State v. Porter

170 Idaho 391

511 P.3d 273

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Tyrel Gibbs PORTER, Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 48634

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: February 17, 2022

Review Denied: June 27, 2022

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Andrew V. Wake argued.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Kimberly A. Coster argued.

HUSKEY, Judge

The State appeals from the district court's order granting Tyrel Gibbs Porter's motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the court's order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts in this case are undisputed by the parties. According to the district court's factual findings, in the early morning hours of December 28, 2019, law enforcement received a call that an individual had wandered into a home and was acting peculiar. Deputy Knudsen and Deputy Grunig responded to the call. Deputy Knudsen arrived near the reporting party's home and saw Porter walking along the roadway in the snow, in very cold weather, wearing only underwear. Deputy Knudsen approached Porter and asked if he was okay. Porter had both hands in the air, was shaking, and told Deputy Knudsen that he was very cold and needed help; Porter asked if he could get into Deputy Knudsen's police truck. Deputy Grunig arrived on the scene, and Deputy Knudsen told Porter that he could get into Deputy Grunig's truck. Porter got into the truck, and Deputy Knudsen retrieved a blanket from his truck and gave it to Porter.

Deputy Knudsen asked Porter whether he had consumed any alcohol or drugs; Porter responded that he had consumed "two methamphetamine rocks." Deputy Knudsen also asked Porter why he was not wearing any clothes. Porter said that the individuals in the home he had entered had given him some clothes, but he had taken them off because he did not know whose clothes they were. Paramedics arrived approximately ten minutes later and transported Porter to the hospital. At some point prior to being transported to the hospital, Porter was asked where his clothing was and he replied that he did not know. Deputy Knudsen followed the ambulance to the hospital where he remained outside Porter's room.

Meanwhile, Deputy Grunig continued to the address of the reporting party. Deputy Grunig accidentally drove past the house, and as he was turning around, he noticed some clothes alongside the road approximately 500 yards from where he made contact with Porter. Deputy Grunig stopped and went over to the clothing to see if he could identify to whom it belonged. The clothing consisted of a gray and yellow coat and a pair of black snow pants; in the pocket of the pants, Deputy Grunig found a bank card with Porter's name on it. Deputy Grunig put the clothing in his truck and continued to the reporting party's address. Deputy Grunig later found the clothing given to Porter by the reporting party behind the house. After speaking with the reporting party, Deputy Grunig went to the sheriff's office where he again searched the clothing found on the roadside. In the pocket of the snow pants, Deputy Grunig found methamphetamine and additional forms of identification belonging to Porter.

Deputy Grunig went to the hospital and explained to Deputy Knudsen that he planned to arrest Porter for possession of a controlled substance. Before arresting Porter, Deputy Grunig spoke with Porter and asked him to identify the clothing that he was missing. Porter identified his clothing as a gray and yellow coat and black snow pants. Deputy Grunig then placed Porter under arrest for possession of methamphetamine.

A criminal complaint was filed December 30, 2019, charging Porter with possession of methamphetamine. Porter waived his preliminary hearing and an information was filed January 14, 2020. On July 23, 2020, Porter entered a plea of not guilty and trial was set for October 26-27, 2020. On September 17, 2020, Porter filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his clothing. The State filed a memorandum in opposition, arguing that the motion was untimely under Idaho Criminal Rule 12 and, alternatively, that Porter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothes because he had voluntarily abandoned them.

The district court held a hearing on the motion. The district court addressed the State's timeliness objection, noting that if the court heard the motion, the motion would not be resolved without infringing on Porter's speedy trial rights. Porter agreed to waive his right to a speedy trial to allow the district court time to rule on his motion to suppress. Without making any finding of good cause or excusable neglect for Porter's failure to comply with the I.C.R. 12 deadline, the district court denied the State's timeliness objection and proceeded with the motion to suppress hearing. Following the hearing, the district court allowed the parties to submit post-hearing briefing. Porter submitted a brief; the State did not. In his brief, Porter argued that he "did not have sufficient capacity to knowingly abandon" his clothes. He also argued that once Deputy Grunig found the clothes and identified them as belonging to Porter, a warrant was required to conduct the additional search at the sheriff's office.

The district court also ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the application of the community caretaking doctrine. Both parties filed a supplemental memorandum. The State argued the search of Porter's clothes was justified by the community caretaking function because Officer Grunig was at the scene for the purpose of rendering aid to Porter and because once Porter said he had consumed methamphetamine, Officer Grunig had a responsibility to ensure any hazardous substance (methamphetamine) was not left in public. Porter asserted that while the initial search of his clothing may have been justified by the community caretaking function, the subsequent search of his clothing at the sheriff's office was not. Porter argued the community caretaking function did not justify the second search because at the time the search took place, Porter's health and safety had been secured, emergency services were no longer being provided, and there was no danger of potential evidence disappearing or being destroyed.

The district court granted the motion to suppress. The court found that there was "no evidence offered by the State to suggest that Porter had abandoned any further interest in his clothing." The district court further found that Porter had not abandoned his clothing for purposes of the Fourth Amendment:

Based on Porter's statements to Deputy Knudsen and Deputy Grunig as well as Porter's physical and mental state at the time of the encounter, it is clear that Porter was not in a state of mind to affirmatively abandon any possessory interest in his clothing or his expectation of privacy with respect to his clothing. Not only was Porter wandering around outside in sub-freezing temperatures wearing only his boxer shorts, but Porter admitted that he had consumed "two rocks of methamphetamine." Under the totality of the circumstances and the lack of any objective evidence, the Court finds that Porter had not abandoned his clothing for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Court finds it more likely that Porter, being under the influence of methamphetamine, removed his clothing for some drug induced purpose and forgot where he left them.

The court concluded that Porter maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his clothing from the time he removed it to the time he identified the clothing during his discussion with Deputy Grunig at the hospital. The district court also found that although Deputy Grunig was acting within his community caretaker capacity when he conducted the initial search of the clothing, there was no evidence to justify the second search of the clothing pursuant to the community caretaker function.

The State timely appeals from the district court's order granting Porter's motion to suppress.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The power to extend or shorten the required time for filing a motion to suppress under I.C.R. 12(d) is discretionary. State v. Alanis , 109 Idaho 884, 887-88, 712 P.2d 585, 588-89 (1985). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera , 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina , 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

III.ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Considering Porter's Untimely Motion to Suppress Without Finding Good Cause Or Excusable Neglect

The State argues the district court abused its discretion when it considered Porter's motion to suppress without requiring Porter to provide an explanation for the untimeliness of the motion and without making a finding that good cause or...