State v. Russaw

203 Conn.App. 123

247 A.3d 614

STATE of Connecticut

v.Deykevious RUSSAW

AC 43084

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 10, 2020

Officially released March 9, 2021

Robert L. O'Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, North Haven, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, executive assistant state's attorney, and David L. Zagaja, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Alvord, Prescott and DiPentima, Js.

DiPENTIMA, J.

The defendant, Deykevious Russaw, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1) and one count of evading responsibility in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (1). The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to the police, which he alleges were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our discussion. On July 18, 2017, Rosella Shuler and Shavoka Ceasar were standing near the corner of Ashley Street and Sigourney Street in Hartford. While operating a stolen Toyota Highlander, the defendant struck Shuler and Ceasar. When the vehicle came to a rest after crashing into a fence, the defendant and five other individuals exited the vehicle and fled the scene. Shuler and Ceasar were transported to Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center, where Shuler later succumbed to complications from her injuries.

On July 19, 2017, the defendant was brought to the Hartford Police Department and questioned about the motor vehicle incident and an unrelated, fatal shooting. The police questioned the defendant about the shooting first and then discussed the motor vehicle incident. Although the defendant initially denied being the operator of the vehicle that struck Shuler and Ceasar, he eventually admitted that he was the driver and signed a written statement to that effect. The interrogation ended at approximately 1 a.m. on July 20, 2017.

The defendant was charged by way of a substitute long form information with one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (1), one count of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of § 53a-56 (a) (1), one count of evading responsibility in violation of § 14-224 (b) (1), and one count of evading responsibility in violation of § 14-224 (b) (2). The defendant pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried by a jury. On January 24, 2019, the defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to the police during the July 19 and 20, 2017 interview about the motor vehicle incident.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion on February 4, 2019. At the hearing, Detective Anthony Rykowski of the Hartford Police Department, the lead investigator of the shooting incident, testified regarding the sequence of events surrounding the defendant's interview, and the state introduced into evidence several exhibits, including a video recording of the entire interrogation and signed Miranda waiver and parental consent forms. The court denied the motion to suppress in an oral ruling on February 13, 2019. Trial began on February 14, 2019. The state entered into evidence and read to the jury the defendant's written statement provided to the police, in which he confessed to driving the vehicle that struck Shuler and Ceasar. On February 20, 2019, the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and of evading responsibility. The jury found the defendant not guilty of the remaining two charges. On April 24, 2019, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of sixteen years of incarceration. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his July 19 and 20, 2017 statements to the police. Specifically, the defendant argues that his statements regarding the motor vehicle incident were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.¹ In the defendant's view, the interrogation regarding the motor vehicle incident was a new and separate interview from the one regarding the unrelated shooting, such that the police were required to give him a new Miranda advisement before questioning him about the motor vehicle incident. In response, the state argues that the police were not required to administer a new set of Miranda warnings after obtaining the defendant's statement about the shooting and prior to "switch[ing] gears" and interrogating him about the motor vehicle incident. The state further argues that, even if the court erred in admitting the defendant's statements, such admission was harmless. We agree with the state that new Miranda warnings were not required before questioning the defendant about the motor vehicle incident.

In its oral ruling denying the motion to suppress, the court found the following facts, which the defendant does not challenge in this appeal. On July 19, 2017, the defendant and his father were brought to the Hartford Police Department and were placed in an interview room.² At approximately 3 p.m., the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, and he signed a form waiving his rights. The defendant's father was present while the defendant was being advised of his rights, and he signed a parental consent form, which allowed the police to speak with the defendant.³

Detective Rykowski then proceeded to interview the defendant with Detective Jeffrey Pethigal. The defendant indicated a willingness to speak with the detectives, and Detective Rykowski informed him that he would be under arrest for murder.⁴ The defendant first was questioned about the shooting until 4:28 p.m. At that time, the defendant requested the presence of an attorney. The detectives ceased questioning the defendant.

At 5:05 p.m., a detective entered the interview room where the defendant was being held to process him. When the defendant was informed that he was being booked for murder, he became upset and expressed a desire to continue speaking with the detectives. After the defendant was processed, he was brought back into the interview room, and he told Detective Rykowski that he was willing to speak with him without an attorney. Detective Rykowski read the defendant his Miranda rights again, and the defendant and his father reviewed and signed another set of rights waiver forms.

The police continued questioning the defendant following his second waiver of his Miranda rights. The bulk of the conversation centered on the shooting. The defendant eventually provided a written statement regarding the shooting, which he completed at 11:20 p.m. At 11:37 p.m., Detective Rykowski and Detective Candace Hendrix entered the interview room where the defendant was being held and indicated to the defendant that they were going to "totally switch gears here" and speak with him about "something else." The detectives asked the defendant where he had been and what he had done the previous day, and the defendant responded that he had seen a car accident. The detectives informed the defendant that the car accident was the matter that they wanted to discuss, and they began questioning him about the incident. Prior to questioning the defendant regarding the motor vehicle incident, Detective Rykowski did not readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights. Although the defendant initially denied any culpability, he later changed his statement and admitted to being the operator of the vehicle. He then provided a signed, written statement concerning his involvement in the motor vehicle incident. The interrogation relating to the incident concluded at approximately 1 a.m. on July 20, 2017.

On February 13, 2019, the court issued an oral ruling on the motion to suppress. In its oral ruling, the court noted that it had derived its findings of fact largely from the video of the interrogation. After the court made its findings of fact, it concluded that the state had met its burden of proving that the defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. It then turned to the issue on appeal, namely, whether the police were required to again advise the defendant of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him about the motor vehicle incident. Citing Colorado v. Spring , 479 U.S. 564, 107 S. Ct. 851, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987), and State v. Hermann , 38 Conn. App. 56, 658 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 903, 665 A.2d 904 (1995), the court concluded that Detective Rykowski was not required to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights before questioning him about the motor vehicle incident because a defendant's awareness of all possible topics of questioning in advance of an interrogation is not relevant to whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

"Under our well established standard of review in connection with a motion to suppress, we will not disturb a trial court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record .... [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the court's memorandum of decision ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark , 191 Conn. App. 191, 195, 213 A.3d 1166 (2019).

"[T]he [f]ifth [a]mendment privilege [against self-incrimination] is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all...