State v. Rogers

344 Conn. 343

279 A.3d 184

STATE of Connecticut

v.Roderick ROGERS

SC 20469

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 2, 2022

Officially released August 16, 2022

Megan L. Wade, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was James P. Sexton, Hartford, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state's attorney, and C. Robert Satti, Jr., former supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

D'AURIA, J.

In this certified appeal, we must determine whether the reversal of a codefendant's conviction necessitates the reversal of a defendant's conviction despite the defendant's failure to preserve the issue at trial when the defendant and codefendant were jointly tried and the codefendant properly preserved the issue. Specifically, the defendant, Roderick Rogers, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-48, and four counts of first degree assault in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5). On appeal, he claims that, in light of this court's recent decision in State v. Jackson , 334 Conn. 793, 224 A.3d 886 (2020), in which his codefendant, Raashon Jackson, was granted a new trial premised on his properly preserved objection to the state's untimely disclosure of an expert witness, this court should exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to reverse his conviction, even though he did not join in Jackson's objection to the untimely disclosed expert, because they were tried jointly and suffered the same harm. Additionally, he requests that this court overrule our recent decision in State v. Turner , 334 Conn. 660, 686–87, 224 A.3d 129 (2020), and review the merits of his unpreserved Porter¹ claim under State v. Edwards , 325 Conn. 97, 156 A.3d 506 (2017). We affirm the judgment of conviction.

We begin by briefly summarizing the facts the jury reasonably could have found, as recited recently in Jackson's certified appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment. "On September 10, 2013, [the defendant] called his cousin, David Anderson, for a ride from [his] home in Bridgeport. Before Anderson arrived, a social worker, William Muniz, came to [the defendant's] house at 2:10 p.m. to discuss a job opportunity. [The defendant] informed Muniz that he had to leave but would be back in one hour. As Muniz was leaving, Anderson arrived. Because Anderson was on probation, he wore a global positioning system (GPS) device that tracked his movements.

"Anderson and [the defendant] left the house in Anderson's car, and [the defendant] directed Anderson to drive toward Palisade Avenue, on the east side of Bridgeport. On Palisade Avenue, [the defendant] saw [Jackson], a friend whom he called Red Dreads, and directed Anderson to stop the car. [Jackson] got into the backseat of Anderson's car. [The defendant] then directed Anderson to drive to the ‘Terrace,’ a reference to the Beardsley Terrace housing complex located in the north end of Bridgeport. After arriving at the housing complex, [the defendant] told Anderson to park on a side street off Reservoir Avenue. [The defendant] asked Anderson if he had an extra shirt, and Anderson told him to check the trunk. [The defendant] asked Anderson to wait because he and [Jackson] would be right back. [Jackson] and the defendant got out of the car, went to the open trunk, shut the trunk, and walked down a hill.

"At that time, a group of young men was gathered outside the housing complex. [Jackson] and the defendant approached the group, remarked, ‘y'all just came through the Ave shooting Braz, you all f'ed up,’ and either [Jackson] or the defendant began shooting at the group. One of the shooting victims, LaChristopher Pettway, sustained a fatal gunshot wound to his back. Four other victims, Tamar Hamilton, Leroy Shaw, Jauwane Edwards, and Aijahlon Tisdale, sustained nonfatal wounds.

"[Jackson] and the defendant then left the scene of the shootings and returned to Anderson's car. [The defendant] told Anderson to drive down Reservoir Avenue. Anderson then drove to the corner of Stratford Avenue and Hollister Avenue, where Anderson parked the car on the side of the street. [Jackson] got out of the car, and Anderson drove [the defendant] home. [The defendant] called Muniz at 2:46 p.m., and Muniz returned to [the defendant's] home by 3 p.m." State v. Jackson , supra, 334 Conn. at 797–98, 224 A.3d 886.

On September 16, 2013, the defendant was arrested. Id., at 798, 224 A.3d 886. That same day, he sent Jackson a text message stating that "[d]ey taken [me]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Jackson was subsequently arrested. Id. Both men were charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and four counts of assault in the first degree. Id., at 798, 224 A.3d 886 ; see id., at 799 n.2, 224 A.3d 886. The trial court granted the state's motion to consolidate for trial the defendant's case with Jackson's case, and the two were tried jointly before a jury. See id., at 798, 224 A.3d 886.

At trial, Anderson testified as a cooperating witness for the state. See id., at 798, 224 A.3d 886. Over defense counsel's objection, the state also presented the testimony of an expert on cell site location information (CSLI), Sergeant Andrew Weaver of the Hartford Police Department, who testified to the location of Jackson's and the defendant's cell phones, and Anderson's GPS monitor. Id., at 798–99, 224 A.3d 886.

The jury found both the defendant and Jackson guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of forty-five years of incarceration. He then appealed, challenging certain of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. See State v. Rogers , 183 Conn. App. 669, 193 A.3d 612 (2018). Relevant to the present appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had admitted into evidence maps depicting the location of his and Jackson's cell phones and related testimony without first conducting a Porter hearing, as required by our recent decision in Edwards . Id., at 682, 193 A.3d 612. The Appellate Court rejected each of the defendant's evidentiary claims and affirmed the judgment of conviction. See id., at 689–90, 193 A.3d 612. This court then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal.² Additional facts and procedural history will follow as required.

I

Recently, in Jackson , we reversed that defendant's conviction based on his properly preserved objection to the state's untimely disclosure of Weaver as an expert. Specifically, we held that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to afford Jackson a reasonable continuance and that this error was harmful. See State v. Jackson , supra, 334 Conn. at 809–10, 224 A.3d 886. Notwithstanding that he did not independently object, or join Jackson's objection, to the state's untimely disclosure of Weaver, the defendant requests that this court exercise its supervisory authority to either reverse his conviction or review his unpreserved claim that the untimely disclosure prejudiced him. Specifically, he argues that this is an exceptional circumstance because he and Jackson were tried jointly, and it would be unfair for Jackson's conviction, but not his conviction, to be reversed based on a failure of preservation when both he and Jackson were similarly harmed. He contends that the present case is similar to federal cases in which courts have reversed a defendant's conviction based on an unpreserved claim when the defendant was tried jointly with a codefendant, and the codefendant properly preserved and succeeded on the claim. Because we determine that Jackson and the defendant in the present case were not similarly situated and, thus, not similarly harmed by the state's late disclosure of Weaver, we decline to exercise our supervisory authority to either reverse the defendant's conviction or to review his unpreserved claim.

Approximately six months before trial started, the trial court ordered the state to disclose any experts to the defense. The state never specifically disclosed any witness as an expert. Rather, when jury selection began, the state provided the defendant with a list of 128 potential witnesses, including Weaver, whom it did not identify as an expert but as a member of the Hartford Police Department. Id., at 801, 224 A.3d 886. Seven days before evidence began, however, the state provided the defendant with Weaver's resume and a copy of a PowerPoint computer software presentation Weaver had prepared, which the state would argue charted the locations of cell phones associated with the defendant and Jackson, as well as the GPS unit worn by Anderson around the time of the shootings. Id. In response, the day before evidence began, Jackson's counsel moved in limine, seeking to preclude Weaver's testimony based on the state's untimely disclosure of Weaver as a CSLI expert. Id., at 801–802, 224 A.3d 886. Counsel for the defendant did not file a similar motion or join Jackson's motion. The trial court held a hearing on Jackson's motion several days after evidence began but before Weaver testified before the jury. Id., at 802, 224 A.3d 886. Counsel for Jackson argued that the state's late disclosure prejudiced Jackson and that the proper remedy was either a reasonable continuance of six weeks or suppression of the testimony. Id., at 804, 224 A.3d 886. At no time during the hearing did counsel for the defendant object to the untimely disclosure, join Jackson's motion, or raise any concerns regarding the untimely disclosure before the trial court. The trial court ultimately denied Jackson's motion, including his request for a continuance, despite determining that the delay was avoidable. Id., at 804–806, ...