State v. Robertson

223 N.E.3d 56

2023-Ohio-2746

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Melvin ROBERTSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22AP-227

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on August 8, 2023

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, (C.P.C. No. 20CR-3824).

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula M. Sawyers for appellee. Argued: Paula M. Sawyers.

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Francisco E. Luttecke for appellant. Argued: Francisco E. Luttecke.

DECISION

MENTEL, J.

[1–4] {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Melvin Robertson, appeals from a March 22, 2022 judgment entry, pursuant to a no contest plea,¹ of one count of having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a felony of the third degree.

{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 3} On August 18, 2020, appellant was indicted on one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a felony of the third degree. Appellant entered a not guilty plea on September 3, 2020. On August 7, 2021, appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, Article I, Section 14. Specifically, appellant argued that law enforcement had no cause to initiate a traffic stop of his vehicle as, per Am.Sub. H.B. No. 197 ("H.B. 197"), which temporarily suspended the expiration of vehicle registrations, his vehicle registration was not expired at the time of the stop. On August 24, 2021, the state filed a memorandum in opposition arguing that Officer Kyle Jacobs made a reasonable mistake of law and the good-faith exception should preclude the suppression of any evidence derived from the initial stop. The trial court held a suppression hearing on October 12, 2021. Officer Jacobs was the sole witness to provide testimony in this matter. (Oct. 12, 2021 Tr. at 5.)² The following evidence was adduced at the hearing.

{¶ 4} Officer Jacobs has been a patrol officer with the City of Whitehall for over seven years. According to Officer Jacobs, he is proficient in Ohio traffic law through his initial training with the Highway Patrol as well as ongoing training and self-study. (Tr. at 5.) Prior to the incident at issue in this case, Officer Jacobs would make traffic stops based on expired vehicle registrations "fairly often." (Tr. at 6.)

{¶ 5} On August 11, 2020, Officer Jacobs was driving his patrol route, in a marked Whitehall police cruiser, when he first observed a vehicle near the intersection of Yearling and Main Street.³ (Tr. at 7.) According to Officer Jacobs, he randomly runs vehicle tags when "there is not much going on." (Tr. at 7.) Officer Jacobs described the process of running tags as follows: "I have a computer in the cruiser with me and I just type in the plate number. It goes to the LEADS terminal which pops up with everybody’s information and will show basically all of the vitals for the BMV and any other information that people put in." (Tr. at 8.) Officer Jacobs testified that when he ran the tag on appellant’s vehicle, he concluded that appellant’s vehicle registration was expired. (Tr. at 8.) When asked if LEADS provided the exact date of expiration or generally that the vehicle registration was expired, Officer Jacobs responded, "[i]t will show the exact date of vehicle expiration." (Tr. at 8.) Believing that appellant’s vehicle registration had expired, Officer Jacobs initiated a traffic stop. According to Officer Jacobs, when he approached the window, he "saw the [appellant] reach over the passenger seat, like extensively reach over," and he could smell the odor of raw marijuana coming from the vehicle. (Tr. at 8-9.) After smelling the odor of marijuana, Officer Jacobs asked appellant to exit the vehicle. Officer Jacobs searched the vehicle and discovered rounds of ammunition, marijuana, and a handgun. (Tr. at 9.)

{¶ 6} Officer Jacobs testified that he is familiar with H.B. 197 and that it concerns registration and licensing requirements. (Tr. at 9-10.) Officer Jacobs denied that, on or before August 11, 2020, he knew the implications of H.B. 197. Officer Jacobs stated that he was only given "limited" direction on H.B. 197 and, to his knowledge, he was not given any information regarding the change in protocol concerning licenses or vehicle registrations. (Tr. at 10.) The only information he was provided was a document from the BMV, marked as Exhibit A. (Tr. at 10-12.)⁴ According to Officer Jacobs, he was provided the BMV memorandum around March 19, 2020. When asked if the document distinguishes "between license and vehicle registration?," he responded, "No -- yes -- I think? I believe it would distinguish -- I don’t know." (Tr. at 11.) Officer Jacobs, "interpreted [the BMV memorandum] as the Highway Patrol will not issue tickets to drivers, and then furthermore it says, ‘recommended that other law enforcement agencies in Ohio do the same thing.’ " (Tr. at 11-12.) Officer Jacobs believed, based on the information provided, he was "still able to essentially stop for expired vehicle registration." (Tr. at 12.)

(¶ 7} On cross-examination, Officer Jacobs acknowledged an important part of his job is knowing the laws of the State of Ohio and that, pursuant to H.B. 197, there were no expired registrations. (Tr. at 13.) On re-direct examination, Officer Jacobs testified that he believed at the time of the stop that he was abiding by the law of the State of Ohio.

{¶ 8} On March 4, 2022, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying appellant’s motion to suppress.⁵ The trial court provided no discussion of the language of H.B. 197, or whether it determined the uncodified provision was ambiguous. Instead, the trial court began its analysis concluding that Officer Jacobs was not "properly informed about [H.B.] 197, as the information given was unclear as to how agencies and officers should respond." (Mar. 4, 2022 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5.) The trial court wrote that the BMV memorandum was sent before H.B. 197 went into effect and "stated that the Ohio State Highway Patrol would not issue tickets for expired licenses, it did not say anything about other law enforcement agencies." Id. Despite concluding that Officer Jacobs made a mistake of law, the trial court found the mistake was reasonable as H.B. 197 was new and the language at issue was in an uncodified portion of the law. "These facts and circumstances assign no fault to the officer." Id. Finally, the trial court stated that the LEADS printout only tells officers the date of expiration but not the reason for the expiration. "Thus, the LEADS printout at the very least gave Officer Jacobs reasonable suspicion to pull the (sic.) Mr. Robertson over to investigate the reason his registration was expired." Id. at 6.⁶

{¶ 9} On March 21, 2022, appellant entered a plea of "no contest" to having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a felony of the third degree. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years of community control.

{¶ 10} Appellant filed a timely appeal.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 11} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:

[1] The trial court erred when it failed to analyze Officer Jacobs’ mistake of law for reasonableness.

[2] The trial court erred when it applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and determined the evidence gathered from the illegal seizure and eventual search of Mr. Robertson’s car was admissible.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Appellant’s First Assignment of Error

{¶ 12} In appellant’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred when it failed to examine Officer Jacobs’ mistake of law for reasonableness.

1. Standard of Review

[5, 6] {¶ 13} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State ?. Harrison, 166 Ohio St.3d 479, 2021-Ohio-4465, 187 N.E.3d 510, ¶ 11, citing State ?. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. In a suppression hearing, the trial court acts as the trier of fact, and as such, is best positioned to resolve questions of fact and determine the credibility of the witnesses. State ?. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582

N.E.2d 972 (1992). Accordingly, a reviewing court should defer to the trial court’s factual determinations when supported by "competent, credible evidence." Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State ?. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).

[7] {¶ 14} Upon accepting the factual determinations of the trial court, a reviewing court, "without deference to the [trial] court’s legal conclusions," must then independently resolve whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Harrison at ¶ 11, citing Burnside at ¶ 8. A reviewing court must consider the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. State ?. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, ¶14.

2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution

[8] {¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution preclude unreasonable searches and seizures. State ?. Massey, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-649, 2013-Ohio-1521, 2013 WL 1619189, ¶ 18, citing State ?. Kinney, 83 Ohio St.3d 85, 87, 698 N.E.2d 49 (1998); Katz ?. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Subject to only a few established and well-delineated exceptions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. Los Angeles ?. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419, 135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015), citing Arizona ?. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009).

[9–11] {¶ 16} A law enforcement officer’s stop of a motor vehicle constitutes a substantial intrusion, which requires justification as a "seizure"...