State v. Santerre

301 A.3d 1244

2023 ME 63

STATE of Maine v. Robert SANTERRE

Docket: Ken-22-392

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: June 7, 2023

Decided: September 12, 2023

Revised: November 7, 2023

Bruce W. Hepler, Esq. (orally), and Benjamin E. Hartwell, Esq., Law Offices of Bruce W. Hepler, LLC, Portland, for appellant Robert Santerre

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney (orally), Kennebec County District Attorney's Office, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS,JJ.

Majority: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

Concurrence: CONNORS, J.

JABAR, J.

[¶1] Robert Santerre appeals from the trial court's (Kennebec County, Cashman, J. ) imposition of consecutive license suspensions after he admitted to three charges of violating 29-A M.R.S. § 2413-A(1) (2023). On appeal, Santerre contends that the trial court erred when it interpreted section 2413-A to (1) permit a determination that Santerre had committed three civil violations and (2) authorize the trial court to impose the consecutive license suspensions. We conclude that the trial court did not err in interpreting section 2413-A to permit a determination that Santerre had committed three civil violations and to authorize consecutive license suspensions, nor did it abuse its discretion when it imposed the three license suspensions consecutively. We affirm the penalties accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On May 20, 2021, at 2:00 p.m., Santerre struck three pedestrians with his vehicle. While driving over the speed limit, Santerre became drowsy and crossed the double-yellow line, striking three pedestrians on the other side of the road, resulting in the deaths of all three people. In its investigation, law enforcement found no evidence of reckless or negligent driving. There was no evidence to suggest that Santerre was using a phone or was impaired by alcohol or drugs, and Santerre did not have a known preexisting medical condition.

[¶3] On December 3, 2021, the State charged Santerre with three counts of committing a motor vehicle violation resulting in death, pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2413-A(1). On August 10, 2022, the trial court held a hearing during which Santerre admitted to all three counts. On November 9, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to determine what penalty to impose for Santerre's violations of section 2413-A. The trial court heard presentations from the State and Santerre, and received victim impact statements from the victims’ families and statements of support for Santerre.

[¶4] In determining an appropriate penalty, the trial court noted that the Legislature created section 2413-A expressly for the purpose of addressing circumstances such as the accident at issue. The trial court discussed the need for public safety, expressing its concern that Santerre had only been driving for approximately ten minutes before falling asleep at the wheel and killing the victims, and commented that distracted driving comes in many forms, including driving while fatigued, which "has an impact on people's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state." The trial court also acknowledged the numerous statements of support for Santerre as well as Santerre's lack of prior driving record and his history of being a law-abiding citizen.

[¶5] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed a $5,000 fine and a three-year license suspension for each of the three counts of committing a motor vehicle violation resulting in death, with the fines being cumulative and the suspensions to be imposed consecutively, totaling $15,000 in fines and a nine-year license suspension. In lieu of paying the cumulative $15,000 fine, the trial court presented Santerre with an alternative option to donate $5,000 to a memorial for the victims. ¹ Santerre timely appealed the nine-year license suspension. M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶6] Santerre makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 2413-A by considering the accident, which resulted in the deaths of three people, as three separate violations of the statute permitting three separate penalties, rather than as one violation of the statute permitting only one penalty. Second, Santerre contends that the court erred when it imposed consecutive license suspensions for the three violations because the statute does not explicitly authorize consecutive license suspensions, and even if the statute allows consecutive suspensions, 17-A M.R.S. § 1608 (2023) does not permit consecutive suspensions on these facts.

A. Legal Overview

[¶7] Santerre raises questions of statutory interpretation concerning section 2413-A, which is a civil violation for which a trial court may impose only civil penalties. We begin this discussion with an overview of (1) our canons of statutory interpretation, (2) the purposes of civil penalties, and (3) section 2413-A.

1. Statutory Interpretation

[¶8] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Gagne , 2019 ME 7, ¶ 16, 199 A.3d 1179. "In interpreting a statute, our single goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute." Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. , 2014 ME 158, ¶ 19, 107 A.3d 621. "The first step in statutory interpretation requires an examination of the plain meaning of the statutory language in the context of the whole statutory scheme." Sunshine v. Brett , 2014 ME 146, ¶ 13, 106 A.3d 1123 (quotation marks omitted). "If the statutory language is silent or ambiguous, we then consider other indicia of legislative intent." Dyer v. Dyer , 2010 ME 105, ¶ 7, 5 A.3d 1049.

[¶9] We are guided by a host of principles when interpreting the plain meaning of a statute. See Dickau , 2014 ME 158, ¶¶ 20-22, 107 A.3d 621. "In construing the plain meaning of the language, we seek to give effect to the legislative intent and construe the language to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results." Sunshine , 2014 ME 146, ¶ 13, 106 A.3d 1123 (quotation marks omitted). "All words in a statute are to be given meaning, and none are to be treated as surplusage if they can be reasonably construed." Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Pros. Licensure , 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11, 896 A.2d 271. We also consider the subject matter, design, and structure of the statute, as well as the consequences of specific interpretations. Dickau , 2014 ME 158, ¶¶ 20-22, 107 A.3d 621.

2. Purposes of Civil Penalties

[¶10] A civil violation is "[a] law or ordinance which prohibits defined conduct, but does not provide an imprisonment penalty." 17-A M.R.S. § 4-B(3) (2023). Civil penalties, unlike criminal punishments, are coercive and are imposed to incentivize compliance with the law rather than to punish. City of Lewiston v. Verrinder , 2022 ME 29, ¶ 22, 275 A.3d 327. We generally consider a suspension of a driver's license nonpunitive in nature because the suspension is intended to provide the public with safe roadways and to protect the nonpunitive objective of public safety. Richard v. Sec'y of State , 2018 ME 122, ¶¶ 13, 18, 192 A.3d 611. "[S]uspension of an operator's license does not tend to make the offense criminal if it is not imposed to punish the individual but reflects a judgment that the violator should not continue to drive." State v. Anton , 463 A.2d 703, 707 (Me. 1983). Where violating a statute subjects the violator to the imposition of a fine, the statute is penal, and we construe the statute strictly. State v. Chittim , 2001 ME 125, ¶ 5, 775 A.2d 381. However, construing the statute strictly is "subordinate" to the rule "that the judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible, with a view to effectuating the legislative design and the true intent of the Legislature."

State v. Millett , 392 A.2d 521, 525 (Me. 1978). Whether interpreting the statute as penal or regulatory, or interpreting the provisions of the statute liberally or strictly, a court has the inherent authority under the common law to impose consecutive suspensions. Neither the plain language of the statute nor any other legal doctrines limit the court's inherent authority. See infra ¶¶ 17-20.

3. 29-A M.R.S. § 2413-A

[¶11] There are three subsections contained in 29-A M.R.S. § 2413-A. ² Under subsection 1, "[a] person commits the civil violation of motor vehicle violation resulting in death if that person, while operating a motor vehicle and committing a traffic infraction, causes the death of another person." Id. § 2413-A(1). Subsection 2 requires the State to prove that the death was caused as a result of the defendant "committing a traffic infraction while operating a motor vehicle" and indicates that the court "shall apply [ 17-A M.R.S. § 33 (2023) ] in assessing" causation. Id. § 2413-A(2). Under subsection 3, "[a] person who violates [ section 2413-A ] commits a civil violation for which a fine of not more than $5,000 may be adjudged. Any portion of the fine adjudged may be satisfied by a court-ordered requirement of community service work. The court shall also impose a license suspension of no less than 14 days and up to 4 years." Id. § 2413-A(3).

B. Analysis

1. Separate Violations

[¶12] Santerre contends that the trial court erred when it considered the accident as three separate violations of the statute because of the three deaths that occurred, rather than one violation because the deaths arose out of a single course of conduct or occurrence.

[¶13] The plain meaning of the language at section 2413-A(1) demonstrates that the trial court did not err when it found that Santerre violated the statute three times. Section 2413-A(1) prohibits causing the death of " another person ," not "one or more other persons," while committing a traffic infraction. Each death caused by a traffic violation forms the basis for a separate civil violation, and because Santerre's traffic infractions resulted in the deaths of three people, Santerre committed...