State v. Peoples

240 Ariz. 245

378 P.3d 421

State of Arizona, Appellant

v.Robin Peoples, Appellee.

No. CR–15–0301–PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed September 12, 2016

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney, Nicolette Kneup (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public Defender, Michael J. Miller, David J. Euchner (argued), Deputy Public Defenders, Tucson, Attorneys for Robin Peoples

JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL and BOLICK joined.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether an overnight guest who left his cell phone in his host's apartment lost his legitimate expectation of privacy in that phone, thereby defeating his challenge to a warrantless search of the phone. We hold that the defendant here did not lose his expectation of privacy in his phone. And as an overnight guest, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. Because no exception to the warrant requirement existed, and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, the trial court properly suppressed evidence of a video found on the phone and of statements the defendant made to the police about that video.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Robin Peoples lived next door to his girlfriend, D.C., at a Tucson apartment complex. He frequently spent time at D.C.'s studio apartment. About three months into the relationship, Peoples spent the night at D.C.'s apartment and used his cell phone to film the couple having sex. D.C.'s daughter, who also lived at the complex, found D.C. unresponsive in bed the next morning while Peoples was in the bathroom. The daughter called 911, and Peoples ran from the apartment to direct the paramedics, leaving his cell phone behind. While paramedics were tending to D.C., whom they ultimately pronounced dead, Peoples sought solace at a friend's upstairs apartment. No one asked Peoples to leave D.C.'s apartment.

¶ 3 Tucson Police Officer Travis Mott came to D.C.'s apartment after she was pronounced dead. He looked for information that might identify D.C.'s doctor, hoping the doctor could shed light on D.C.'s recent health and sign the death certificate. He found a “smart” cell phone in the bathroom. Assuming the phone belonged to D.C., the officer turned it on and opened it with a finger swipe to search her contacts (it was not passcode protected). A paused video-image of D.C. on her back in bed, mostly naked, appeared on the screen. The officer pressed “play” and watched part of a video of Peoples having sex with a seemingly unresponsive D.C. Before he watched the video, Officer Mott had been told that Peoples spent the night at the apartment.

¶ 4 Peoples returned to D.C.'s apartment a short time after leaving and asked a police officer at the door to retrieve his cell phone from the bathroom. According to Peoples, that officer entered the apartment and later returned, handcuffed Peoples, and took him into Peoples' apartment. Officer Mott testified he was never told about Peoples' request. According to Officer Mott, after viewing the video, he detained Peoples in his apartment, read him his Miranda rights, and questioned him about the video. Peoples confirmed that he had sex with D.C. during the early morning hours and filmed it with his phone. Peoples also told Officer Mott that D.C. “probably was [dead]” when they had sex, although he “thought she was breathing” and had heard “her snoring earlier.” Peoples later watched the video with other officers and answered their questions.

¶ 5 The State charged Peoples with necrophilia and two counts of sexual assault. Peoples moved to suppress evidence of the video, contending that the warrantless search of the phone was unlawful under the federal and state constitutions. After an evidentiary hearing at which Officer Mott, Peoples, and a detective testified, the trial court granted the motion. It also suppressed Peoples' statements to police because they resulted from the illegal search. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the warrantless search was permissible because Peoples did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in either D.C.'s apartment or his cell phone and therefore could not challenge the searches. State v. Peoples , 2 CA–CR 2014–0408, 2015 WL 4599646, at *5–6 ¶¶ 22, 27–28 (Ariz. App. July 30, 2015) (mem. decision).

¶ 6 We granted review because the constitutional issues raised are of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

¶ 7 We review the grant of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, 302 ¶ 9, 371 P.3d 627, 630 (2016). An error of law, however, constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Cheatham , 240 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 6, 375 P.3d 66, 67 (2016). In reviewing the ruling, we consider only the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing and view that evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 301 ¶ 3, 371 P.3d at 629.

¶ 8 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 8, of the Arizona Constitution protect against unlawful searches and seizures. State v. Wilson , 237 Ariz. 296, 298 ¶ 7, 350 P.3d 800, 802 (2015). These rights are personal and can be invoked only by a defendant with a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Our courts have sometimes referred to this requirement as “standing” for the sake of brevity. See, e.g., State v. Martinez , 221 Ariz. 383, 389 ¶ 21 n.7, 212 P.3d 75, 81 n.7 (App. 2009) ; State v. Juarez , 203 Ariz. 441, 445 ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 784, 788 (App. 2002). But courts must decide whether a defendant possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy applying Fourth Amendment principles rather than traditional standing principles. See Rakas , 439 U.S. at 139–40, 99 S.Ct. 421 ; see also Minnesota v. Carter , 525 U.S. 83, 87, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (emphasizing that Rakas “expressly rejected” use of “ ‘standing’ doctrine” to decide whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy). A defendant's subjective expectation of privacy is “legitimate” if it is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 95–96, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (quoting Rakas , 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S.Ct. 421 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 9 A warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and article 2, section 8, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 302 ¶ 10, 371 P.3d at 630 (citing Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) ). The court must exclude from a criminal trial any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and article 2, section 8, unless the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 236–39, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ; see also State v. Guillen , 223 Ariz. 314, 317 ¶ 13 n.1, 223 P.3d 658, 661 n.1 (2010) (stating that for purposes of the Arizona Constitution, “the exclusionary rule to be applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 10 The primary issue here is whether Peoples had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell phone or in D.C.'s apartment as an overnight guest at the time of the search. If he did, the State concedes that no exception to the warrant requirement applies to permit the search. In that event, we must consider whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule nevertheless permits introduction of the evidence the trial court suppressed.

A. Legitimate expectation of privacy

1. Cell phone

¶ 11 The trial court relied on Riley v. California , –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), to find that Peoples had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell phone. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not permit cell phone searches because the rationale for that exception does not apply to cell phones. Id. at 2485–91. Significantly, the Court recognized a uniquely broad expectation of privacy in cell phones because they essentially serve as their owners' digital alter egos. It reasoned that modern cell phones are unlike other objects found within an arrestee's control, being “minicomputers” that contain “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [people's] lives–from the mundane to the intimate.” Id. at 2489–90. “The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.” Id . at 2495.

¶ 12 Mindful of its general preference to clearly guide law enforcement by constructing categorical rules that avoid application “in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers,” the Court held that an officer must generally obtain a warrant before searching cell phone data. Id. at 2491–93 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Warrantless searches are prohibited unless “case-specific exceptions ... justify a warrantless search of a particular phone,” such as “the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.” Id. at 2494.

¶ 13 The court of appeals found Riley inapplicable because Peoples did not have the cell phone within his immediate control when Officer Mott found and searched it. Peoples , 2 CA–CR 2014–0408, at *5 ¶¶ 26–27. But Riley did not hold that individuals have privacy interests in their...