State v. Robinson

675 S.W.3d 526

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Leron ROBINSON, Appellant.

No. ED 110585

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.

Filed: July 18, 2023

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied August 21, 2023

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied October 24, 2023

FOR APPELLANTS: Christian Lehmberg, 1000 W Nifong Bldg 7, Columbia, Missouri 65203.

FOR RESPONDENT: Andrew Bailey, Zeb J. Charlton, P.O. Box 899, 221 West High Street, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.

Kelly C. Broniec, C.J., Philip M. Hess, J., and James M. Dowd, J.

OPINION

James M. Dowd, Judge

Appellant Leron Robinson appeals his convictions following a jury verdict for statutory sodomy in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first-degree for which he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty-five years, fifteen years, and ten years.

Robinson's first three claims relate to evidentiary rulings by the trial court which Robinson claims were erroneous and prejudiced his ability to present to the jury his theory of defense that the victim, A.R., fabricated the allegations against him. Specifically, Robinson claims the trial court erred by precluding him from adducing on cross-examination of A.R. that for years she "brushed" off and "avoided" answering her long-time therapist's questions whether she had ever been sexually molested. In Robinson's second and third points, he claims the trial court erred by precluding him from adducing evidence through the cross examination of A.R. and A.R.’s mother (Mother) that A.R.’s motive to fabricate the allegations was related to A.R.’s sexual orientation which, Robinson claims, caused a serious quarrel between A.R. and Mother just before A.R. came forward with her allegations of sexual abuse against Robinson. Robinson sought to have the jury infer that A.R. fabricated those allegations in order to rectify her estrangement from Mother.

We are unpersuaded because the trial court exercised its considerable discretion with regard to these evidentiary questions by striking a balance which gave Robinson ample opportunity to pursue his fabrication defense through cross-examination of A.R. and of Mother, while also placing certain reasonable limitations on what the jury heard. State v. Brasher , 867 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993)

In his fourth and fifth points, Robinson relies on State v. Jackson , 433 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Mo. banc 2014) and State v. Farr , 611 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) for his argument that the court plainly erred when it refused to instinct down from the two first -degree child molestation counts by submitting the lesser included offense instructions for second -degree child molestation. We need not reach these claims of error because we exercise our discretion to deny Robinson plain error review and affirm the convictions because Robinson failed to establish that manifest injustice resulted. State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 532 (Mo. banc 2020).

Background

A.R. testified to multiple instances of sexual abuse by Robinson, her uncle, both in Michigan and at her grandmother's house in Missouri when she was between the ages of ten and twelve. The State submitted to the jury three of those crimes, each of which occurred between April 1, 2009 and April 1, 2013.

The jury instruction for Count I (first-degree statutory sodomy) submitted that Robinson committed deviate sexual intercourse by knowingly placing his mouth on the genitals of A.R. This count was based on A.R.’s testimony that Robinson did this to her at her grandmother's house when she was twelve years old. Count II (first-degree child molestation), which submitted that Robinson touched A.R. with his genitals through her clothing, was based on A.R.’s testimony regarding an incident that occurred at her grandmother's house when she was twelve years old. Count III (first-degree child molestation), which submitted that Robinson touched A.R.’s breasts through her clothing, was based on A.R.’s testimony that this incident again occurred when she was twelve years old while staying at her grandmother's house.

In 2011, while the abuse was ongoing and due to A.R.’s behavioral issues at school, she began seeing a therapist. A.R. did not inform her therapist about the sexual abuse until February 2019. About three months before this disclosure, Mother expelled A.R. from the home after the two argued at a restaurant. Then, after A.R. disclosed the abuse to her therapist and to Mother, A.R.’s relationship with Mother improved and A.R. moved back home. During trial, Robinson sought to demonstrate that A.R. had fabricated the allegations against him based on (1) A.R.’s years-long failure to disclose the abuse to her therapist and (2) that A.R.’s sexual orientation drove the rift between A.R. and Mother which only resolved after A.R. came forward with her allegations against Robinson.

The trial court allowed Robinson to adduce evidence of A.R.’s sexual orientation, A.R.’s arguments with Mother, and that Mother expelled A.R. from the home near the time A.R. came forward with her accusations. The court did not, however, allow Robinson to ask A.R. whether she ever denied being molested in light of her testimony that "she never denied the abuse, she just never answered those questions from her therapist." The trial court also precluded Robinson from asking Mother about her personal negative beliefs regarding A.R.’s sexual orientation and from arguing in his opening statement that Mother's disapproval of A.R.’s sexual orientation caused A.R. to come forward with fabricated allegations against Robinson. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

The trial court is vested with broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence. State v. Walker , 318 S.W.3d 789, 791 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). "We review the trial court's decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion" that results in prejudice to the defendant. State v. White , 385 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration. State v. Mabry , 285 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009).

We may consider unpreserved errors under our plain error standard of review. See State v. Speed , 551 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citing State v. Taylor , 466 S.W.3d 521, 533 (Mo. banc 2015) ); Rule 30.20 ("Whether briefed or not, plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom."). Rule 30.20 is the exclusive means by which an appellant can seek review of any unpreserved claim of error and said claim—no matter if it is statutory, constitutional, structural, or of some other origin—is evaluated by this Court's plain error framework without exception. Brandolese , 601 S.W.3d at 530.

Review for plain error involves a two-step process. The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error "facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that ‘manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.’ " State v. Baumruk , 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (quoting State v. Brown , 902 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 1995) ) (internal citation omitted); Rule 30.20. All prejudicial error, however, is not plain error, and "[p]lain errors are those which are ‘evident, obvious, and clear.’ " Baumruk , 280 S.W.3d at 607 (quoting State v. Scurlock , 998 S.W.2d 578, 586 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) ) (internal citation omitted). If plain error is found, the court then must proceed to the second step and determine "whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice." Id.

Discussion

Robinson's first three points relate to his claim that certain limitations the trial court placed on his cross examination of A.R. and Mother erroneously restricted Robinson's ability to fully present to the jury his defense that A.R. had fabricated the allegations against him.

Point I

Point I¹ relates to A.R.’s years-long non-disclosure to her therapist of Robinson's abuse from which Robinson sought to have the jury infer that the abuse did not occur and that A.R. fabricated the allegations. The trial court precluded Robinson from asking A.R. whether she denied to her therapist that she had been molested because A.R. had already testified to the jury that she never denied being molested, but just avoided answering that question. The court permitted Robinson to extensively cross-examine A.R. about her conversations with the therapist.

The trial court is vested with broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial. State v. Perkins , 656 S.W.3d 285, 294 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). Defendants in sexual assault cases are allowed to introduce evidence demonstrating the prosecuting witness's story is a fabrication. State v. Taylor , 588 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). While the bias of a witness is always relevant, the scope of the evidence used to show bias is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Perkins, 656 S.W.3d at 294. On direct appeal, we review the trial court for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Hein , 553 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).

Here, Robinson relies for his argument on State v. Hedrick , 797 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990) and State v. Lampley , 859 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). In Hedrick , the defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and two counts of sodomy. 797 S.W.2d at 824. He sought to impeach T.H., the victim, with the long history of conflict among himself, his mother, and T.H. regarding T.H.’s custody, child support, and visitation. Id. Hedrick argued such evidence would have impeached T.H. by showing her motive to fabricate...