State v. Penna

385 So.3d 595

STATE of Florida, Petitioner,

v.Zachary Joseph PENNA, Respondent.

No. SC2022-0458

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 2, 2024

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Great Public Importance, Fourth District - Case No. 4D2020-0345 (Palm Beach County)

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Daniel William Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Allen L. Huang, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent

GROSSHANS, J.

We accepted for review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that ordered suppression of certain statements made by Zachary Penna, concluding that police obtained those statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Penna v. State, 344 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). At the request of the State, the district court certified a question to us involving the requirements of Miranda as interpreted by Shelly v. State, 262 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2018). In particular, the district court asked if Miranda is "automatically violated" when an officer does not "re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact" with law enforcement. Penna, 344 So. 3d at 442 (on motion for certification). We answer that question in the negative and recede from our decision in Shelly, which announced a per se rule that is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.¹

I

In 2015, Penna unlawfully entered a home in Palm Beach County and brutally stabbed two men to death when they refused his demand for their vehicle. The force and number of stabbings caused significant bloodshed throughout the home. Penna, covered in the victims’ blood, scooped up some blood and drank it.

After stabbing the two men, Penna took their SUV, drove to a nearby neighborhood, and robbed an elderly woman. Moments later, Penna kidnapped a coworker from his home, but he was able to escape when Penna stopped at a restaurant.

Undaunted, Penna drove north to Brevard County where he abandoned the SUV. After locating another vehicle, he approached the owner and demanded the keys. When the owner did not fully comply with his directives, Penna slashed the man’s throat with a knife.² Then, Penna fled into the woods.

Responding to the attack, law enforcement deployed a canine that successfully located Penna. Penna stabbed the canine and then ran out of the woods with a knife in hand. Officers ordered Penna to drop the knife, but he refused. Only after being shot four times did Penna stop charging at the officers.

Following his apprehension, Penna was transported to a nearby hospital where he received medical treatment. The next day, Detective Jonathan D’Angelo went to the hospital to speak with Penna. At that time, Penna was shackled to his bed and on several medications. Despite his physical condition, Penna was able to communicate with the detective.

At the outset of their conversation, Detective D’Angelo asked Penna if he had been advised of his Miranda rights. In response, Penna began listing those rights, noting the right to silence and an attorney. Despite this, the detective read Penna the Miranda warnings as listed on his department-issued card.

Detective D’Angelo then began asking questions related to the murders. Penna answered the first few questions, generally denying that he recognized the murder victims or their home. But when Detective D’Angelo asked Penna how he came to have possession of the stolen SUV, Penna invoked his right to counsel. At that point, Detective D’Angelo stopped questioning Penna and left the room. When another detective entered Penna’s room later that day, Penna again invoked his right to counsel.

Following these interactions with law enforcement, Penna remained in a hospital for roughly a month and a half, always restrained to his bed. During this time, at least one officer was assigned to constantly monitor him.

One of the assigned officers was Deputy Michael Nettles, who started monitoring Penna roughly four weeks after the murders. One day, Penna asked Deputy Nettles why he (Penna) was in the hospital. Deputy Nettles responded by saying, "[Y]ou don’t know why you’re here?" A short time later, Penna volunteered to Deputy Nettles that he had "stabbed a couple of people." In response to a clarifying question, Penna confessed to stabbing a police dog and confirmed that he had stabbed two men.

Two days later, Deputy Nettles was again assigned to monitor Penna. Without prompting, Penna stated that he was in a poor mood and that his life was messed up. Deputy Nettles followed up by asking why Penna had this dim outlook. Penna responded that he had ruined his own life, adding: "I know what I did. I’m going to prison for my whole … life."

The very next day, Deputy Nettles was again assigned to watch Penna. While talking with Deputy Nettles, Penna asked, "What do you think I will get?" Penna clarified that he meant for "killing th[e] two [men]." Redirecting that question, Deputy Nettles asked Penna what he thought his punishment would be for the crimes. At that point, Penna told Deputy Nettles that he would share what happened. Deputy Nettles reminded Penna that he was an officer and would write down his statements. In addition, Deputy Nettles also cautioned Penna against talking unless he wanted to. Deputy Nettles, though, stopped short of giving Miranda warnings to Penna. Penna proceeded to offer additional details about his crime spree.

Roughly a week later, Penna again struck up a conversation with Deputy Nettles. During that conversation, Penna once more spoke of his crimes and said that he thought the murders would result in life sentences.

The final relevant conversation with Deputy Nettles occurred roughly two weeks later. In addition to mentioning expected criminal sanctions, Penna spoke of being reborn and his belief in the Egyptian god Ra. Alluding to his anticipated prose- cution, Penna said that he would testify that Ra told him to do things.

Ultimately, the State charged Penna with several crimes, including two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, Penna moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing that such statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court held a hearing on the motion at which Detective D’Angelo and Deputy Nettles testified. Among other things, Deputy Nettles testified about his conversations with Penna and the circumstances surrounding those conversations. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion in its entirety, stressing that Penna initiated all the conversations with Deputy Nettles. Thus, in the court’s view, Penna had failed to establish a Miranda violation.

At the ensuing trial, the State presented substantial physical evidence and witness testimony to establish Penna’s guilt. One of its witnesses was Deputy Nettles. Through his testimony, the State presented many of Penna’s incriminating statements. After the State rested, Penna introduced evidence to support his insanity defense. Rejecting that defense, the jury found Penna guilty as charged on all counts. The court entered judgment consistent with the verdicts and sentenced Penna to life in prison.

Penna appealed to the Fourth District. At the outset of the majority opinion, the district court rejected what it characterized as the parties’ "all or none" approach. Penna, 344 So. 3d at 431-32. It found that the statements during the first two conversations were not obtained in violation of Miranda. According to the majority, such statements were not the products of police interrogation, i.e., they were either spontaneous or made in response to clarifying questions. Id. at 434-36. However, partially agreeing with Penna, the majority found that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing to "specifically" give Penna "his Miranda rights again" prior to custodial interrogation during the final three conversations. Id. at 436-38. In support of that conclusion, the majority relied on its own precedent, see Quarles v. State, 290 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), which had interpreted our decision in Shelly to require a full rereading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this case. Penna, 344 So. 3d at 434 (discussing Quarles). The majority went on to find that the error was not harmless, despite acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt. Id. at 438-39.

Judge Artau agreed that Quarles compelled a finding that Miranda was violated. Id. at 440-41 (Artau, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But in his view, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 441-42. He also questioned whether Shelly was correctly decided, though his doubts about that case were not the basis of his partial dissent: Id.

Following issuance of the district court’s decision, the State asked the court to certify a question of law to us. Granting that request, the district court certified the following question as being of great public importance, asking:

WHETHER A DEFENDANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT MIRANDA RIGHTS ARE AUTOMATICALLY VIOLATED WHEN AN OFFICER FAILS TO RE-READ A MIRANDA WARNING FOLLOWING A DEFENDANT’S VOLUNTARY RE-INITIATION OF CONTACT.

Based on that certified question, we granted the State’s request for review.

II

[1] The certified question presents us with a pure legal issue. As such, our stan- dard of review is de novo. See City of Tallahassee v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., 375 So. 3d 178, 183 (Fla. 2023). In undertaking this review, we first discuss background legal principles and then analyze our decision in Shelly against that backdrop.

[2, 3] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467-69, 86 S.Ct. 1602, the ...