State v. Ryder

301 Conn. 810

23 A.3d 694

STATE of Connecticut

v.Gary RYDER.

No. 18411.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 14, 2011.Decided Aug. 9, 2011.

Gary Ryder, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, Dina Urso, assistant state's attorney, and Ricki Goldstein, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.McLACHLAN, J.

The defendant, Gary Ryder, appeals ¹ from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his home. State v. Ryder, 114 Conn.App. 528, 969 A.2d 818 (2009). The defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the warrantless search of his house did not violate his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We agree with the defendant, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts as found by the trial court: “On August 15, 2004, [Andrew Kelly, a police officer] was working the 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. shift. He was ordered out of his daily check out at the beginning of his shift and told to report to dispatch. [Kelly] testified that such a procedure was unusual and done only in cases of emergency situations, such as a motor vehicle accident.

“[Kelly] was informed that the dispatcher received numerous telephone calls from a father in Vermont, who was sounding increasingly frantic. The father informed the police that his two [teenaged] sons took the train to Greenwich for the weekend to visit friends, that they were supposed to return to Vermont by train at the conclusion of the weekend and failed to do so. The [teenagers] had been missing for approximately twenty-four hours prior to the time the father called the police, during which time the father indicated that he was constantly trying to contact them. The father was finally able to contact ... [the fourteen year old son] ... who informed him that ... [the sixteen year old son] was at the defendant's house in Greenwich.² [Kelly] was told by the dispatcher that the ... father and the defendant previously had a relationship and resided together. [Kelly] also learned from the dispatcher that officers from the prior shift that day went to the defendant's house, spoke with him about the ... father's claim that his [sixteen year old son] inexplicably failed to return to Vermont and informed him that the father believed that [that son] was at the defendant's residence. The defendant directed the officers to another address where he stated the [sixteen year old son] was staying, which proved to be [incorrect] information.

“[Kelly] proceeded to the defendant's house ... in Greenwich, which he described as an affluent area of town. He arrived at the house at [approximately] 4:30 p.m. and pulled into the beginning of the gated driveway, [the gate to which] was closed. He immediately noticed from that vantage point that there was a couch that was sticking partly out of the garage onto the driveway and a BMW convertible with its top down parked in the driveway.

“[Kelly], who was dressed in full uniform, used the intercom located at the driveway's entrance, but received no response.... [H]e stepped over the ... [gate] and began to walk around the house, announcing the presence of the police. [Kelly] rang the front doorbell and knocked on the front door to no avail. He then walked around the back of the house and approached a set of French doors. He observed through those doors a cot on which there was a bag of clothes that appeared suitable for a teenager, some video games and an otherwise impeccable house. [Kelly] grabbed the handle, realized that the door was not locked and proceeded to open the door. At that point, he called for backup in accordance with police procedure relative to finding an open door in a residence.... Robert Smurlo [another police officer] arrived at the scene within a few minutes and was briefed by ... Kelly before they entered the residence.

“[Kelly] testified that based on the facts as he knew them to be, he believed that the missing [sixteen year old son] may be in danger inside the house. Important to that belief were the facts of a reportedly missing [teenager], the nature of the couch and vehicle in the driveway area, no response to his repeated calls from outside the house, an unlocked door and the ... clothes strewn on the cot on the first floor. For those and other reasons, [Kelly and Smurlo] decided to enter the residence ... to look in places where a [teenager] may be located.

“The officers searched the first floor of the house for the [sixteen year old son] and then proceeded upstairs. At one point ... Kelly went into a bathroom on the second floor and noticed what appeared to be a dark figure through the bathtub shower door. The glass was frosted. He testified that he believed the dark figure was the missing [son]. In this regard, he testified as follows: I slid the door open to the tub. To the greatest bit of relief, just a crocodile or a large lizard [was] in the tub. [Kelly] estimated that the reptile was six or seven feet in length.

“[Kelly] closed the shower door, and he and ... Smurlo continued to search the rest of the residence for the [sixteen year old son]. [Kelly] did not know at the time whether the possession of the reptile in the tub was illegal. The officers, having completed their search ... exited the residence and left the reptile still in the bathtub where they found it.

“On September 8, 2004, almost four weeks later, the defendant was arrested on charges of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53–21 and illegal possession of a reptile in violation of [General Statutes] § 26–55. On March 6, 2006, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his home and to dismiss the charges against him. After a three day suppression hearing, the court denied the defendant's motions. The state entered a nolle prosequi with regard to the charge of risk of injury to a child, and the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the possession of a reptile charge, conditioned on reserving his right to appeal from the court's ruling on his motions to suppress and to dismiss.... The [trial] court found that the rulings on the defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to suppress were dispositive of the case for the purposes of General Statutes § 54–94a and Practice Book § 61–6(a)(2)(i) and sentenced him to pay a $35 fine, which he since has paid.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 530–33, 969 A.2d 818.

The record also reveals the following additional undisputed facts and procedural history. The defendant subsequently appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress and to dismiss. The Appellate Court described his appeal as claiming that “the warrantless search of his house violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures” under the state and federal constitutions. State v. Ryder, 111 Conn.App. 271, 274, 958 A.2d 797 (2008). The state responded that the Appellate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the defendant had rendered the appeal moot by paying the fine prior to the hearing before the Appellate Court. Id. The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant's appeal would indeed be moot unless he could demonstrate that he had paid the fine involuntarily or that prejudicial collateral consequences were reasonably possible as a result of his conviction, and, accordingly, remanded the case to the trial court for factual findings as to those two issues. Id., at 277–78, 958 A.2d 797. On remand, the trial court found that the defendant had paid the fine involuntarily and that there existed a reasonable possibility that the defendant would suffer prejudicial collateral consequences as a result of his conviction. State v. Ryder, 51 Conn.Supp. 91, 94, 98, 976 A.2d 116 (2009).

In light of the trial court's findings, the Appellate Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the defendant's appeal, and it then reviewed the question of whether the warrantless search of the defendant's home had violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.³ State v. Ryder, supra, 114 Conn.App. at 534–35, 969 A.2d 818. The Appellate Court determined that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement justified the officers' entry into the defendant's home. Id., at 538–40, 969 A.2d 818. Specifically, it concluded that it was objectively reasonable for Kelly to believe that a minor was in need of immediate aid, “[g]iven the frantic telephone calls by an apparently concerned parent, the suggestion, based on the presence of the car and couch in the driveway, that someone was in the defendant's home, the lack of an answer at the intercom and front door and the sight of a teen's belongings on the first floor....” Id., at 539, 969 A.2d 818. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., at 540, 969 A.2d 818. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the warrantless search of his house did not violate his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment.⁴ He contends that the police intrusion into his house was not warranted under the emergency doctrine because a reasonable police officer in Kelly's circumstances would not have believed that a warrantless entry was necessary to assist a person in need of immediate aid. The defendant further argues that, even if this court concludes that a reasonable officer would...