State v. Pemberton

186 N.E.3d 647

STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.Derick S. PEMBERTON, Appellee-Defendant

Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-668

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED March 31, 2022

Attorneys for Appellant: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Assistant Chief Counsel of Appeals, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorney for Appellee: Lisa Diane Manning, Plainfield, Indiana

May, Judge.

[1] The State of Indiana appeals the Putnam Circuit Court's dismissal of one count of Class B felony child molesting¹ alleged to have been committed by twenty-three-year-old Derick S. Pemberton when Pemberton was sixteen years old. On appeal, the State asserts that dismissal was an error because circuit courts have original and concurrent jurisdiction over all criminal matters. Pemberton responds by asserting Indiana Code section 31-30-1-11(a) divests criminal courts of jurisdiction over adults who committed delinquent acts as children, and in support he cites our court's recent decision in State v. Neukam , 174 N.E.3d 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), reh'g denied, trans. granted. The State, on reply, presents multiple arguments challenging Pemberton's interpretation of Section 31-30-1-11(a).

[2] At the heart of the issue before us is a lack of clarity in the Indiana Code about whether the legislature intends adult criminal courts to have jurisdiction over individuals who allegedly committed delinquent acts as juveniles but were not identified as having allegedly committed those acts before turning twenty-one years of age. We, like the Putnam Circuit Court, are uncomfortable with the lack of an explicit indication of our legislature's intent in these circumstances. Nevertheless, the judiciary is not the branch of government the State should petition to correct statutory inadequacies, as our authority is limited to interpreting laws, not to creating the statutes themselves. See D.P. v. State , 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1217 (Ind. 2020) (refusing to "violate separation-of-power principles" by rewriting statutes).

[3] In light of the "exclusive original jurisdiction" given to Indiana's juvenile courts, Ind. Code § 31-30-1-1, and the fact that "children are constitutionally different from adults[,]" Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 471, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), we infer the legislature did not intend criminal courts to have jurisdiction over adults who allegedly committed delinquent acts as juveniles, unless the alleged delinquent act was an offense over which the legislature explicitly gave jurisdiction to criminal courts when the actors were younger than age eighteen. As the criminal court would not have automatically had jurisdiction of Pemberton when he allegedly committed Class B felony child molesting as a sixteen-year-old, we affirm the criminal court's dismissal of the State's criminal charge against Pemberton for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In 2012, sixteen-year-old Pemberton allegedly forced eleven-year-old K.S. to have sexual intercourse. K.S. did not report the allegation to her parents until November 2018, when K.S. was sixteen years old and Pemberton was twenty-two years old. K.S.’s parents contacted police, who began an investigation.

[5] In January 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging Pemberton, when he was sixteen, had committed an act that would be Class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult. D.P. , 151 N.E.3d at 1212. The State asked the juvenile court to waive then twenty-three-year-old Pemberton into adult criminal court. Id. Pemberton moved to dismiss and argued the juvenile court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to consider the delinquency petition or conduct the waiver hearing. Id. The juvenile court denied Pemberton's motion but certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Id. Our Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Pemberton and, in September 2020, ordered the juvenile court to grant Pemberton's motion to dismiss. Id. at 1217.

[6] Then, on October 22, 2020, the State filed a charge of Class B felony child molesting against Pemberton in criminal court for the sexual intercourse that is alleged to have occurred when Pemberton was sixteen years old. Pemberton filed a motion to dismiss and argued the adult criminal court did not have jurisdiction over him for acts that occurred when he was a juvenile. The criminal court dismissed the case, and the State now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Pemberton's motion to dismiss rested on an allegation that the adult criminal court did not have jurisdiction over the charge filed against him. "Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's constitutional or statutory power to hear and adjudicate a certain type of case." In re D.P. , 151 N.E.3d at 1213. If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any judgment it enters is void. Id. We review a court's subject matter jurisdiction de novo as a question of law when the underlying facts are not in dispute. Id.

[8] We also conduct de novo review of the meaning of any statute at issue. Id. Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent. Id. at 1216. To ascertain that intent, we look first to the statute's language. Id. "If the language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and cannot resort to judicial construction." Id. When statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we must construe the statute to give effect to the legislature's intent. Nash v. State , 881 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result. Thus, we must keep in mind the objective and purpose of the law as well as the effect and repercussions of such a construction.

Id. "When interpreting the words of a single section of a statute, this court must construe them with due regard for all other sections of the act and with regard for the legislative intent to carry out the spirit and purpose of the act." Fuller v. State , 752 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We consider the intent behind the entire act because "[s]tatutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme." Id.

[9] Pemberton's motion to dismiss relied on Indiana Code section 31-30-1-11(a), which states:

Except as provided in section 9 of this chapter,^{[2 ]} if a court having criminal jurisdiction determines that a defendant is alleged to have committed a crime before the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age, the court shall immediately transfer the case, together with certified copies of all papers, documents, and testimony, to the juvenile court. The juvenile court shall proceed as if it had received a referral under IC 31-37-8.

Pemberton asserts that statutory language required the adult criminal court to transfer the charge against him to the juvenile court because he was alleged to have committed the crime before he was eighteen years old, and in support he cites our court's recent decision in Neukam , 174 N.E.3d 1098, which has since been vacated by our Indiana Supreme Court's grant of transfer. See also State v. Dibble , 177 N.E.3d 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (affirming criminal court's dismissal of adult charge of Class B felony child molesting against Dibble for act committed before Dibble was eighteen years old based on Section 31-30-1-11(a) ).

[10] The State asserts Pemberton misreads Indiana Code section 31-30-1-11(a) when he infers that it divests criminal courts of jurisdiction over defendants whose alleged delinquent acts were committed before age eighteen. According to the State, the statute requires a criminal court to transfer a case to juvenile court only if the State's criminal allegation is filed before the defendant turns eighteen years old. We reject the State's reading of Indiana Code section 31-30-1-11(a) for a plethora of interrelated reasons, the most important of which is how the transfer statute fits into the broader purpose of the juvenile code, and we begin with that discussion.

[11] Juvenile codes exist because juveniles are a "special class." Hicks v. State , 249 Ind. 24, 29, 230 N.E.2d 757, 760 (1967).

First, children have a " ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ " leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk taking. Second, children "are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures," including from their family and peers; they have limited "control over their own environment" and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child's character is not as "well formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely to be "evidence of irretrievable depravity."

Miller , 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 560-570, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ). "Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects of reform, ... ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’ " Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ). Accordingly, the State is "parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge (in proceedings against a juvenile offender)." Hicks , 249 Ind. at 29, 230 N.E.2d at 760.

[12] Regarding the purpose of Indiana's juvenile justice system, our Indiana Supreme Court has stated:

The nature of the juvenile process is rehabilitation and aid to the juvenile to direct his behavior so that he will not later become a criminal. For this reason the statutory scheme of dealing with minors is vastly different than that directed to an adult who commits a crime. Juvenile judges have a variety of placement choices for juveniles who have delinquency problems, ranging

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