State v. Robinson

540 P.3d 614

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Floyd Corry ROBINSON, Appellant.

No. 20210293

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard May 15, 2023

Filed December 7, 2023

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Daniel L. Day, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee

Nicolas D. Turner, St. George, for appellant

Justice Pohlman authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Pearce, Justice Petersen, and Justice Hagen joined.

Justice Pohlman, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Nearly fourteen years after Floyd Corry Robinson pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and child abuse, he moved the district court, under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to correct what he claimed was an unconstitutional sentence. Robinson asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional because his counsel was ineffective and because the State suppressed favorable evidence. The court denied Robinson's motion on the ground that his claims were not cognizable under rule 22(e).

¶2 Robinson appeals, contending that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to identify relevant grounds to challenge his sentence under rule 22(e). He posits that the grounds he asserted in his motion fall within rule 22(e) ’s sweep because the rule generally allows for challenges to allegedly unconstitutional sentences. But Robinson relies on precedent interpreting a version of the rule that does not apply to his case, and his interpretation of the applicable rule is untethered to its plain language. Because Robinson did not identify a viable ground to challenge his sentence, the court did not err in denying his motion.

¶3 Robinson alternatively contends that the district court erred in construing his motion according to its caption rather than its substance. Although Robinson invoked rule 22(e), he claims his motion was more in line with a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) and that the court erred by not construing it as such. Even if the grounds Robinson asserted were not cognizable under rule 22(e), both the caption and substance of his motion indicated his intent to invoke the rule. The court did not err in construing the filing as what it purported to be.

¶4 Finally, invoking Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and State v. Clayton , 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), Robinson asks us to review four additional issues that his appellate counsel does not endorse. We do not reach the merits of those issues because we hold it is procedurally improper for appellate counsel to file a hybrid- Anders brief, simultaneously seeking review of both frivolous and nonfrivolous issues.

BACKGROUND

¶5 In 2005, Robinson shot and killed his ex-girlfriend in front of her three children. The State charged Robinson with aggravated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and child abuse. After nearly two years of pretrial motions and discovery, the State and Robinson reached a plea agreement in which Robinson pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and child abuse in exchange for the State dismissing the charges of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. The State also agreed not to seek the death penalty and stipulated to a twenty-years-to-life prison sentence. The district court ultimately sentenced Robinson to an indeterminate term of twenty years to life for aggravated murder and a consecutive indeterminate term not to exceed five years for child abuse.

¶6 Since his conviction, Robinson has sought to challenge his plea and sentence through various means, including by filing at least two failed PCRA petitions. At issue in this case is Robinson's pro se motion titled "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Under URCrP 22(e)," filed in 2020 in his criminal case. In that motion, and in an associated request to submit the matter for decision, Robinson maintained that his sentence required correction because it violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, he asserted that his trial counsel acted ineffectively and that the State suppressed favorable evidence.

¶7 The district court denied Robinson's rule 22(e) motion, concluding that he "fail[ed] to identify any of the relevant grounds, or otherwise comply with the [r]ule." The court also noted that the grounds identified in Robinson's motion "may be more suited for a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" under rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶8 Robinson appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶9 Robinson asserts that the district court erred in denying his rule 22(e) motion to correct his sentence when it concluded that the constitutional violations he alleges—ineffective assistance of counsel and suppression of favorable evidence—are not cognizable under rule 22(e). We review the grant or denial of a rule 22(e) motion for correctness, giving "no deference to the district court." State v. Houston , 2015 UT 40, ¶ 16, 353 P.3d 55.

¶10 Robinson also contends that the court erred in construing his rule 22(e) motion according to its title rather than its substance. Both parties ask us to review this question for correctness. Robinson asserts that the standard we use to review a district court's interpretation of a rule of procedure applies, while the State cites the standard of review applicable to a court's grant or denial of a rule 22(e) motion. The authority the parties cite does not specify the standard we should apply in reviewing the district court's decision now at issue—its decision to construe Robinson's filing as a rule 22(e) motion rather than as a petition for post-conviction relief—and we question whether correctness is the appropriate standard. See, e.g. , Workers Comp. Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co. , 2011 UT 61, ¶ 15 n.5, 266 P.3d 792 (stating that "district courts have broad discretion in determining whether to construe a motion under rule 59 or rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" and that "if a motion is not captioned as a rule 59 or rule 60(b) motion and does not cite to rule 59 or rule 60(b), a district court does not err in failing to construe it as such"). However, because both parties argue this issue under a correctness standard of review, we apply that standard here without endorsing its application in a future case.

¶11 Robinson raises four additional issues pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and State v. Clayton , 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). But we need not address the standards of review applicable to those issues because, as discussed infra ¶¶ 38–42, we hold it is procedurally improper to file a hybrid- Anders brief.

ANALYSIS

I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ROBINSON'S RULE 22(e) MOTION

¶12 Robinson contends that the district court erred in denying his rule 22(e) motion. Specifically, he argues that the court erred in concluding that the grounds he identified as the bases for his motion—ineffective assistance of counsel and suppression of favorable evidence—are not cognizable under rule 22(e). We disagree with Robinson and conclude that the court correctly interpreted the rule.

¶13 "When interpreting a rule, we use our general rules of statutory construction." Wyatt v. State , 2021 UT 32, ¶ 19, 493 P.3d 621 (cleaned up). Thus, we begin our review of whether the district court correctly interpreted rule 22(e) by looking at the rule's plain language. See id. ; see also Clark v. Archer , 2010 UT 57, ¶ 9, 242 P.3d 758. "If a rule's language is clear and unambiguous, analysis of the rule's meaning ends." Clark , 2010 UT 57, ¶ 9, 242 P.3d 758.

¶14 The language in rule 22(e) is straightforward. Subparagraph (e)(1) requires a court to correct a sentence if it fits into one of six enumerated categories. It states:

The court must correct a sentence when the sentence imposed:

(A) exceeds the statutorily authorized maximums;

(B) is less than statutorily required minimums;

(C) violates Double Jeopardy;

(D) is ambiguous as to the time and manner in which it is to be served;

(E) is internally contradictory; or

(F) omits a condition required by statute or includes a condition prohibited by statute.

UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)(1).

¶15 Subparagraph (e)(2), in turn, requires a court to correct an unconstitutional sentence, but only under specific circumstances. It states:

The court must correct the sentence of a defendant who can prove that the sentence is unconstitutional under a rule established or ruling issued by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after sentence was imposed, and the rule or ruling was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction or sentence became final.

Id. R. 22(e)(2).¹

¶16 In seeking to correct his sentence under rule 22(e), Robinson does not contend that the bases he identified in his motion fall within any of the six enumerated categories in subparagraph (e)(1). Nor does he contend that his challenges meet the requirements of subparagraph (e)(2). Rather, Robinson maintains that rule 22(e) is not intended to be exhaustive in its scope and that this court's rule 22(e) precedent allows all "constitutional-based" challenges to a sentence to be raised under the rule.

¶17 Robinson recognizes that the current language of rule 22(e) "appear[s]" to limit the scope of the rule's application. But, relying on State v. Candedo , 2010 UT 32, ¶¶ 10–11, 232 P.3d 1008, he argues that we previously rejected a narrow reading of the rule and that his constitutional challenges fall within Candedo ’s reach.

¶18 Robinson is correct that in Candedo we read rule 22(e) broadly. There, we held that "[b]ecause an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) includes constitutional violations, an appellate court must allow a petitioner to raise constitutional ... challenges[ ] to [a petitioner's] sentence under rule 22(e)." Id. ¶ 11. But Candedo does not aid Robinson's position because, in that case, we analyzed an earlier version of rule 22(e) —a version with "sweeping language" that has since...