State v. Riley Purgatory Bluff Creek Watershed Dist.

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State of Minnesota, by Spring Valley Friends, LLC, et al., Appellants, v. Riley Purgatory Bluff Creek Watershed District, Respondent, Pulte Homes of Minnesota, LLC, Respondent.

No. A22-1697

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

July 31, 2023

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-21-11618

Miles Ringsred, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellants)

Paul D. Reuvers, Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington Minnesota (for respondent Riley Purgatory Bluff Creek Watershed District)

Rob A Stefonowicz, Larkin Hoffman, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Pulte Homes of Minnesota, LLC)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.

OPINION

COCHRAN, JUDGE

Appellant, a non-profit citizens group, challenges the district court's dismissal of its appeal pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103D.537(a) (2022) of a permit decision made by respondent-watershed district. Because appellant did not perfect its appeal within the statutory time period, we affirm.

FACTS

This case involves a decision by respondent Riley Purgatory Bluff Creek Watershed District (the watershed district) to grant a permit for a new residential development in Eden Prairie and the subsequent filing of an appeal by appellant Spring Valley Friends in district court.^[1] The following facts are undisputed.

Respondent Pulte Homes of Minnesota LLC applied to the watershed district for approval of an erosion-prevention and sediment-control permit and a stormwater-management plan in connection with a development project (the permit).^[2] In June 2021, the board of managers of the watershed district held a regular meeting where it considered Pulte Homes' application. The board heard from several people at the meeting, including a member of Spring Valley Friends. Spring Valley Friends, a non-profit limited liability company, and its members "use, enjoy, and benefit from" the natural resources in the city of Eden Prairie. The board determined that it lacked sufficient information to decide on the application at the June meeting.

On August 4, the board convened for another regular meeting. At least one member of Spring Valley Friends was present. During the public input portion of the meeting, an engineering professor submitted a presentation and recommended a more thorough slope-stability analysis of the proposed project for consideration by the board. The board also heard from staff, including its engineering consultant, and the matter was continued. On August 12, the board met again, and the managers voted to approve the permit. The vote was taken by a voice, roll-call vote. A member of Spring Valley Friends was present at the meeting. On September 1, the board approved the minutes of the August 12 meeting.

Spring Valley Friends decided to appeal the August 12 permit decision to the district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103D.537(a). On September 10, 2021, Spring Valley Friends served its complaint on the watershed district. On September 23, Spring Valley Friends filed its complaint in district court.

The watershed district moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis that Spring Valley Friends' appeal was not filed within the 30-day statutory appeal period. The district court agreed. The district court dismissed the appeal with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the appeal was not timely filed because it was filed more than 30 days after the August 12 vote granting the permit.^[3] This appeal follows.

DECISION

Spring Valley Friends challenges the district court's dismissal of its appeal brought pursuant to section 103D.537(a) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that it timely filed its appeal in district court.

A district court properly dismisses an action when the district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Minn. R Civ. P. 12.08(c). "Time limits on appeals are jurisdictional and untimely appeals must be dismissed." In re Establishment of Cnty. Ditch No. 11 (Bevens Creek), 511 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn.App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994); see also In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. 2013) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal to the district court regarding a county's variance decision that was not initiated within the 30-day statutory period). "Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo." Daniel v. City of Minneapolis, 923 N.W.2d 637, 644 (Minn. 2019).

Spring Valley Friends' appeal of the watershed district's permit decision is governed by Minnesota Statutes section 103D.537(a). The statute provides, in relevant part:

Except as provided in section 103D.535, an interested party may appeal a permit decision or order made by the managers by a declaratory judgment action brought under chapter 555.... The decision on appeal must be based on the record made in the proceeding before the managers. An appeal of a permit decision or order must be filed within 30 days of the managers' decision.

Minn. Stat. § 103D.537(a) (emphasis added).

The parties agree that the statute unambiguously requires Spring Valley Friends to file its appeal "within 30 days of the managers' decision" for the district court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. But the parties disagree as to when the managers made their "decision" for purposes of commencing the appeal period. The watershed district asserts that the district court correctly concluded that the managers made their "decision" on the permit on August 12 when they voted at the board meeting to grant the permit. Spring Valley Friends does not dispute that the managers decided to approve the permit by a voice vote on August 12, but argues that the "decision" was not final for purposes of section 103D.537 until the decision was reduced to writing. On this basis, Spring Valley Friends argues that the managers' decision was not made until September 1 when the board of managers approved the meeting minutes of the August 12 meeting. The determination of when the managers made their "decision" is important because Spring Valley Friends did not file its appeal in district court until September 23. Thus, if the "decision" occurred on August 12, at the time of the voice vote, Spring Valley Friends' appeal was not timely under section 103D.537 because the appeal was filed more than 30 days after the decision. But, if the "decision" occurred on September 1, Spring Valley Friends' appeal was timely.

The Plain Language of Section 103D.537(a)

To resolve this question, we must interpret the term "decision" as used in section 103D.537(a). "Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo." Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics Advanced Info. Sys., Inc., 869 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. 2015). We aim to "ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature," "give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning," and "read the statute as a whole." Id. The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous. Id. A statute "is ambiguous only if, as applied to the facts of the particular case, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." Id. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and do "not explore the spirit or purpose of the law." Id.

We begin our analysis by noting that the term "decision," as used in section 103D.537(a), is not defined. In the absence of statutory definitions, "[w]e may consider dictionary definitions to determine the [plain and ordinary] meaning of a statutory term." In re Krogstad, 958 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). The specific "meaning of a word depends on how it is being used in context." Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

Dictionaries of common use, as well as legal dictionaries, define "decision" in a similar manner. For example, the American Heritage Dictionary defines "decision" as "[t]he act of reaching a conclusion or of passing of judgment on an issue under consideration." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 470 (5th ed. 2018). Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "decision" as "[a] judicial or agency determination after consideration of the facts and the law." Black's Law Dictionary 511 (11th ed. 2019). Instructively, these definitions reflect that a "decision" is the act of reaching a conclusion or determination. But neither definition of "decision" requires that the conclusion or determination be in writing to constitute a "decision." Rather, a "decision" is the "act of reaching a conclusion" or making a "determination."

With this definition in mind, we consider the meaning of the term as used in the context of section 103D.537(a). The statute provides that an appeal of a permit decision "must be filed within 30 days of the managers' decision." Minn. Stat. § 103D.537(a). Applying the dictionary definition of "decision" to the phrase "filed within 30 days of the managers' decision," we conclude that the appeal must be filed within 30 days of when the managers reach a conclusion or make a determination about a permit application. Significantly, there is no language in section 103D.537(a) requiring that the "managers' decision" be in writing. Id. Rather, the appeal provision simply refers to "the managers' decision" as starting the 30-day appeal period.

To read the statute to require a written decision to start the appeal period, as requested by Spring Valley Friends, would add language to the statute. It is well established that "[w]e cannot add words to a statute that the...