State v. Petersen

994 N.W.2d 410

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Jered Mark PETERSEN, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20230049

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Filed August 17, 2023

Casey W. Moen, Assistant State's Attorney, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.

Erica A. Skogen Hovey, Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellant.

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Jered Petersen appeals from a criminal judgment entered on a conditional plea of guilty to actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, reserving the right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress evidence. He argues law enforcement unlawfully trespassed into his vehicle, violating his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We reverse, concluding law enforcement unlawfully searched Petersen's vehicle, and remand for further proceedings.

I

[¶2] Petersen was charged with being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a fourth or subsequent offense in 15 years. He moved to suppress evidence. The district court held a suppression hearing. The relevant facts are undisputed.

[¶3] At approximately 1:48 a.m. on March 18, 2022, two Fargo Police Officers responded to a report of a vehicle accident in a bar parking lot in south Fargo. The complainant reported that his vehicle was struck by a semi-truck and the driver was asleep behind the wheel of the parked semi. The first responding officer spoke with the complainant at the scene, who told the officer that although he did not see the accident, he believed the semi struck his vehicle because he observed that the paint color on the semi's bumper matched the color of his vehicle.

[¶4] The second responding officer testified that upon arriving at the scene, she noticed the semi was idling with the driver asleep. The officers then approached the semi. The second responding officer approached the passenger-side door of the semi, while the first responding officer approached the driver-side door. The second responding officer immediately opened the unlocked passenger-side door and stepped up onto the running boards, followed by announcing "Fargo Police." The officer on the driver's side then began tapping on the outside window with his flashlight and shined the light into the cab. The individual asleep in the driver's seat did not respond. The officers testified it was difficult to hear because the semi's engine was running.

[¶5] The second responding officer testified that after standing on the running boards for about a minute, she flipped open the wallet lying on the passenger seat. After walking around to the passenger side, the other officer removed the identification card, identifying the individual as Jered Petersen. The second responding officer then entered the cab and turned the engine off. She gave Petersen sternum rubs, waking him up. She testified that at that point she smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from Petersen and noticed he had bloodshot watery eyes. The officers eventually administered field sobriety tests, a preliminary breath test, and a chemical breath test.

[¶6] After the hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement applied and the officers’ actions of opening the semi-truck door and checking Petersen's wallet for identification were reasonable under the circumstances. Petersen conditionally pled guilty to the actual physical control charge, reserving his right to appeal the order denying suppression. The court sentenced Petersen, stayed execution of sentence pending appeal, and entered judgment.

II

[¶7] Petersen argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The standard of review is well established:

When reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, we defer to the court's findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. This Court will affirm the district court's decision on a motion to suppress unless we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence. Whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal. Whether law enforcement violated constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure is a question of law.

State v. Boger , 2021 ND 152, ¶ 7, 963 N.W.2d 742.

III

[¶8] Petersen argues law enforcement unlawfully trespassed into his vehicle when the officer opened his semi-truck door to gather information and without first attempting to get his attention.

[¶9] The Fourth Amendment and N.D. Const. art. I, § 8, protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects. A vehicle is an "effect" and the State's trespass upon a vehicle with the intent of obtaining information constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jones , 565 U.S. 400, 404, 408 n.5, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) ; see also New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 119, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (holding that officer's reaching into vehicle to remove papers obscuring VIN was a search, albeit a reasonable search under the circumstances). Because law enforcement did not have a search warrant, an exception to the warrant requirement must apply for law enforcement action to have been lawful. State v. Washington , 2007 ND 138, ¶ 10, 737 N.W.2d 382 ("Warrantless searches are unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.").

[¶10] The community caretaker doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Stewart , 2014 ND 165, ¶ 12, 851 N.W.2d 153. Community caretaking functions are "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Bridgeford v. Sorel , 2019 ND 153, ¶ 8, 930 N.W.2d 136. "Contact with citizens falls within the community caretaking role when an officer's objective is to help a person in possible need of assistance." Id. Petersen contends that because the officers were investigating the possibility of his violating the law, their actions were not totally divorced from the criminal investigation and the community caretaker exception does not apply.

[¶11] In Bridgeford , we analyzed a law enforcement encounter with a sleeping individual in a parked vehicle and concluded knocking on the window was reasonable:

Where it is obvious a citizen neither needs nor desires assistance, an officer has no community caretaking role to fill. However, the appearance of an individual slumped over sleeping is not an obvious indication that a citizen does not need assistance. When an officer encounters a person whose state of consciousness prevents a conversational inquiry from occurring, the officer must decide the actions necessary to get the person to respond and may need to approach a non-responsive person differently from a person who is conscious and able to converse with the officer. To determine if assistance is needed, it is reasonable for an officer to knock on a vehicle's window. By knocking, an officer is doing "no more than any private citizen might do." Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 8 [133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495] (2013) (discussing warrantless searches of homes).

2019 ND 153, ¶ 10, 930 N.W.2d 136 (cleaned up). Thus, we concluded the officer's knocking on the vehicle window was within the scope of the community caretaking function and not an impermissible trespass. Id. at ¶ 13.

[¶12] Additionally, the Court in Bridgeford reviewed whether the officer's subsequent opening of the vehicle's unlocked door was also a community caretaking function. There, the officer saw an individual asleep in a running vehicle at a gas station parking lot at 1:38 a.m. 2019 ND 153, ¶ 2, 930 N.W.2d 136. The officer approached the vehicle and "knocked loudly on the window and raised his voice for approximately 15 seconds." Id. After the individual, Bridgeford, failed to respond, the officer opened the door and shook him until he awoke. Id. The majority of the Court noted there was no indication in the record of "any obvious sign Bridgeford did not need or desire assistance." Id. at ¶ 18. The majority concluded the officer's entering of the vehicle was within the community caretaker function, stating "our caselaw allows an officer to continue a community caretaker role from outside a vehicle to the inside of a vehicle when a sleeping individual fails to respond to attempts to get a response from outside the vehicle. " Id. at ¶ 20 (emphasis added); see also Rist v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2003 ND 113, ¶¶ 2, 11, 665 N.W.2d 45 (concluding community caretaker exception applied where officer shouted "Sheriff's Department, wake up!" several times through an open window prior to reaching inside and shaking occupant); Lapp v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2001 ND 140, ¶¶ 15-16, 632 N.W.2d 419 (applying community caretaker exception where prior to officer's opening door, security guard told officer he had unsuccessfully tried to awaken occupant for ten minutes by knocking on window, officer tapped on window twice within two minutes, and officer observed occupant's glossy eyes).

[¶13] The dissenting justices in Bridgeford noted, "the State must prove the officer objectively thought Bridgeford needed help." 2019 ND 153, ¶ 25, 930 N.W.2d 136 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent concluded that because there was no sign of distress and "it was not incumbent on Bridgeford to communicate that he did not need or desire assistance," the officer's entry into the vehicle exceeded the community caretaking function. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26. The majority's conclusion that the community caretaking function applied to opening the door was based on the premise that the sleeping individual failed to respond to...