State v. Pires

316 A.3d 701

STATE

v.Napoleao PIRES.

No. 2021 34-C.A.

(P2/18-488AG)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 26, 2024

Providence County Superior Court, Associate Justice Robert D. Krause

Virginia M. McGinn, Department of Attorney General, for State.

Robert J. Caron, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court.

The defendant, Napoleao Pires, appeals from a judgment of conviction for carrying a firearm without a license and possession of a controlled substance. The defendant challenges the trial justice’s decision to deny his motion to suppress on the basis that the seizure violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the decision on the motion to suppress and, accordingly, vacate the judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court.

I Facts and Travel ¹

[1] On July 9, 2016, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Patrol Officer James Leach of the Pawtucket Police Department arrived at the intersection of Dunnell Avenue and Sisson Street in response to a dispatch. The dispatch reported that a light-skinned black male, wearing a striped shirt and dark pants, was walking around with a gun in his hand.² When Officer Leach arrived, he observed a man who matched the description—defendant—walking just north of the intersection. Officer Leach did not observe anyone else in the area. The intersection was well-lit, illuminated by streetlights and the headlights of Officer Leach’s police cruiser. Officer Leach did not detect any criminal activity afoot, and he could not see defendant’s hands to determine whether defendant was holding a gun. Nevertheless, Officer Leach ascertained that defendant was the man described in the dispatch, based on his clothing, appearance, and location.

Observing that defendant matched the description, Officer Leach exited his cruiser, wearing his full police uniform, and immediately commanded defendant to show Officer Leach his hands. The defendant complied.

Officer Leach next ordered defendant to turn around, face away, and walk backward toward the sound of Officer Leach’s voice while keeping his hands up. Instead, defendant walked forward toward Officer Leach, although his hands were still raised. Officer Leach repeated the order for defendant to turn around and walk backward, but defendant proceeded forward. At this point, Officer Leach was unsure whether defendant was noncompliant or simply unable to understand his instructions.

Once defendant came within a twelve- to fifteen-foot radius of Officer Leach, defendant pivoted and reached for his waistband. Officer Leach thought that defendant was attempting to grasp a firearm. In a "split-second decision[,]" Officer Leach grabbed defendant from behind and incapacitated him by the use of a "full nelson."³ The defendant began speaking in a foreign language but did not otherwise struggle or resist.⁴

Two additional Pawtucket police officers then reported to the scene for backup. Officer Leach instructed one of them to look in defendant’s waistband. The backup officer looked in defendant’s waistband and immediately yelled, "gun." Officer Leach secured defendant on the ground and placed him in handcuffs. The officers searched defendant’s person. In addition to the firearm, the officers uncovered "crack cocaine and also a white powdery substance that appeared to be cocaine as well wrapped up in a dollar bill loose." The officers confirmed that the firearm was not loaded and, after canvassing the surrounding area, affirmed that no ammunition had been abandoned nearby. The officers then placed defendant under arrest.

At some point after defendant’s arrest, Officer Leach spoke with "the reporting party." He testified, "I went to her house, and she did not want to complete a written statement."⁵

Thereafter, the state charged defendant with possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-5.2; carrying a pistol or revolver without a license or permit, in violation of § 11-47-8(a); and possession of cocaine, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i). The defendant moved to suppress the white powdery substance and the firearm as fruits of an unconstitutional search and seizure.

On July 15, 2019, a justice of the Superior Court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, the trial justice elicited testimony about the nature of the neighborhood and determined that, under the totality of the circumstances—Officer Leach’s thirty years of experience as a law enforcement officer, the dispatch sending him to "one of the higher crime" areas in Pawtucket, defendant’s match to the dispatch description "to a T," defendant’s deliberate noncompliance to Officer Leach’s commands, and defendant’s pivot to reach for his waistband—amounted to the level of reasonable suspicion required to justify the warrantless stop. As a result, the trial justice concluded that the gun and cocaine had been lawfully seized, and he thus denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

On March 4, 2020, the Superior Court held a bench trial on the charges brought against defendant. The trial justice found defendant guilty of carrying a pistol or revolver without a license or permit and possession of cocaine.⁶ The defendant was sentenced to two separate sentences, to .be served concurrently, with one year to serve and four suspended, with five years of probation, for the firearm charge; and one year suspended, with one year of probation, for the controlled-substance charge.⁷ A judgment of conviction and commitment then entered on September 16, 2020.

On July 2, 2020, defendant filed a premature but valid notice of appeal.

II Standard of Review

[2, 3] This Court reviews de novo an alleged violation of a constitutional right. See State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 329 (R.I. 2003). When conducting this review, we defer to the factual findings of the trial justice, applying a clear error standard, and we address questions of law de novo. See State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 50 (R.I. 2014); see afeo Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ("We therefore hold that as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal.").

III Discussion

[4, 5] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its Rhode Island counterpart, article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution, protect persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Patino, 93 A.3d at 51 (stating that the purpose of these constitutional provisos is to "guarantee the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government" (brackets omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989))); see also State v. Hudgen, 272 A.3d 1069, 1079 (R.I. 2022) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment and its Rhode Island counterpart provide the same protections). "The question of whether a search and seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case." Patino, 93 A.3d at 51 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967)).

[6, 7] It is well settled that "a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop, provided the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person detained is engaged in criminal activity." State v. Abdullah, 730 A.2d 1074, 1076 (R.I. 1999) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1147 (R.I. 1980)). We determine whether an officer's suspicions are sufficiently reasonable to justify a search based on the totality of the circumstances. See Keohane, 814 A.2d at 330 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

The defendant claims that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress because the dispatch that directed Officer Leach to defendant’s location could not have, by itself, justified a warrantless search and seizure. The defendant disputes the trial justice’s conclusion that Officer Leach rightly stopped and searched him based primarily upon an unsubstantiated tip from an informant who refused to give any identifying information or provide a written statement to the police. This result, defendant contends, contravenes the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), in which the Court held that a Terry stop based on an unsubstantiated anonymous tip was unconstitutional.⁸ The defendant argues that, as in J.L., the anonymous tip in this case "provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility." J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375.

Moreover, defendant notes that Officer Leach did not conduct an independent investigation to corroborate the tip and failed to observe any other criminal behavior or furtive gestures prior to the seizure. The defendant also contests the weight that the trial justice placed on defendant’s location in a "high-crime" neighborhood.

In response, the state distinguishes J.L. from the case at bar on the basis that Artie was an eyewitness who had firsthand knowledge of the criminal activity in question. The state additionally asserts that Officer Leach’s ability to ascertain Artie’s identity made the tip non-anonymous and, therefore, more reliable. Primarily, the state reiterates the factors that the trial justice articulated at the hearing on the motion to suppress—namely, defendant’s location in "one of the higher crime rate areas in Pawtucket" at 1:00 a.m., Officer Leach’s law enforcement experience, the fact that Officer Leach could...