State v. Phillips

548 P.3d 51

2024-NMSC-009

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Petitioner,

v.Clive Dalton PHILLIPS, Defendant-Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.

NO. S-1-SC-38910

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: March 4, 2024

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Clara Moran, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner

OPINION

THOMSON, Justice.

{1} Defendant Clive Phillips was convicted of six counts of aggravated battery and pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter after he violently attacked Adrian Carriaga and Alexzandria Buhl (Allie), killing Adrian and severely injuring Allie. Defendant challenges his convictions, arguing that double jeopardy bars the multiple convictions with the exception of one count of battery for attacking Allie and one count of manslaughter for attacking and killing Adrian. We conclude that the manslaughter conviction and the challenged battery convictions are each based on distinct conduct and therefore do not violate Defendant’s right against double jeopardy. We reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant, Allie, Adrian, and Sean Madrid were close friends and shared a four-bedroom house. Defendant and Allie had been in an on-and-off relationship since high school and had a baby together. In the summer of 2013, Allie broke up with Defendant and moved into her own bedroom in the house with the baby. Shortly thereafter, Allie and Adrian began a romantic relationship.

{3} Early one morning, Sean became suspicious that Allie and Adrian were sleeping together and called Defendant, who was not home at the time, to inform him of his suspicions. Defendant drove to the house, walked into Allie’s room with a baseball bat, and discovered Allie and Adrian in bed together.

{4} Armed with the bat, Defendant struck the two numerous times, and a struggle ensued. Defendant eventually dropped the baseball bat and left Allie’s room to retrieve a handgun. Allie immediately shut and locked her bedroom door, but Defendant came back, shot the door handle, and kicked the door open. Upon reentering Allie’s room, Defendant shot Adrian once in the chest and once in his right armpit. Out of ammunition, Defendant left Allie’s room, and Allie called 911. Defendant returned to the room soon after with a rifle. He asked Adrian, "Are you ready?", placed the rifle under Adrian’s chin, and fired, killing Adrian.

{5} Defendant then turned to Allie and shot her once in her shin and inserted his finger into her bullet wound. Defendant grabbed Allie’s phone, which was still connected to 911, and before ending the call described to the operator what had happened. He then resumed his assault on Allie by punching her in the face. The two struggled before Defendant pushed Allie against the wall in the hallway and choked her, causing her to lose consciousness. The police arrived at the home shortly thereafter.

{6} For Defendant’s attack on Adrian, the jury could not reach a verdict on the murder charge or on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter for the killing of Adrian. See NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1 (1994) (murder); NMSA 1978, § 30-2-3 (1994) (manslaughter). However, the jury convicted Defendant of two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon—one for striking Adrian with the baseball bat and one for shooting Adrian with the handgun. See NMSA 1978, § 30-3-5 (1969) (aggravated battery); NMSA 1978, § 31-18-16 (1993, amended 2022) (firearm enhancement). For his attack on Allie, the jury convicted Defendant of four counts of aggravated battery against a household member—one for striking Allie with the baseball bat (deadly weapon), one for shooting her with the rifle (deadly weapon), one for punching her, and one for strangling her (great bodily harm). See NMSA 1978, § 30-3-16 (2008, amended 2018) (aggravated battery against a household member); § 31-18-16 (1993) (firearm enhancement). Following an appeal to this Court regarding the scope of retrial on the murder charge, see State v. Phillips (Phillips I), 2017-NMSC-019, 396 P.3d 153, Defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter for the death of Adrian. At sentencing, Defendant argued that his convictions for attacking Adrian and Allie were based on unitary conduct and therefore violated the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause. The district court disagreed and sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment, suspending seven years.

{7} Defendant appealed, contending (1) that he should only be convicted of one count of battery for attacking Adrian and one count of battery for attacking Allie and (2) that his battery conviction for shooting Adrian with the handgun should be vacated because it was based on the same conduct as the manslaughter conviction. State v. Phillips (Phillips II), 2021-NMCA-062, ¶¶ 1, 9, 17, 31, 499 P.3d 648. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions for the two batteries against Adrian as they were not based on unitary conduct and therefore, did not violate double jeopardy. Id. ¶ 16. However, the Court concluded that the battery (handgun) and manslaughter convictions violated double jeopardy because a reasonable jury could have found either unitary conduct or distinct acts. Id. ¶¶ 23-26, 29. Therefore, the Court presumed that the conduct was unitary as required by State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 28, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140 (holding that we must presume a defendant’s conduct is unitary if the jury convicted the defendant under a general verdict and the record does not indicate whether the jury relied on a legally inadequate alternative that would result in double jeopardy), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683. Id. ¶¶ 26-29. Finally, the three battery convictions for hitting Allie with the baseball bat, shooting her with the rifle, and strangling her were affirmed. See Phillips II, 2021-NMCA-062, ¶¶ 1, 33, 499 P.3d 648. The Court accepted the State’s concession that the battery conviction for punching Allie was violative of double jeopardy and reversed that conviction. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. That reversal is not at issue in this appeal.

{8} Defendant petitioned for certiorari, contending that his two battery convictions for attacking Adrian (baseball bat and handgun) and his three battery convictions for attacking Allie (baseball bat, rifle, and strangulation) all violate double jeopardy. The State cross-petitioned, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the conviction for battery of Adrian with a handgun. We granted both petitions. We affirm Defendant’s manslaughter conviction and all five of his aggravated battery convictions. We further conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in its application of the presumption announced in Foster. Additionally, we clarify that in conducting a double jeopardy analysis for a conviction rendered by a guilty plea, a reviewing court should examine what the record shows about whether a defendant’s acts are distinct rather than what a reasonable jury could have found.

II. DISCUSSION

[1–4] {9} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall … be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The double jeopardy clause prohibits a court from "imposing multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 5, 476 P.3d 1201 (text only)¹ (citation omitted). There are two types of multiple punishment cases: "those cases in which a defendant is charged with multiple violations of a single statute based on a single course of conduct (unit of prosecution cases) and those cases in which a defendant is charged with violating different statutes in a single course of conduct (double-description cases)." State v. Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 44, 470 P.3d 227 (text only) (citation omitted). "While the analysis for each type of case focuses on whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments, the particular canons of construction we apply in ascertaining the Legislature’s intent depend on the specific type of multiple punishment case in front of us." State v. Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 11, 493 P.3d 366 (text only) (citation omitted). We review this question of constitutional law de novo. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 11, 476 P.3d 1201.

{10} This case involves both unit of prosecution and double description analyses. Defendant raises a unit of prosecution argument, contending that his multiple battery convictions violate double jeopardy because "he attacked [Adrian] and [Allie] during a single episode, which took place in a small space and a short amount of time, and therefore he should not have been convicted of more than one count of battery against each of them." The State argues under a double-description challenge that Defendant’s convictions for aggravated battery with a handgun and manslaughter stemming from his attack on Adrian were not based on unitary conduct, and therefore we should reverse the Court of Appeals’ determination that these convictions violate double jeopardy. We address Defendant’s unit of prosecution challenge first.

A. Unit of Prosecution

[5–9] {11} In a unit of prosecution case, we focus on "whether a defendant has received more punishments than the number of punishments that the Legislature intended to authorize under the facts and circumstances of the case." Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 12, 493 P.3d 366. This is a two-part test. Id. First, "we must analyze the statute to determine whether the Legislature has defined the unit of prosecution." Id. ¶ 13 (text only) (citation omitted). We do this by considering "all markers of legislative intent … including the wording, structure, legislative history, legislative purpose, and quantum of...