State v. Ryle

STATE OF DELAWARE, v. ALEX RYLE, Defendant.

I.D. No. 1404000692

Cr. A. No. IN14-12-1394-1396

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Submitted: March 11, 2021

June 2, 2021

ORDER

Upon the Defendant's Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a)

DENIED.

This 2nd day of June, 2021, upon consideration of Defendant Alex Ryle's Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence (D.I. 128), the State's objections thereto (D.I. 130), and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On April 1, 2014, Mr. Ryle was arrested in Wilmington, Delaware, for absconding from probation authorities.¹ When police searched Mr. Ryle incident to his arrest, they found a firearm.² That Baretta 25-caliber handgun—loaded with nine live rounds of ammunition—was located in Mr. Ryle's right front pant pocket.³The police had been watching Mr. Ryle for some time prior to his arrest.⁴ Yet not one officer recognized that he had the gun hidden on his person.⁵ Mr. Ryle was later questioned at the police station and confessed to possessing the gun in a post-Miranda recorded interview.⁶ Due to his previous convictions, Mr. Ryle was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm.⁷

(2) In February 2015, following a two-day trial, a Superior Court jury convicted Mr. Ryle of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited ("PFBPP"), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited ("PABPP"), and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon-Firearm ("CCDW-Firearm").⁸ Mr. Ryle represented himself at trial.⁹

(3) Mr. Ryle's sentencing occurred in October 2015, after: (a) he prosecuted an unsuccessful pro se motion for a new trial;¹⁰ (b) he was (at hisrequest) re-appointed counsel for sentencing; (c) a pre-sentence investigative report was prepared; and (d) the State had filed a habitual criminal petition.¹¹ Mr. Ryle was sentenced to the minimum required for the PFBPP and CCDW-Firearm: 23 years at Level V to be served under the provisions of the then-extant Habitual Criminal Act.¹² Both PFBPP and PABPP charges are varieties of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (PDWBPP) crimes.¹³ For the ammunition count, he received eight years at Level V that was suspended in whole for diminishing levels of supervision.¹⁴

(4) Mr. Ryle retained new counsel and filed a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court arguing that this Court—though it repeatedly advised him of thedangers of doing so—should not have permitted him to proceed pro se at trial.¹⁵ The Supreme Court found Mr. Ryle's claims lacked merit (i.e., that this Court properly authorized and honored his waiver of counsel) and affirmed this Court's judgments of conviction and sentence.¹⁶

(5) Thereafter, Mr. Ryle filed a timely pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.¹⁷ He also requested appointment of postconviction counsel.¹⁸ The Court granted Mr. Ryle's motion for appointment of counsel and that attorney was given leave to amend Mr. Ryle's pro se Rule 61 motion.¹⁹ Ultimately, this Court denied Mr. Ryle postconviction relief and that judgment was also affirmed on appeal.²⁰

(6) Most recently, Mr. Ryle filed a Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence invoking Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).²¹ Mr. Ryle says that the cumulation of three separate convictions and sentences stemming from his one episode of possessing a loaded handgun violates constitutional or statutory double jeopardy protections. According to Mr. Ryle, the PFBPP and PABPP crimes are merely lesser-included offenses of his CCDW-Firearm charge. Too, he says, the Delaware General Assembly failed to clearly set forth its unambiguous intent that PFBPP/PABPP and CCDW-Firearm could be charged from one continuous event. Mr. Ryle alleges that both his PFBPP and PABPP charges should be vacated so as to rectify his "illegal" sentence. While he suggests otherwise, Mr. Ryle chooses the CCDW-Firearm as the greater offense because it carries the lesser of his mandatory sentences. He'd like to erase his consecutive 15-year PFBPP minimum mandatory sentence.

(7) The federal Double Jeopardy Clause contains three protections. First, "[i]t protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal."²² Next, "[i]t protects against a second prosecution for the same offense afterconviction."²³ And lastly, "it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."²⁴ This last Double Jeopardy protection—against what is called "multiplicity"—is at issue here.²⁵

(8) Convictions are considered multiplicitous when a defendant faces "multiple punishments for the same offense where [the legislature] has not authorized cumulative punishment."²⁶ But cumulative punishments for a single occurrence are not considered to be double jeopardy where the legislature expresses an unambiguous intent for that single occurrence to accrue such liability.²⁷ Importantly, the bar against multiplicity is not a Constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments or convictions from a single act, but only a requirement that such punishments or convictions derive from the clear expression of the legislature,whether federal or state.²⁸ In Delaware, the intent of the legislature is expressed in the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute.²⁹

(9) Thus, when addressing the multiplicity issue in a given circumstance "the primary inquiry must be one of statutory construction and whether there exists clearly expressed legislative intent to impose multiple punishments."³⁰ Analysis of a constitutional objection ordinarily first inquires as to whether the statute in fact raises the constitutional issue alleged, because in Delaware "a constitutional question will not be decided unless its determination is essential to the disposition of the case."³¹ "But because the bounds of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause's protection itself is measured only by a rule of statutory construction, this normal procedure is inapplicable and the two steps become one."³²

(10) Where a constitutional claim is brought under similar clauses present in both the Delaware and United States Constitutions, the court must "apply a logical, deductive analytical process" to determine if the Delaware Constitutionaffords any protection beyond the federal Constitution.³³ Thus, the Court must necessarily examine the Constitution of the United States before it can determine if Delaware protections go further.³⁴ The Double Jeopardy Clauses in the Delaware and United States Constitutions appear in "virtually identical" terms,³⁵ so this is a case where examination of the Delaware Constitution must necessarily be the final step.

(11) Mr. Ryle posits that conviction and sentencing of an offense included in another offense charged in the same indictment implicates the multiplicity doctrine.³⁶ Where the Court concludes a criminal defendant is convicted in the same trial of an offense included in another of which he is simultaneously found guilty,principles of double jeopardy bar the Court from sentencing him for both—the lesser merges into the greater for the purposes of sentencing.³⁷ But there is no greater/lesser-offense relationship between PDWBPP and CCDW.

(12) According to Mr. Ryle, PFBPP and PABPP charges are lesser included offenses of the CCDW charge as defined by 11 Del. C. § 206(b)(3) because they (1) "involve the same result—unlawful possession of a firearm/ammunition" and (2) the elements needed to prove the offenses differ in no significant way.³⁸ While Mr. Ryle offers a creative take on defining these subject offenses, their purposes, and the applicable lesser-offense test,³⁹ he's off the mark in his attempt to do so.

(13) "Unlawful possession of a firearm/ammunition"⁴⁰ is not a "result" as that is understood in Delaware criminal law—it is the act itself.⁴¹ And while sharing general thematic public safety similarities, any definable resultant "injury or risk ofinjury to the . . . public interest" from the commission of CCDW or a PFBPP offense is indeed different.⁴²

(14) The specific aim of the CCDW statute is "to remove the 'temptation and tendency' to use concealed deadly weapons under conditions of 'excitement.' The legislative purpose, originally and presently, seems to be the avoidance of a deadly attack against another by surprise."⁴³ On the other hand, our PFBPP statute seeks to protect society from gun violence by "previously-convicted violent felons and drug dealers by increasing the punishment for their illegal possession of a firearm."⁴⁴ So one of the statutes (CCDW) really concerns itself with the conditions—immediate and concealed—under which a weapon is possessed. The second (PFBPP) concerns who possesses that weapon.

(15) As well, two statutory provisions are non-multiplicitous under the federal Double Jeopardy Clause and support separate indictments, convictions, and punishments where "each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."⁴⁵ Multiplicity is avoided if the different charges each have an element whoseproof does not necessarily satisfy an element in the other charge, even if a single continuous or concurrent act proves an element in multiple charges.⁴⁶

(16) The prohibitory clause of PDWBPP reads: "[a]ny prohibited person as set forth in subsection (a) of this section who knowingly possesses, purchases, owns or controls a deadly weapon or ammunition for a firearm while so prohibited shall be guilty of possession of a deadly weapon or ammunition for a firearm by a person prohibited."⁴⁷

(17) "A conviction for PFBPP requires proof that a defendant was a prohibited person and knowingly possessed a firearm;" "a conviction for PABPP requires proof that a defendant was a prohibited person and knowingly possessed firearm ammunition."⁴⁸ There is no specific manner in which the gun or ammo must be held. Prohibited status coupled with defined "possession" or "control" will suffice.

(18) By contrast, "a person is guilty of CCDW when the person carriesconcealed a deadly weapon upon or...