State v. Purdue Pharma L.P.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, by and through, PETER NERONHA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA INC.;THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.;RHODES PHARMACEUTICALS L.P.; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES;RHODES TECHNOLOGIES INC.; RICHARD S. SACKLER;INSYS THERAPEUTICS, INC.; JOHN N. KAPOOR; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.;CEPHALON, INC.; MALLINCKRODT PLC; MALLINCKRODT, LLC;SPECGX, LLC; CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.;MCKESSON CORPORATION d/b/a MCKESSON DRUG COMPANY;and AMERISOURCEBERGEN DRUG CORPORATION, Defendants.

C.A. No. PC-2018-4555

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

May 31, 2019

DECISION

GIBNEY, P.J. Before this Court is a Motion by Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., and The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. (collectively Purdue Defendants or Purdue) for the Court to Reconsider its May 6, 2019 Order (the Order) granting the State of Rhode Island's (Plaintiff or the State) Motion to Compel the Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Purdue (the Deposition). Alternately, Purdue Defendants move the Court to rule on their objections to the topics in the State's April 4, 2019 Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) to Purdue Defendants (the Notice), and to clarify the permissible scope of the Deposition. The State objects to Purdue's Motion for Reconsideration and further moves for an order that the Deposition commence within ten days of the denial of Purdue's Motion for Reconsideration. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14 and Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

IFacts and Travel

This motion arises from an ongoing matter in which the State, by and through its Attorney General Peter Neronha,¹ seeks to recover for damages allegedly caused by the opioid epidemic from seventeen defendants comprised of opioid manufacturers, distributors, and two individuals with executive positions (or former executive positions) at defendant organizations. For a more thorough recitation of the facts underlying this dispute, the Court refers readers to State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. PC-2018-4555, 2018 WL 6074198 (R.I. Super. Nov. 15, 2018).

On April 4, 2019, the State noticed Purdue of a Deposition pertaining to topics related to finance and corporate structure, pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Purdue objected to the Notice, to which the State responded with its intent to file a Motion to Compel. On April 15, 2019, Purdue moved for a Protective Order from this Court and to Quash the Notice. In support thereof, Purdue Defendants argued that the Notice is overbroad and seeks irrelevant information; is duplicative of information already in the State's possession; and is unduly burdensome in its scope, timing, and location. The State objected to Purdue's Motion to Quash—arguing that the requested Deposition is relevant and necessary, that it is not duplicative or premature, and that Purdue Defendants have not cooperated with the State's requests to meet and confer—and on April 17, 2019, filed a Cross-Motion to Compel the Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Purdue Defendants. This Court heard argument on May 1, 2019.

On May 6, 2019, the Court entered an Order granting the State's Motion to Compel. On May 13, 2019, Purdue moved the Court to Reconsider its Order under Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In the alternative, Purdue requested that the Court rule on Purdue's specific objections to the Notice. On May 16, 2019, the State objected to Purdue's Motion for Reconsideration.

IIStandard of Review

The Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly recognize a motion for reconsideration. Flanagan v. Blair, 882 A.2d 569, 574 (R.I. 2005). Rather, the Supreme Court "treat[s] motions for 'reconsideration' . . . as the equivalent of motions to vacate under Rule 60(b)." Id. at 574 (citing Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 850 A.2d 912, 916 (R.I. 2004)). Specifically, Rule 60(b) states, in pertinent part,

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

"(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

"(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

"(3) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

"(4) The judgment is void; "(5) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which the judgment is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or

"(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has recognized that "[i]t is perhaps an understatement to say that Rule 60(b)(6) rarely is invoked with success." McLaughlin v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of Tiverton, 186 A.3d 597, 609 (R.I. 2018) (explaining that there is a dearth of cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence finding vacation of judgment proper under this subsection of the rule). Indeed, Rule 60(b)(6) "does not function as a 'catchall' provision or as a substitute for a timely appeal but rather requires that circumstances be extraordinary to justify relief." 1 Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure § 60.8 (2018-19 ed.). Significantly, courts may only grant motions pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) under "unique circumstances to prevent manifest injustice." Id.

"It is the burden of the moving party to convince the trial justice that legally sufficient grounds exist to warrant the vacation of judgment under Rule 60(b)." McBurney v. Roszkowski, 875 A.2d 428, 439 (R.I. 2005) (citing DeFusco v. Giorgio, 440 A.2d 727, 730 (R.I. 1982)). In reviewing such decisions, the Supreme "Court employs an abuse of discretion standard of review with respect to motions to vacate filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)." In re Estate of Brown, 206 A.3d 127, 134 (R.I. 2019) (citing Allen ex rel. Allen v. South County Hospital, 945 A.2d 289, 293 (R.I. 2008)).

IIIAnalysis

Purdue Defendants bring the Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the Court granted the State's Motion to Compel but did not formally deny their Motion to Quash and did not specifically rule on their objections to the Notice. Purdue Defendants further submit that the Order did not provide formal guidance as to any limitations of scope or breadth of the proposed Deposition. Accordingly, Purdue asks the Court to reconsider its May 6, 2019 Order and alternately to offer guidance regarding Purdue's objections to the Notice. See Purdue Defs.' Mot. Quash Ex. B.

In support of this Court's reconsideration of the Order, Purdue Defendants argue that the topics in the Notice of Deposition are irrelevant to the underlying claims of the case, and that they are duplicative and overly broad. Citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hindle, Purdue Defendants argue that the topics in the Notice are irrelevant because the information is solely related to the State's future interest in post-judgment relief and therefore is not discoverable. 748 A.2d 256, 259 (R.I. 2000). Purdue Defendants further assert that the information in the Notice is duplicative because they already have provided the State with "tens of millions of pages of documents" related to topics included in the Notice. (Purdue Defs.' Mot. Recons. 5.) Finally, Purdue Defendants argue that the Court lacks authority to compel Purdue's designees to appear for depositions in Rhode Island because Purdue Defendants are foreign corporations, and request that the Deposition be held out of state.

Should this Court deny Purdue's Motion to Reconsider, Purdue Defendants request individual rulings on their objections to the Notice of Deposition as well as clarification of the Order. Specifically, Purdue Defendants ask the Court to clarify the "scope and breadth" of the Deposition and to elucidate the appropriate timeframe. (Purdue Defs.' Mot. Recons. 3.) The Notice requests information from 1996 to the present, and Purdue Defendants argue that this information is irrelevant and overly burdensome. Purdue Defendants additionally argue that many of the topics seek information that would be more appropriate to produce and review in writing, noting that some of the requests seek information regarding non-party entities.

In response, the State asks the Court to deny Purdue's Motion and to order the Deposition to commence within ten days of such denial. In support thereof, the State argues that Purdue Defendants have failed to carry out their burden under Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The State notes that only once in their memorandum do Purdue Defendants reference Rule 60(b)(6), and that they fail to present any case law demonstrating an analogous situation in which this rule was applied to reverse a decision or order. Importantly, the State submits that Purdue Defendants do not explain why the facts here are unique or extraordinary, as required for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(6).

Notwithstanding Purdue Defendants' failure to meet their burden under Rule 60(b)(6), the State maintains that this Court correctly decided the issue in its Order. According to the State, Purdue's reliance on Hindle is misplaced and financial inquiry is relevant. The State further argues that the Notice of Deposition is not overbroad, and that the timeframe relates directly to the allegations in the Amended Complaint. The State notes that Purdue Defendants do not have the right to dictate the mode of discovery under the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the State may utilize various methods as it sees fit. Finally, the State submits that the location of the Deposition is not in dispute. According to the State, it has agreed to meet and confer with Purdue to determine a mutually agreeable location for the Deposition.

It is well-settled that the trial court has broad discretion over discovery, and that ...