State v. Riley

315 Conn. 637

110 A.3d 1205

STATE of Connecticut

v.Ackeem RILEY.

No. 19109.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 16, 2014.

Decided March 10, 2015.

Adele V. Patterson, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, John F. Fahey, senior assistant state's attorney, and Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

William M. Bloss and Sean K. McElligott, Bridgeport, filed a brief for the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance et al. as amici curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

McDONALD, J.

In a recent trilogy of cases, the United States Supreme Court fundamentally altered the legal landscape for the sentencing of juvenile offenders¹ to comport with the ban on cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment to the federal constitution. The court first barred capital punishment for all juvenile offenders; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ; and then barred life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79–80, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose a term of life imprisonment without parole on juvenile homicide offenders, thus precluding consideration of the offender's youth as mitigating against such a severe punishment, violate the principle of proportionate punishment under the eighth amendment.

Miller did not specifically address the constitutional parameters of when a life sentence without parole may be imposed in the exercise of the sentencing authority's discretion on a juvenile homicide offender. The present case requires us to consider this question.

The defendant, Ackeem Riley, was seventeen years old when he committed homicide and nonhomicide offenses for which the trial court imposed, in the exercise of its discretion, a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment. The defendant has no possibility of parole before his natural life expires. In his certified appeal to this court, the defendant claims that his sentence and the procedures under which it was imposed violate Graham and Miller, and, hence, the eighth amendment. Specifically, the defendant contends that: (1) Miller required the trial court to consider his youth and circumstances attendant to his youth as mitigating against the functional equivalent to a life sentence without parole when exercising its sentencing discretion; and (2) if the trial court imposes the functional equivalent to a life sentence in the exercise of its discretion, Graham requires that he be afforded a subsequent opportunity to obtain release based on his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

We agree with the defendant's Miller claim. Therefore, he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding at which the court must consider as mitigation the defendant's age at the time he committed the offenses and the hallmarks of adolescence that Miller deemed constitutionally significant when a juvenile offender is subject to a potential life sentence. We decline, however, to address the defendant's Graham claim. As we explain later in this opinion, the legislature has received a sentencing commission's recommendations for reforms to our juvenile sentencing scheme to respond to the dictates of Graham and Miller. Therefore, in deference to the legislature's authority over such matters and in light of the uncertainty of the defendant's sentence upon due consideration of the Miller factors, we conclude that it is premature to determine whether it would violate the eighth amendment to preclude any possibility of release when a juvenile offender receives a life sentence.

We begin with a brief overview of the facts that the jury reasonably could have found and the procedural history of this case. In November, 2006, when the defendant was seventeen years old, he participated in a drive-by shooting into a crowd that left an innocent sixteen year old dead and two other innocent bystanders, ages thirteen and twenty-one, seriously injured. The defendant and his accomplice thought that someone responsible for a gang related shooting the previous week was at the scene. The defendant's identity as one of the perpetrators was corroborated by his involvement in an incident two months after the crimes at issue in which a firearm was discharged that matched the weapon used in the 2006 shootings. A jury convicted the defendant of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–54a (a) and 53a–8, two counts of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 (a)(2) and 53a–54a (a), two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–59 (a)(5) and 53a–8, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 (a) and 53a–54a (a). The murder conviction exposed the defendant to a potential sentence of twenty-five to sixty years imprisonment, with no possibility of parole. See General Statutes §§ 53a–35a (2), 53a–35b and 54–125a (b)(1)(E). The other convictions exposed him to sentences ranging from one year imprisonment to twenty years imprisonment.

The trial court ultimately imposed a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment. It is undisputed that this sentence is the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole.² See State v. Riley, 140 Conn.App. 1, 3 n. 2, 58 A.3d 304 (2013). In stating its basis for imposing this sentence, the trial court made no reference to the defendant's age at the time he committed the offenses. After the trial court rendered judgment in the present case in 2009, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller.

In his appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant contended that his sentence and the procedure under which it was imposed violated his rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. Id., at 4, 10 and n. 7, 58 A.3d 304. A majority of the Appellate Court rejected these contentions. Id., at 4, 58 A.3d 304. The majority concluded that Miller requires only that a defendant be afforded the opportunity to present mitigating evidence, including evidence relating to his age, and that the court be permitted to impose a lesser sentence than life without parole after considering any such evidence. Id., at 10, 14–16, 58 A.3d 304. It determined that Connecticut's sentencing scheme comported with these requirements. Id., at 18, 58 A.3d 304. The majority further concluded that the trial court in the present case had in fact considered many of the factors identified as relevant in Miller before imposing the defendant's sentence. Id., at 19–21, 58 A.3d 304. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Borden disagreed with each of these determinations and concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. Id., at 23–40, 58 A.3d 304. Judge Borden further opined that, if a trial court determines that a life sentence is appropriate after giving due weight to the offender's youth, Graham requires the court to provide for a “second look,” i.e., a meaningful opportunity for the juvenile offender to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Id., at 39–40, 58 A.3d 304.

In his certified appeal to this court, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court majority was incorrect as a matter of law and fact. Specifically, he contends that the sentencing procedure and the sentence itself failed to conform to the dictates of Miller and Graham. For the reasons that follow, we agree that the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding that follows the dictates of Miller.

ITHE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S TRILOGY

The eighth amendment to the United States constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” This provision is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). “[T]he [e]ighth [a]mendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183.

Although the unique aspects of adolescence had long been recognized in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence,³ it was not until the trilogy of Roper, Graham, and Miller that the court held that youth and its attendant characteristics have constitutional significance for purposes of assessing proportionate punishment under the eighth amendment. Cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382–405, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's failure to consider principle of proportionate punishment in determining that death penalty may be applied to persons who committed capital crime between ages of sixteen and eighteen), overruled in part by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). Because Roper and Graham lay the foundation for Miller, we begin with a brief overview of those cases.

ARoper

Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old when he planned and carried out the brutal murder of a stranger. Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 556–57, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The state of Missouri challenged the Missouri Supreme Court's decision setting aside Simmons' sentence of death and resentencing him to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole due to his age when he committed the offense. Id., at 559–60, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the state court that the...