State v. Ryan

287 Neb. 938

845 N.W.2d 287

State of Nebraska, appellee

v.Michael W. Ryan, appellant.

No. S–12–215

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed April 18, 2014

Appeal from the District Court for Richardson County: Daniel E. Bryan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

James R. Mowbray and Robert W. Kortus, of Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy, for appellant.

Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and James D. Smith for appellee.

Michael W. Ryan, pro se.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller–Lerman, JJ., and Inbody, Chief Judge.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Postconviction: Appeal and Error. In appeals from postconviction proceedings, an appellate court independently resolves questions of law.

2. Postconviction: Appeal and Error. Whether a movant has failed to state a claim for postconviction relief is a question of law.

3. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Strictly speaking, “jurisdiction” refers to a court's adjudicatory authority. Accordingly, the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) implicating that authority.

4. Constitutional Law: Judgments: Postconviction: Jurisdiction. Whether a factual circumstance exists whereby the judgment is void or voidable under the state or U.S. Constitution is an element of a claim for postconviction relief, not a jurisdictional prerequisite.

5. Judgments: Sentences: Postconviction. Method-of-execution claims do not challenge the underlying conviction or the sentence itself (which is the judgment in a criminal case); so, a method-of-execution claim, even if successful, would not render the judgment void or voidable, as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001 (Cum. Supp. 2012).

Connolly, J.

SUMMARY

Michael W. Ryan, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, ¹ moved for postconviction relief. The district court dismissed his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Because Ryan's motion failed to state a claim for postconviction relief, either because his claims were without legal basis or because they were not cognizable in postconviction, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Factual and Procedural Background

We affirmed Ryan's conviction and sentence on direct appeal.² The underlying facts are long and brutal and need not be repeated here. Since our affirmance, Ryan has filed two other postconviction motions, both of which were denied.³Ryan also filed for federal habeas relief, which the federal courts denied.⁴ We have, at various times, ordered Ryan to be executed, but each time we subsequently stayed the execution. Our last order scheduling Ryan's execution was January 11, 2012, but following Ryan's motion for postconviction relief, filed on February 13, and subsequent emergency motion for a stay, we again stayed Ryan's execution. The district court dismissed Ryan's motion without an evidentiary hearing, and he appealed.

District Court's Order Dismissing Postconviction Motion

In its order dismissing Ryan's motion, the court set forth each of Ryan's alleged grounds for postconviction relief, which we summarize as follows:

1. The State illegally obtained stolen thiopental, in violation of Nebraska law. The State's attempt to use that drug to conduct Ryan's execution denies Ryan due process and equal protection under both the state and federal Constitutions.

2. The State's pattern of bad faith in seeking an execution date for Ryan denies Ryan due process under both the state and federal Constitutions.

3. The Legislature passed 2009 Neb. Laws, L.B. 36, which changed Ryan's “final” sentence by mitigating the method of execution from electrocution to lethal injection, and is in violation of the Board of Pardons' exclusive commutation power and the separation of powers provisions of the state Constitution.

4. The Legislature's passing of L.B. 36 was an improper abdication and delegation of its exclusive authority to determine the particular quantity and type of drugs to be used in lethal injection, in violation of the separation of powers provisions in the state Constitution.

5. The Legislature's passing of L.B. 36 changed the method of execution to lethal injection and, along with the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services' creating a new execution protocol after Ryan's conviction became final, violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions.

In dismissing Ryan's motion, the court observed that “it [could] only enter relief in cases where a prisoner in custody under sentence assert[ed] facts that claim[ed] a right to be released on grounds that there was a denial or infringement of state or federal constitutional rights that would render the judgment of conviction void or voidable.” The court characterized Ryan's alleged grounds for relief as “not deal[ing] with the judgement [sic] of the death sentence,” but, rather, “deal[ing] with the method of inflicting the death penalty.” Thus, the court observed, Ryan's claims were not cognizable in postconviction.⁵ The court therefore dismissed Ryan's motion without an evidentiary hearing.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Ryan assigns, restated, that the district court erred in dismissing his motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In appeals from postconviction proceedings, we independently resolve questionsof law.⁶ Whether a movant has failed to state a claim for postconviction relief is a question of law.⁷

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the court dismissed Ryan's motion on jurisdictional grounds. A review of the court's order suggests that the court understood its ruling to be based on jurisdictional grounds. Relying on our decision in State v. Lotter,⁸ the court stated that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29–3001 (Cum.Supp.2012) limited its jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief. And because the court concluded that Ryan was not entitled to postconviction relief under § 29–3001, it dismissed his motion.

In Lotter, citing a Nebraska Court of Appeals decision, we stated that “[a]bsent a factual circumstance whereby the judgment is void or voidable under the state or U.S. Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief.” ⁹ Our language, however, was imprecise. Courts, including this court,¹⁰ have frequently used the term “jurisdiction” too loosely.¹¹ Strictly speaking, “ ‘[j]urisdiction’ refers to ‘a court's adjudicatory authority.’ ” ¹² “Accordingly, the term ‘jurisdictional’ properly applies only to ‘prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)’ implicating that authority.” ¹³ Here, the court clearly had both.

Whether a factual circumstance exists whereby the judgment is void or voidable under the state or U.S. Constitution is an element of a claim for postconviction relief, not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Thus, where such a circumstance is lacking, the proper course is to dismiss for failure to state a claim, not for lack of jurisdiction. And here, despite the labeling confusion, that is effectively what the court did. We review de novo that determination. ¹⁴

As set forth above, Ryan's motion contained five claims for postconviction relief. The district court characterized all of Ryan's claims as “deal[ing] with the method of inflicting the death penalty.” If that characterization is correct, Ryan's claims would not be cognizable in postconviction.¹⁵ This is because such claims do not challenge the underlying conviction or the sentence itself (which is the judgment in a criminal case ¹⁶); so, a method-of-execution claim, even if successful, would not render the judgment void or voidable, as required by § 29–3001(1).¹⁷

We agree with the court's characterization with one exception. Ryan's second claim challenges whether the State can put him to death at all, no matter the method. Ryan argues that the State, through its alleged dilatory conduct and scheduling of “sham executions,” violated his due process rights and effectively forfeited its right to execute him.¹⁸ This claim is not a method-of-execution claim. Nevertheless, on our de novo review, we conclude that this claim does not state a claim for postconviction relief. Despite Ryan's argument to the contrary, his claim appears to be similar to the claim we rejected in State v. Moore.¹⁹ And the only authority he provides for his claim is either inapposite or not authority at all.²⁰

As for Ryan's other four claims, we agree with the court's characterization: they are method-of-execution claims. Ryan agrees that the first claim is a method-of-execution claim, but disagrees as to the other three. Our review of his motion and brief, however, indicates that they too are method-of-execution claims. Ryan's third claim alleges that the Legislature improperly commuted his sentence “by mitigating the method of execution from electrocution to lethal injection.” Ryan's fourth claim alleges that the Legislature improperly delegated its responsibility “to determine the particular quantity and type of drug(s) to be used in lethal injection” to the executive branch. And Ryan's fifth claim alleges that the change to lethal injection violated the ex post facto provisions of the federal and state Constitutions. Each of these claims takes issue (in different ways) with the method of execution, not the sentence of death. Thus, they are method-of-execution claims.

As the court recognized, we held in State v. Moore that such claims are not cognizable in postconviction.²¹ There, the defendant's petition for postconviction relief challenged the electrocution protocol for implementing the death penalty. We observed that the defendant's petition did not challenge “either his underlying conviction or the judgment of a sentence of death.” ²² We concluded, after reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's cases in Nelson v. Campbell²³ and Hill v. McDonough,²⁴ that the defendant's claim was not cognizable in...