State v. Perez-Gutierrez

548 P.3d 1102

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.Manuel David PEREZ-GUTIERREZ, Appellant.

No. CR-23-0137-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed May 31, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County, The Honorable Geoffrey H. Fish, Judge, No. CR2020-135003-001. REMANDED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 255 Ariz. 232, 530 P.3d 395 (App. 2023). VACATED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General, Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Ashley Torkelson Levine (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender, Aaron J. Moskowitz (argued), Maricopa County Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Manuel Perez-Gutierrez.

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, MONTGOMERY, and KING joined.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

[1, 2] ¶1 Most errors made by a trial court fall into one of two categories: trial error or structural error. See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552 ¶ 45, 65 P.3d 915, 933 (2003). If a criminal defendant does not object to trial error when it occurs, the error is only reversable on appeal if it is "fundamental" and prejudicial. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140 ¶ 12, 425 P.3d 1078, 1083 (2018). Conversely, if a defendant can establish that structural error occurred, the error results in automatic reversal, regardless of whether the error prejudiced the defendant—and regardless of whether an objection was lodged at trial. See Ring, 204 Ariz. at 552 ¶ 45, 65 P.3d at 933.

¶2 But not all trial errors require an appellate court to reverse or affirm the trial court’s disposition. Consequently, Arizona courts have developed a limited-remand practice. This practice does not require a showing of prejudice, but it also does not necessarily result in reversal. Courts have not always agreed on when it is appropriate to deploy this limited-remand practice.

¶3 This case calls for us to decide whether an unobjected-to violation of A.R.S. § 13-711(A)—which requires courts to explain certain sentencing decisions on the record—is amenable to: (1) fundamental-error review, (2) structural-error review, or (3) the limitedremand practice developed in cases like State v. Anzivino, 148 Ariz. 593, 716 P.2d 50 (App. 1985), and State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 1, 985 P.2d 486 (1999). Because violations of § 13-711(A) are akin to administrative errors that a trial court can correct without affecting the disposition, we hold that a remand for the limited purpose of statutory compliance is appropriate.

BACKGROUND

¶4 A jury convicted Manuel Perez-Gutierrez of eight counts of sexual conduct with a minor. Perez-Gutierrez’s victim was under the age of fifteen for counts one and two, resulting in two twenty-year terms of imprisonment. He received one-year sentences for the remaining six counts. The court ordered Perez-Gutierrez to serve all sentences consecutively.

¶5 Arizona law compelled the trial court to impose consecutive sentences for counts one and two. See A.R.S. § 13-705(E), (P), (T); A.R.S. § 13-1405. But the court had discretion to impose the remaining sentences consecutively or concurrently. See §§ 13-711(A), -1405. When deciding whether to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently, however, the court was statutorily required to "state on the record the reason for its determination." § 13-711(A). The trial court here failed to do so. Perez-Gutierrez did not object, but he did appeal on that basis. State v. Perez-Gutierrez, 255 Ariz. 232, 232 ¶ 1, 530 P.3d 395, 396 (App. 2023). On appeal, he argued—for the first time—that "the superior court erred by failing to explain why it imposed consecutive sentences as required by A.R.S. § 13-711(A)." Id. at 234 ¶6, 530 P.3d at 397.

¶6 A split court of appeals agreed with Perez-Gutierrez, remanding the case with instructions for the trial court to put the reasons for its sentencing determination in the record. Id. at 238 ¶27, 530 P.3d at 401. Relying on the Anzivino and Harrison lines of cases, the court of appeals’ majority explained that § 13-711(A) requires a judge to: (1) articulate at sentencing the factors he or she considered, and (2) explain how those factors led to the sentence he or she imposed. See id. at 235 ¶13, 530 P.3d at 398. The court of appeals held that if a judge fails to substantially comply with these requirements, the case must be remanded for the trial court to satisfy § 13-711 by providing its sentencing reasons. Id. at 235 ¶14, 530 P.3d at 398.

¶7 The dissenting judge agreed that the superior court had violated § 13-711(A) but believed that remand was unnecessary. Id. at 238 ¶¶28–29, 530 P.3d at 401 (Catlett, J., dissenting). Instead, the dissent maintained that the count of appeals’ usual trial error framework should apply. Id. ¶ 29. That is, if a trial court violates § 13-711(A), appellate courts should review for harmless error if the defendant objects, and fundamental error if the defendant does not. Id. And here, because Perez-Gutierrez did not object at trial, the dissent argued that the court of appeals should review for fundamental error and affirm the sentences. Id.

¶8 A separate court of appeals’ panel subsequently issued State v. Garcia, 256 Ariz. 434, 436 ¶ 2, 541 P.3d 559, 561 (App. 2023), which explicitly endorsed the dissent’s analysis in Perez-Gutierrez. We granted review to resolve this conflict, and because the standard of review for violations of § 13-711(A) is a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

[3] ¶9 This Court reviews the interpretation of sentencing statutes de novo, Allen v. Sanders, 240 Ariz. 569, 571 ¶ 9, 382 P.3d 784, 786 (2016), but reviews a "trial judge’s reason[s] for imposing … consecutive sentences" for an abuse of discretion, see State v. Meeker, 143 Ariz. 256, 266, 693 P.2d 911, 921 (1984); see also § 13-711(A).

I.

¶10 When imposing multiple sentences of imprisonment, sentencing courts are governed by § 13-711, which reads in relevant part:

A. Except as otherwise provided by law, if multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time the sentences imposed by the court may run consecutively or concurrently, as determined by the court. The court shall state on the record the reason for its determination.

§ 13-711(A) (emphasis added). The final sentence of this section imposes a duty on sentencing courts to explain, on the record, t heir reasons for imposing sentences either consecutively or concurrently.

¶11 Sentencing courts are also governed by the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure promulgated by this Court. One such rule, concerned with consecutive sentences, reads in relevant part:

If the court imposes separate sentences of imprisonment on a defendant for two or more offenses, the sentences run consecutively unless the judge expressly directs otherwise. This rule applies even if the offenses are not charged in the same indictment or information. There is no presumption favoring consecutive sentences rather than concurrent sentences.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.13 (emphasis added). Unlike § 13-711(A), this rule does not require a sentencing court to state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.

[4] ¶12 Section 13-711(A) and Rule 26.13 both apply to sentencing procedures, and the duty to explain sentencing decisions required by § 13-711(A) ostensibly conflicts with Rule 26.13. And "in the event of irreconcilable conflict between a procedural statute and a [Court-promulgated] rule, the rule prevails." Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 89 ¶ 8, 203 P.3d 483, 487 (2009). This is because our constitution vests this Court—and it alone— with the "[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court." Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(5); see also id. art. 3 (delineating Arizona’s separation of powers).

[5] ¶13 Here, however, we avoid this potential constitutional conflict by prospectively adopting § 13-711(A)’s on-the-record requirement. See generally In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. S-933, 135 Ariz. 278, 281, 660 P.2d 1205, 1208 (1982) (avoiding a potential constitutional issue by adopting A.R.S. § 8-538(A)’s statutory on-the-record requirement); cf. Seisinger, 220 Ariz. at 89 ¶ 11, 203 P.3d at 487 (explaining that courts will construe statutes to avoid constitutional violations when possible). Section 13-711(A)’s procedural requirement is reasonable, workable, and enables meaningful appellate review. Henceforth, regardless of whether a sentencing judge imposes sentences consecutively or concurrently, the judge must state on the record the reason for his or her determination.

II.

¶14 Having adopted § 13-711(A)’s procedural requirement, we now address the merits of Perez-Gutierrez’s appeal.

A.

[6] ¶15 As a threshold matter, we note that this requirement regulates secondary conduct which occurs during the sentencing process. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) ("[R]ules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct …. "). And neither the State nor Perez-Gutierrez have a vested interest in matters of procedure. See id.; accord, Aranda v. Indus. Comm’n, 198 Ariz. 467, 470 ¶ 11, 11 P.3d 1006, 1009 (2000). Thus, we may apply § 13-711(A) to Perez-Gutierrez’s ongoing appeal without impermissibly interfering with the parties’ vested rights. See Aranda, 198 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 11, 11 P.3d at 1009.

B.

[7] ¶16 As previously noted, § 13-711(A) requires a sentencing court to "state on the record the reason[s] for its [sentencing] determination." Failure to substantially comply with this requirement is error. Cf. Harrison, 195 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 12, 985 P.2d at 489. In this context, substantial compliance requires the trial court to sufficiently (1) articulate the relevant...