State v. Rovin

472 Md. 317

246 A.3d 1190

STATE of Maryland, et al.

v.Valerie ROVIN

No. 29, Sept. Term, 2020

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 2, 2021

Argued by Carl N. Zacarias, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Petitioners.

Argued by Peter C. Hershey and Mark F. Gabler (Rich and Henderson, P.C., Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J.; McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth and Biran, JJ.

Watts, J.

This case stems from a lawsuit brought by Valerie Rovin ("Ms. Rovin"), Respondent, against the State and the prosecutors and law enforcement officers who were responsible for charging her with juror intimidation and assault after she allegedly threatened the foreperson of a jury that had convicted her daughter of a criminal offense. The primary question presented in the case is whether a type of immunity—absolute common law judicial or prosecutorial immunity or statutory immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act ("the MTCA")—bars Ms. Rovin's claims against the State and the prosecutors and law enforcement officers who participated in her arrest and prosecution such that summary judgment was correctly granted in favor of all of them. We are also asked to determine whether the law enforcement officers can be civilly liable for an arrest (Ms. Rovin's) made pursuant to an arrest warrant based on a judicial officer's determination that probable cause existed for the arrest, where that determination was later held by a trial court to be based on an error of law.

Absolute immunity is "[a] complete exemption from civil liability, usu[ally] afforded to officials while performing particularly important functions, such as a representative enacting legislation and a judge presiding over a lawsuit." Absolute Immunity , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). One variety of absolute immunity is judicial immunity, which has been defined as the "immunity of a judge from civil liability arising from the performance of judicial duties." Judicial Immunity , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Another form of absolute immunity is prosecutorial immunity, which has been defined as "[t]he absolute immunity of a prosecutor from civil liability for decisions made and actions taken in a criminal prosecution." Prosecutorial Immunity , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

Although judicial immunity and prosecutorial immunity are common law doctrines, see Gill v. Ripley, 352 Md. 754, 765-66, 724 A.2d 88, 94 (1999), another form of immunity is statutory. The General Assembly has created immunity for State personnel under certain circumstances. Md. Code Ann., State Gov't (1984, 2014 Repl. Vol.) ("SG") § 12-105, which is part of the MTCA, provides that "State personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under" Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.) ("CJ") § 5-522(b). CJ § 5-522(b) provides:

State personnel, as defined in § 12-101 of the State Government Article,^{[1 ]} are immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or its units have waived immunity under Title 12, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article, even if the damages exceed the limits of that waiver.

The facts that gave rise to the question concerning immunities in this case are as follows. Later on the same day after the conclusion of a jury trial in which her daughter was found guilty of criminal charges, including drunk driving, Ms. Rovin went to the workplace of Robert Rovin ("Mr. Rovin"), who had served as the foreperson of the jury. (Mr. Rovin is not related to Ms. Rovin.) Ms. Rovin and Mr. Rovin have offered differing accounts of their encounter that day. Ms. Rovin has alleged that she and Mr. Rovin had a conversation, whereas Mr. Rovin has alleged that Ms. Rovin verbally assaulted him and threatened to have someone cause him bodily harm. In any event, after Ms. Rovin left, Mr. Rovin called the Wicomico County Sheriff's Office to report the encounter. Deputy Sheriff Matthew Cook responded to the call. The next day, Mr. Rovin filed a petition for a peace order in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Wicomico County, regarding Ms. Rovin's alleged conduct. The District Court denied the petition but advised that there is a statute making it a criminal offense to intimidate a juror and that Ms. Rovin may have committed a crime.

Deputy Cook consulted with the Office of the State's Attorney for Wicomico County, and was advised to apply for a statement of charges. Deputy Cook did so. A District Court Commissioner approved the application for a statement of charges and issued an arrest warrant for Ms. Rovin. Ms. Rovin was arrested, detained, and released on bond with a condition of electronic monitoring. The State filed a criminal information, which the State's Attorney for Wicomico County Matthew A. Maciarello² signed, charging Ms. Rovin with juror intimidation in violation of Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) ("CR") § 9-305(a) and second-degree assault. While Ms. Rovin's criminal case was pending, the Sheriff of Wicomico County, Michael Lewis, made statements about the case on the Sheriff's Office Facebook page and in the media. At a jury trial in Ms. Rovin's case, in which the State was represented by Assistant State's Attorney Richard Brueckner, approximately four months after Ms. Rovin's release on bond, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County granted a motion for judgment of acquittal as to both charges, upon finding that Ms. Rovin's interaction with Mr. Rovin did not constitute juror intimidation under CR § 9-305(a) or assault.

Subsequently, in the circuit court, Ms. Rovin sued the State, Maciarello, Assistant State's Attorney Brueckner, Sheriff Lewis, and Deputy Cook (together, "Petitioners")³ for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, false light invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The State and prosecutors filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The officers filed a separate motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. After Ms. Rovin filed a request for production of documents, the State and prosecutors filed a motion for a protective order. The circuit court granted the motion for a protective order, and granted summary judgment in favor of all of the Petitioners as to all of Ms. Rovin's claims. The circuit court concluded, among other things, that Maciarello and Assistant State's Attorney Brueckner were entitled to prosecutorial immunity for all claims brought against them, which extended to the State as well, and that the prosecutors and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Ms. Rovin appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court. See Valerie Rovin v. State of Maryland, et al., No. 233, Sept. Term, 2018, 2020 WL 3265119, at *9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 17, 2020). The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the circuit court abused its discretion in precluding Ms. Rovin from engaging in discovery before granting summary judgment. See id. at *1. The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the reason that the defendants pursued criminal charges against Ms. Rovin was that the circumstances justified doing so or that the defendants had an ulterior or otherwise inappropriate motive for doing so. See id. at *9. In this Court, the State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on behalf of itself, Maciarello, Assistant State's Attorney Brueckner, Sheriff Lewis, and Deputy Cook, which this Court granted. See State v. Rovin, 471 Md. 103, 240 A.3d 853 (2020).

Before us, Petitioners contend that absolute common law immunity and State personnel statutory immunity bar all of Ms. Rovin's claims. Petitioners also argue that Ms. Rovin's claims arising from the officers’ actions fail because the officers had a good faith belief that her conduct violated the juror intimidation statute and that her claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy fail because she cannot establish the element of falsity that is required for both claims. Ms. Rovin responds that the record is insufficient to demonstrate that any form of immunity bars her claims. She also contends that whether the officers had a good faith belief that she violated the juror intimidation statute is a question of fact and argues that her claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy are viable.

Upon careful consideration of the record and our case law, as to the immunity issue, we hold that the circuit court was correct in concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to Maciarello's and Assistant State's Attorney Brueckner's entitlement to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity, and that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the prosecutors was warranted as a matter of law as to all of Ms. Rovin's claims. Because Maciarello and Assistant State's Attorney Brueckner are entitled to prosecutorial immunity, the State is not civilly liable for their actions in this case. As such, the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the State, Maciarello, and Assistant State's Attorney Brueckner as to any action in the complaint alleged to have been taken by the prosecutors.

On the other hand, the officers, Sheriff Lewis and Deputy Cook, are not entitled to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity. Similarly, the officers are not entitled to absolute common law immunity in the form of judicial immunity. We decline to extend judicial immunity under the holding in Keller-Bee v....