State v. Quinn

95 N.E.3d 664

2017 Ohio 7000

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.James QUINN, Defendant–Appellant

No. 2014–CA–44

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Clark County.

Rendered on July 28, 2017

MEGAN M. FARLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0088515, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark County Prosecutor's Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Fourth Floor, Springfield, Ohio 45502, Attorney for Plaintiff–Appellee

JAMES QUINN, Inmate No. 699–607, London Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 69, London, Ohio 43140, Defendant–Appellant, Pro Se

OPINION

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Following a trial held on March 24–25, 2014, a jury found Defendant-appellant, James Quinn, guilty of two counts of domestic violence, third degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2919.25 ; two counts of kidnapping, first degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and (B)(1) ; one count of abduction, a third degree felony in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) ; and one count of intimidation of a victim in a criminal case, a third degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1). Quinn argues that his resulting conviction should be vacated because the trial court erred by overruling challenges for cause he directed at two prospective jurors. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled the challenges for cause, and therefore, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} A jury found Quinn guilty as charged on March 25, 2014, at the conclusion of a two-day trial. At his disposition hearing, held on March 26, 2014, the trial court merged the two kidnapping offenses with the abduction offense for purposes of sentencing, and the State elected to proceed on one of the kidnapping offenses. The court sentenced Quinn to serve consecutive terms of three years' imprisonment for each of the charges of domestic violence; 11 years for the merged charge of kidnapping; and three years for the charge of intimidation of a victim, for a total sentence of 20 years.

{¶ 3} Quinn appealed his conviction, and in State v. Quinn , 2016-Ohio-139, 57 N.E.3d 379 (2d Dist.), decided on January 15, 2016, we affirmed the trial court's judgment. On April 12, 2016, Quinn filed an application to re-open his appeal based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, faulting counsel for failing to present arguments concerning the trial court's rulings on the challenges for cause he raised during voir dire. We granted Quinn's application to re-open on May 11, 2016. Although we appointed counsel to represent Quinn for this appeal, he elected instead to represent himself and filed a motion on October 3, 2016 for leave to proceed pro se. We sustained Quinn's motion on October 20, 2016.

II. Analysis

{¶ 4} For the first of his three assignments of error, Quinn contends that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY OVERRULED A CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE THAT RESULTED IN THE APPELLANT HAVING TO USE A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE UNNECESSARILY. THE APPELLANT EXHAUSTED ALL OF HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BEFORE A FULL JURY WAS SEATED WHICH [SIC] IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.¹

{¶ 5} The "Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to be tried by an impartial jury." State v. Priest , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24225, 2011-Ohio-4694, 2011 WL 4337156, ¶ 15, citing Morgan v. Illinois , 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) ; see also Article I, Section 10, Ohio Constitution (establishing that, "[i]n any trial, in any court, the party accused" has the right to a "speedy public trial by an impartial jury"). When deciding whether to exclude a prospective juror for cause, a court must determine whether that person has "views that would ‘prevent or substantially impair the [person's] performance’ " of the duties of a juror " ‘in accordance with [the court's] instructions and [the juror's] oath.’ " Priest , 2011-Ohio-4694, 2011 WL 4337156, ¶ 15, quoting Adams v. Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). Under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) and (D), and R.C. 2945.25(B), a prospective juror may be challenged, among other things, for an inability to "be * * * fair and impartial" or, similarly, for suspected bias against the prosecution or the defense.

{¶ 6} Given that the "determination of juror bias necessarily involves a[n] [assessment of] credibility, the basis of which often will not be apparent from an appellate record," a court of appeals must give " ‘deference * * * to the trial judge who sees and hears the [challenged] juror.’ " State v. DePew , 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 280, 528 N.E.2d 542 (1988), quoting Wainwright v. Witt , 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 LEd.2d 841 (1985). The relevant inquiry in this situation is " ‘whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court's [putative] error.’ " (Emphasis omitted.) Gray v. Mississippi , 481 U.S. 648, 665, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987), quoting Moore v. Estelle , 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1982) ; see also State v. Broom , 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 287, 533 N.E.2d 682 (1988), citing Gray , 481 U.S. at 665, 107 S.Ct. 2045. Thus, a defendant in a criminal case " ‘cannot complain of prejudicial error in the overruling of a challenge for cause if [the] ruling does not force him to exhaust his peremptory challenges.’ " (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Hale , 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Eaton , 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 7} The decision "whether to disqualify a juror for cause is a discretionary function of the trial court" and is "not reversible on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Choice , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25131, 2013-Ohio-2013, 2013 WL 2150828, ¶ 19, citing Berk v. Matthews , 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 559 N.E.2d 1301 (1990), syllabus. An abuse of discretion is "a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Id. , citing Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. , 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248 (1985). Because Quinn used all of his peremptory challenges, we turn to the merits of his first assignment of error. Trial Tr. 42, 49, 54–55 and 62, Mar. 24–25, 2014.

{¶ 8} Quinn argues that the trial court should have excused Prospective Juror No. 58 (the "Locksmith") as the result of bias in favor of the State.² See Appellant's Br. 2–5. He cites the following as illustrative of the Locksmith's purported bias:

PROSECUTOR: * * *. Do you have any close friends or family in law enforcement?

THE LOCKSMITH: Most of them are retired.

PROSECUTOR: Anything from the interactions that you've had with them that would keep you from being a fair and impartial juror today?

THE LOCKSMITH: I believe them more than I believe regular people.

PROSECUTOR: Let's talk about that. That's an interesting statement. Would you agree with me that police officers have certain experience and expertise that the rest of us may not have?

THE LOCKSMITH: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: They respond to scenes and handle things that we can't even imagine.

THE LOCKSMITH: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Does that mean that police officers[,] at least in your mind [,] don't make the same mistakes that the rest of us make?

THE LOCKSMITH: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Do you think that police officers are above * * * stretching the truth?

THE LOCKSMITH: For the most part, yes. I worked as a special with them for twenty-five years, and I still do odds and ends work with them.

PROSECUTOR: Do you think just because a police officer comes in here today and tells you that something happened, does that mean—or because a police officer has filed charges[,] do you think that means that the defendant is guilty?

THE LOCKSMITH: I believe he does.

PROSECUTOR: You believe the police officer does?

THE LOCKSMITH: Yes. But it's yet to be proven[,] though.

Trial Tr. 56–58. After this exchange, Quinn's attorney questioned the Locksmith as follows:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: [I]s it because you have worked so closely with law enforcement that you would believe an officer to be truthful?

THE LOCKSMITH: Probably so. I worked as a special on the third shift a couple of times a month for twenty-five years.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: If an officer got up on the stand and told you something, can you imagine that you would ever not believe him? If he looked you in the eye and told you something happened, he witnessed it or—

THE LOCKSMITH: If he said he witnessed it, I would believe him.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: What if that conflicted with another witness, who would you believe?

THE LOCKSMITH: I would have the tendency to believe the police officer first.

* * *

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Even though an officer has filed charges against my client and he's sitting here, because of that do you have any preconceived notions about my client's innocence?

THE LOCKSMITH: Just because he's filed charges and—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.

THE LOCKSMITH: —I don't have any preconceived—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: The officer swears in a statement things that if believed by you, would probably render a guilty verdict, does that change your mind about whether you think my client is innocent or not innocent sitting here?

THE LOCKSMITH: Depending upon what the officer would say when he's sitting in the chair.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And if he said the same thing [on the stand] that's in the [sworn statement]?

THE LOCKSMITH: I would have a tendency to believe it.

Id. at 59–61.

{¶ 9} Notwithstanding that the Locksmith expressed a tendency to believe law enforcement personnel more readily than others, we conclude that his statements did not evince an inability to remain impartial or reveal an implacable bias in favor of the State. He also expressed his understanding that the State bore the burden of proof, attested to his belief in the principle that a criminal defendant should be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and disclaimed having any preconceived opinions about Quinn's guilt or innocence. Id. at 57–58, 60.

{¶ 10} Quinn argues, even so, that the Locksmith "could not [have been] fair and impartial because he stated he could not," citing to our ...