 2011, and November 17, 2011, DOC advises the Skagit County Prosecuting Attorney's Office by telephone that it cannot comply with the transport order because Peeler is in King County jail.
Dec. 23, 2011	Peeler pleaded guilty and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment on the King County case.
Dec. 30, 2011	Peeler is transported from King County jail back to the WCC.
Jan. 20, 2012	Peeler initiates his second request for speedy disposition of the untried Skagit County charge. A WCC official signs a second certificate of inmate status.
Feb. 2, 2012	The Skagit County Superior Court, issues a transport order for Peeler, and the deputy prosecuting attorney notes a hearing for February 16, 2012.
Feb. 14, 2012	DOC transports Peeler to Skagit County Jail.
Feb. 16, 2012	The Skagit County Superior Court arraigns Peeler on the second degree assault charge and sets the initial trial date for April 9, 2012.
Feb. 23, 2012	The 120–day deadline based on Peeler's first request for speedy disposition expires.
Aug. 17, 2012	Peeler moves to dismiss the Skagit County charge with prejudice for violation of the 120–day speedy disposition deadline under RCW 9.98.010(1).
Aug. 22, 2012	The Skagit County Superior Court denies Peeler's motion.
Aug. 27, 2012	Trial commences over 10 months after the prosecutor and court receive Peeler's first speedy disposition request.

See State v. Peeler, noted at 179 Wash.App. 1038, 2014 WL 720879, at *1.

¶ 4 The Skagit County Superior Court denied Peeler's motion to dismiss, explaining, “For RCW 9.98.010 to apply[,] the person must be imprisoned and available for transport.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 86. That court correctly found that Peeler was physically located in King County, not WCC, when the Skagit County prosecutor received his first request for final disposition. The superior court therefore concluded that Peeler was not available for transport from WCC at that time, that that was the time period that counted for purposes of RCW 9.98.010, and, hence, that the 120–day time limit did not begin. CP at 85–86.

¶ 5 Peeler was then convicted by jury of second degree assault with a special verdict that the victim's injuries substantially exceeded the level of bodily harm necessary to constitute “substantial bodily harm.” CP at 112. The superior court imposed an exceptional sentence of 100 months. CP at 272.

¶ 6 The Court of Appeals reversed. Peeler, 2014 WL 720879, at *1. It held that Peeler's first final disposition request effectively triggered the 120–day period on October 26, 2011, when the Skagit County prosecutor and superior court received it, and that the State did not timely bring him to trial. Id. at *5. The Court of Appeals remanded to the superior court with instructions to dismiss the Skagit County charge with prejudice. Id.

¶ 7 We granted the State's petition for review. State v. Peeler, 181 Wash.2d 1006, 332 P.3d 985 (2014).

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶ 8 This case presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distrib. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 182 Wash.2d 342, 350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015) (citing State v. Veliz, 176 Wash.2d 849, 853–54, 298 P.3d 75 (2013) ). When interpreting a statute, our primary “ ‘objective ... is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent.’ ” Ralph v. Dep't of Natural Res., 182 Wash.2d 242, 248, 343 P.3d 342 (2014) (quoting Arborwood Idaho, LLC v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wash.2d 359, 367, 89 P.3d 217 (2004) ). We determine legislative intent from the statute's plain language, “considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Ass'n of Wash. Spirits, 182 Wash.2d at 350, 340 P.3d 849 (citing Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9–10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) ).

II. The Intrastate Detainers Act, Chapter 9.98 RCW, Gives Prisoners the Right To Request a Trial on Untried Charges within 120 Days

¶ 9 The State argues that Peeler's initial request for final disposition of the untried Skagit County charge did not meet the IDA's requirements. The State concludes that because Peeler's request was invalid, the 120–day time limit did not apply and Peeler's trial was timely. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 1, 8–10, 12. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held that Peeler's request was valid and that the State failed to bring him to trial within 120 days of receiving his valid request, warranting dismissal of the Skagit County charge with prejudice. Peeler, 2014 WL 720879, at *5.

¶ 10 The IDA gives Washington State prisoners the right to request a trial on untried charges within 120 days of the request. State v. Morris, 126 Wash.2d 306, 310, 892 P.2d 734 (1995) ; RCW 9.98.010(1).

¶ 11 The procedures for making that final disposition request, honoring that request, and remedying a violation of the right to have such a request honored are provided by statute. RCW 9.98.010 states,

(1) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, he or she shall be brought to trial within one hundred twenty days after he or she shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the superior court of the county in which the indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment and his or her request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint: PROVIDED, That for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his or her counsel shall have the right to be present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the superintendent having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the indeterminate sentence review board relating to the prisoner.

(2) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in subsection (1) of this section shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the superintendent having custody of him or her, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and superior court by certified mail, return receipt requested.

¶ 12 This statute provides a two-stage process: First, a prisoner makes a request for a speedy and final disposition of untried charges, which “ ‘shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the superintendent having custody of him’.” Morris, 126 Wash.2d at 310, 892 P.2d 734 (quoting RCW 9.98.010(2) ). Second, the superintendent who has custody of the prisoner forwards both this request and a certificate...