State v. Roberts

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINIC ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-39000

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

December 2, 2021

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY James Waylon Counts District Judge.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Cole P. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Mark A. Peralta-Silva Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, JUDGE.

{¶1} Defendant Dominic Roberts appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds prior to his jury trial convictions for unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-1(A)(1) (2009), and conspiracy to commit unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, contrary to Section 30-16D-1(A)(1) and NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979), both fourth-degree felonies.

On appeal, Defendant raises a single issue, that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Having considered the arguments and information before us, we reverse.

DISCUSSION^[1]

{¶2} "The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution." State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 272. We note that Defendant raises his speedy trial claim under both the Federal and New Mexico Constitutions. Because Defendant does not assert that New Mexico's speedy trial guarantee should be interpreted any differently from the Sixth Amendment's guarantee, and our courts have not done so in the past, we treat both protections as the same here. See id. ¶ 16 n.1.

{¶3} In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial, we analyze the four factors set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972): "(1) the length of delay in bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay." State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 5, 366 P.3d 1121. In analyzing the Barker factors, "we give deference to the district court's factual findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the Barker factors de novo." Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We determine whether Defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated by analyzing the particular facts of his case. See id. ¶ 16.

I. Length of Delay

{¶4} "The length of the delay is a two-fold inquiry. Initially, we determine whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial. If it is presumptively prejudicial, we balance the length of the delay against the remaining three factors to assess whether the [C]onstitution has been violated." State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591. The guidelines for determining whether a case is presumptively prejudicial depend on the complexity of the case: "twelve months for simple cases, fifteen months for cases of intermediate complexity, and eighteen months for complex cases." State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. The district court categorized this as a simple case, and both Defendant and the State agree. See State v. O'Neal, 2009-NMCA-020, ¶ 16, 145 N.M. 604, 203 P.3d 135 ("We defer to the district court's finding on the question of complexity when it is supported by substantial evidence." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We agree but pause to emphasize how very simple this case was. When Defendant's trial eventually took place, the State needed only three witnesses, the victim whose truck was stolen and two investigating police officers, and the trial lasted less than a day and a half, including voir dire and closing arguments. In this simple case, a twelve-month delay is presumptively prejudicial.

{¶5} To determine the length of delay, we must first identify the date that Defendant's right to a speedy trial attached. "In general, the right attaches when the defendant becomes an accused, that is, by a filing of a formal indictment or information or arrest and holding to answer." State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, Defendant was supposed to be arraigned on the criminal information on October 3, 2016. Defendant failed to appear for this arraignment and was arrested on a warrant for that failure on February 3, 2017. The district court ruled that Defendant's right to a speedy trial attached on October 3, 2016, when he was supposed to be arraigned. Neither party takes issue with this, and, because it does not impact our disposition of this case, we accept October 3, 2016, as the beginning date for our speedy trial analysis. See State v. Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 792, 182 P.3d 775 (acknowledging that this Court is not bound by a party's concession); see also Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 12 (providing that "the [speedy trial] right attaches when the defendant becomes an accused, that is, by a filing of a formal indictment or information or arrest and holding to answer" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We note the district court's emphasis that "[m]ore than twelve months elapsed from his capture following his failure to appear for arraignment." (Emphasis added.) As stated, however, we calculate Defendant's speedy trial right from the scheduled arraignment rather than his later arrest. Between the date of Defendant's scheduled arraignment on October 3, 2016, and Defendant's trial on December 4, 2019, the case was pending for approximately thirty-eight months, which far exceeds the twelve-month threshold for a simple case. This demonstrates a presumptively prejudicial delay, requiring this Court to weigh and balance the four factors.

{¶6} In determining the weight to be given to the length of delay, "the greater the delay[, ] the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24. Here, the delay is more than three times as long as the twelvemonth threshold and, therefore, this factor weighs heavily against the State. See State v. Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶ 9, 343 P.3d 199 (weighing delay that was nearly twice the "twelve-month threshold for [a] simple case[, ]" heavily against the state). The State concedes that this was a "substantial delay" and that this factor weighs heavily against the State.

II. Reasons for Delay

{¶7}"Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay[, ]" with "different weights [being] assigned to different reasons for the delay." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There are three types of delay that may be weighed against the state at varying levels: (1) deliberate attempts to delay the trial to thwart the defense weigh heavily against the state; (2) negligent or administrative delay weighs less heavily against the state, but "[a]s the length of delay increases, negligent or administrative delay weighs more heavily against the [s]tate[;]" (3) delay that is justified by a valid reason is weighed neutrally. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 29. "The reasons for a period of the delay may either heighten or temper the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Finally, any delay caused by the defendant generally weighs against the defendant." State v. Deans, 2019-NMCA-015, ¶ 10, 435 P.3d 1280.

{¶8} Turning to the first period of delay, we again observe that Defendant's arraignment was scheduled for October 3, 2016; Defendant failed to appear and was arrested on February 3, 2017. Defendant does not dispute that these four months of delay must be attributed entirely to him. This leaves approximately thirty-four months to consider, during which Defendant was held without bond until trial.

{¶9} The parties do not disagree significantly that the next period of delay lasted for approximately the next twenty-seven months, from February 3, 2017, until May 13 2019. Upon our review of the record, there is another period of delay to which we need to apply the same analysis; we also include the period of time from August 5, 2019, until December 4, 2019, in this part of our inquiry. During these thirty-one months, Defendant's trial setting was vacated for the district court's administrative reasons an extraordinary eight times and one time upon the State's request for a continuance. The district court vacated Defendant's first trial setting on May 3, 2017, when another case higher on the trailing docket went to trial. The district court continued Defendant's second trial setting on August 7, 2017, upon a motion from the State due to trial counsel's scheduling conflict; Defendant concurred in this continuance. The district court vacated Defendant's third trial setting on November 27, 2017, when another case higher on the trailing docket went to trial. The district court vacated Defendant's fourth trial setting on February 9, 2018, because the judge was ill. The district court vacated Defendant's fifth trial setting on May 7, 2018, when another case higher on the trailing docket went to trial. The district court vacated Defendant's sixth trial setting on August 21, 2018, because the judge was unavailable. The district...