State v. R.W.-W.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. R.W.-W., Appellant.

No. 54574-8-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

August 24, 2021

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEE C.J.

R.W.-W appeals the juvenile court's disposition finding him guilty of first degree rape of a child. R.W.-W. argues that (1) the juvenile court failed to enter specific findings of fact to permit meaningful appellate review; (2) Article I Sections 21 and 22 of the Washington Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution afford juveniles the right to a jury trial, which he was deprived; and (3) mandatory sex offender registration for juvenile offenders violates his due process rights.

We hold that the juvenile court's findings of fact permit meaningful appellate review. We do not address R.W.-W's arguments, raised for the first time on appeal, regarding whether juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial or whether R.W.-W.'s due process rights were violated by the mandatory sex offender registration requirement. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court's disposition finding R.W.-W. guilty of first degree rape of a child.

FACTS

The State charged R.W.-W., who was 14 years old at the time of the incident, with first degree rape of a child and second degree rape of a child in juvenile court. The incident leading to the charges involved L.H., ^[1] who was 10 years old at the time of the incident. At the bench trial, the State presented testimony from a number of witnesses including L.H. and L.H.'s mother, Crystal Johnson.

L.H testified that he was playing with R.W.-W. in his pool alone. When L.H. went to get out of the pool, R.W.-W. grabbed him by his shorts, pulled them off, "and then, like, just, you know, tried to-you know what I'm saying?" Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Dec. 11, 2019) at 137.

The State then offered and the trial court admitted Exhibit 2 into evidence. L.H. identified Exhibit 2 as a statement L.H. wrote with his father regarding the incident. In the statement, L.H. said that when he was going to get out of the pool, R.W.-W. grabbed him and told him, "I'm going to put my thing in your b[***]." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 246. L.H. then stated, "[H]e grabbed me again, pulled me down, and started doing it." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 246.

After reading the statement, the State asked L.H. what happened when he tried to get out of the pool. L.H. stated, "Well, then he tried to, like, I guess you could say put his penis near my b[***] hole, like, put it in but-well, yeah." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 141. L.H. continued, "I mean, not only did he try, he almost did, but then-I mean, he did." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 141.

On cross-examination, R.W.-W.'s counsel asked L.H., "You said [R.W.-W.] tried, right? You said a couple of times he was trying, or he tried." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 159. L.H. responded, "He was trying, and then, well, I guess he succeeded." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 159.

Johnson also testified regarding the incident between L.H. and R.W.-W. She stated that she learned of the incident when "a number of kids came over and told [her] what had happened." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 97. Johnson then called L.H., who was in the car with his father. L.H. was not comfortable talking about the incident over the phone while in the car, so Johnson asked him a series of yes-or-no questions.

Johnson first asked if R.W.-W. "put his d[***] in your a[**]." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 98. L.H. responded, "[Y]es." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 98. She then asked L.H. where the incident happened. L.H. said it happened in the pool at their house. Johnson further asked, "Does your b[***] hole hurt." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 98. L.H. responded, "[Y]es." VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 98.

After hearing the evidence, the juvenile court found that L.H.'s testimony was the most critical in the case, the evidence of L.H. changing his story "was very thin," and L.H.'s testimony was "credible and consistent, it has the ring of truth, the disclosure to the other children shortly after." VRP (Jan. 10, 2020) at 347. The juvenile court further found that the testimony of L.H.'s mother was "fairly consistent. She wanted the truth to come out." VRP (Jan. 10, 2020) at 347. The juvenile court also found that the medical exam findings by Dr. Kimberly Copeland, the physician who examined L.H. after the incident, were completely normal. Based on these findings, the juvenile court found R.W.-W. guilty of first degree rape of a child. The juvenile court also found that it was "not satisfied as to the quantum of proof on the second charge of the rape in the second degree because the evidence of forcible compulsion was not persuasive enough." VRP (Jan 10, 2020) at 348.

The juvenile court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The juvenile court made the following written findings:

1. On July 2, 2018, the Respondent had sexual intercourse with LPH.

2. LPH was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual intercourse and was not married to the Respondent.

3. LPH, being born on January 22, 2008, was at least twenty-four months younger than the Respondent, born on November 20, 2004.

4. This act occurred in Clark County Washington.

5. LPH's testimony was credible, consistent, and helps prove the above stated facts beyond a reasonable doubt.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 70-71.

The juvenile court sentenced R.W.-W. to a standard range of 15 to 36 weeks of commitment. As a result of his disposition for a class A felony sex offense, the juvenile court imposed a sex offender registration requirement.

R.W.-W. appeals.

ANALYSIS

A. Adequacy of Findings of Fact

R.W.-W. argues that the juvenile court failed to enter adequate findings of fact to permit meaningful appellate review. We disagree.

1. Legal Principles

A juvenile court "shall state its findings of fact and enter its decision on the record." JuCR 7.11(c). The court "shall enter written findings and conclusions." JuCR 7.11(d). The written findings "shall state the ultimate facts as to each element of the crime and the evidence upon which the court relied in reaching its decision." JuCR 7.11(d). Written findings and conclusions are required to enable adequate appellate review. State v. Bynum, 76 Wn.App. 262, 266, 884 P.2d 10 (1994), review denied, 126 Wn.2d 1012 (1995).

The findings of fact "must specifically state the ultimate facts necessary to support a conviction." State v. Avila, 102 Wn.App. 882, 896, 10 P.3d 486 (2000), review denied, 143 Wn.2d 1009 (2001). "Ultimate facts" are '"[t]he logical conclusions deduced from certain primary evidentiary facts.'" State v. Roggenkamp, 115 Wn.App. 927, 948-49, 64 P.3d 92 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 15 n.15, 904 P.2d 754 (1995)). They are "distinguished from evidentiary facts supporting them." Id. at 948 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d at 15 n.15).

"If findings of fact and conclusions of law do not state the 'ultimate' facts, that error can be cured by remand." Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d at 19. But a remand is not necessary in cases where the juvenile court entered a "comprehensive oral ruling," rendering noncompliance with JuCR 7.11(d) inconsequential. Bynum, 76 Wn.App. at 265.

An individual is guilty of first degree rape of a child when they have "sexual intercourse with another who is less than twelve years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least twenty-four months older than the victim." Former RCW9A.44.073(1) (1988). "'Sexual intercourse' . . . has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration." RCW 9A.44.010(1)(a). '"Sexual intercourse' . . . also means any act of sexual contact between the persons involving the sex organs of one person and the . . . anus of another." RCW 9A.44.010(1)(c).

2. Findings of Fact Sufficient for Review on Appeal

R.W.-W. argues that the juvenile court failed to enter adequate findings of fact. But here, the juvenile court entered written findings of fact that mirror the elements required to find an individual guilty of first degree rape of a child. Under the written findings of fact, the juvenile court found that "the Respondent had sexual intercourse with LPH," that "LPH was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual intercourse and was not married to the Respondent," and that "LPH, being born on January 22, 2008, was at least twenty-four months younger than the Respondent, born on November 20, 2004." CP at 70. These findings are logical conclusions that can be deduced from the evidence presented at trial.

The juvenile court deduced these logical conclusions from the primary evidentiary facts as stated under finding of fact 5: "LPH testimony was credible, consistent, and helps prove the above stated facts beyond a reasonable doubt." CP at 71. And the juvenile court's ultimate findings are further supported by the court's oral ruling, where the trial court's decision was obviously based on L.H.'s and Johnson's testimony; the juvenile court found that L.H.'s testimony was "the most critical," that Johnson "wanted the truth to come out," and that Johnson's testimony was "fairly consistent." VRP (Jan. 10, 2020) at 346-47.

R.W.-W. further argues that the juvenile court's findings were inadequate to permit meaningful review because the juvenile court referenced L.H.'s testimony as a whole in its decision, yet L.H. made various inconsistent statements during his testimony. The record fails to support this argument.

At trial, L.H. testified that when he tried to get out of the pool, R.W.-W. grabbed him by the shorts, pulled them off "and then, like, just, you know, tried to-you know what I'm saying?" VRP (Dec. 11, 2019) at 137. The State then offered and admitted Exhibit 2 into evidence. Exhibit...