State v. Sargent

1

2024 ND 121

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Richard Jon Michael Sargent, Defendant and Appellant

Nos. 20230351, 20230353

Supreme Court of North Dakota

June 6, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable Joshua B. Rustad, Judge.

Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State's Attorney, Williston, ND, for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.

Samuel A. Gereszek, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.

BAHR JUSTICE.

[¶1] Richard Sargent appeals from two criminal judgments entered following his conditional pleas of guilty to 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 17 counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of theft of $500-$1000. Sargent's conditional plea reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We conclude the traffic stop was valid, the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and the automobile exception allowed the officers to search the Nissan Armada on the trailer attached to the Chevrolet Tahoe driven by Sargent. We affirm.

I

[¶2] Law enforcement received an anonymous tip "indicating that a 'Richie' would be towing another vehicle to Williston, ND and operating a Yukon SUV. The anonymous tipster indicated that 'Richie' was accompanied by a bearded heavier set male and had 'a lot of guns with them.'" "Based on the information received, law enforcement believed the suspect individual was [Sargent]." At 3:15 a.m. the next day, an officer observed a Chevrolet Tahoe SUV pulling a trailer carrying a Nissan Armada SUV. The Tahoe stopped past a stop sign, drove down a dirt road, and stopped past a second stop sign. The officer conducted a traffic stop of the Tahoe.

[¶3] Sargent was the driver of the Tahoe. There was also a passenger in the Tahoe; an officer described the Tahoe's passenger as "a bearded heavier set male." When the officer attempted to contact the passenger by knocking on the window, the passenger would not look at the officer or acknowledge his presence. The officer went to the driver's side of the Tahoe and made contact with the driver, Sargent. The officer observed "that the front seat passenger appeared to be attempting to conceal his face with a low hat covering his eyes." The officer observed the passenger was not wearing a seatbelt and requested his identification. The passenger initially refused to give the officer his identification, but eventually complied.

[¶4] The officer observed a handgun in the back seat of the Tahoe. The handgun was later determined to be fake. After initial contact with Sargent, officers placed Sargent in a police car. The officers determined Sargent was on probation had a narcotics history, and did not have any active warrants. The officers also determined the passenger was on probation and had a narcotics history. Sargent told the officer they were headed to a shop in town. However, the Tahoe had already passed the shop, the route to the shop Sargent was taking was out of the way, and the route Sargent took was on a poorly maintained road.

[¶5] The officers observed Sargent showed signs of "extreme nervousness." His hands were shaking, he could not be still, and his voice appeared to be in distress.

[¶6] With Sargent still in the police car, officers requested a K-9 unit, which arrived "roughly 30 minutes after the stop." When the K-9 arrived, the K-9 sniffed both vehicles and alerted positively on the Tahoe, but not the towed Armada. Officers searched both vehicles. They found syringes in the Tahoe and firearms in the towed Armada. The officers arrested Sargent for felon in possession of firearms.

[¶7] The State charged Sargent with 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 17 counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of theft of $500-$1000. Sargent moved to suppress the evidence gathered in the stop. The district court denied Sargent's motion to suppress evidence. Sargent entered conditional pleas of guilty to all the charges.

II

[¶8] When reviewing a motion to suppress, this Court:

[D]efer[s] to the district court's findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We will affirm a district court's decision on a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

State v. Casatelli, 2021 ND 11, ¶ 8, 953 N.W.2d 656 (quoting City of Bismarck v. Vagts, 2019 ND 224 ¶ 4, 932 N.W.2d 523). "Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law." Id. (quoting Vagts, at ¶ 4).

III

[¶9] Sargent argues "[t]he anonymous tip was not reliable, nor was it sufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion" to stop the Tahoe. [¶10] "A law enforcement officer may initiate a traffic stop for an investigation if the officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver has violated or is violating a law." State v. Boger, 2021 ND 152, ¶ 8, 963 N.W.2d 742. "Reasonable suspicion for a stop exists when a reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to believe the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity." Id. (quoting State v. Corum, 2003 ND 89, ¶ 10, 663 N.W.2d 151). "The severity of an observed traffic violation is of no consequence: 'It is well settled, traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.'" State v. Ostby, 2014 ND 180, ¶ 8, 853 N.W.2d 556 (quoting Pesanti v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2013 ND 210, ¶ 9, 839 N.W.2d 851). Moreover, the reasonableness of a stop does not depend on the officer's motivations. Id. "[T]raffic violations, even if pretextual, provide a lawful basis to conduct an investigatory vehicle stop, and evidence discovered during those stops is admissible." Ostby, at ¶ 8.

[¶11] After reviewing the video of the stop, the district court found the footage established Sargent "failed to stop at the point nearest the intersection roadway before entering it," in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24. Thus, the court concluded "the traffic violation provided a lawful basis to conduct an investigatory stop." The court's finding Sargent violated N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24 is supported by competent evidence. The court's conclusion the traffic violation provided a lawful basis for the officer to stop the vehicle is in accordance with the law. Because the officer observed Sargent commit a traffic violation, the stop was valid and the reliability of the anonymous tip is not relevant to whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Tahoe.

IV

[¶12] Sargent argues the officers unreasonably extended the traffic stop when they called in a K-9 unit.

[¶13] "During a lawfully-initiated traffic stop, the officer can conduct activities 'related to traffic enforcement but not absolutely necessary to issuing a traffic ticket.'" State v. Marsolek, 2021 ND 175 ¶ 10, 964 N.W.2d 730 (quoting State v. Vetter, 2019 ND 138, ¶ 7, 927 N.W.2d 435). "The Fourth Amendment tolerates certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen the roadside detention." State v. Stands, 2021 ND 46, ¶ 13, 956 N.W.2d 366 (cleaned up) (quoting Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). However, "after the completion of the traffic stop duties, if the officer continues the seizure, he violates the Fourth Amendment 'unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion for believing that criminal activity is afoot.'" Vetter at ¶ 8 (quoting State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 10, 662 N.W.2d 242).

[¶14] In Marsolek, this Court explained when a traffic stop becomes an unconstitutional seizure:

Traffic violations justify a stop by police officers. When an officer seizes an individual for a traffic violation, it justifies a police investigation of that violation. Because a routine traffic stop is relatively brief, it is more like a "Terry stop" than an arrest. The time it takes to complete the "mission" of the stop, to "address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns," is a permissible length of time to detain someone. However, a stop may not extend longer than the amount of time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop. An officer's seizure of a person is permitted only until the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed. A traffic stop prolonged beyond the "time reasonably required to complete the stop's mission" is unlawful. Unrelated inquiries are permitted during a stop as long as they do not prolong the stop and extend the time the individual is detained. A stop may be prolonged only if the officer has reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the individual for inquiries unrelated to the stop.

2021 ND 175, ¶ 9 (quoting Vetter, 2019 ND 138, ¶ 6).

[¶15] The district court found multiple factors gave the officers reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The factors identified by the court include Sargent "appearing nervous, his criminal history, the fact that [Sargent] was on probation, and conflicting information provided in the interactions with the [vehicle] occupants." "In addition," the court found, "law enforcement was able to corroborate certain aspects of the anonymous informant's tip from the night before including a vehicle towing another vehicle, and a name and information law enforcement was able to discern was [Sargent]." It then concluded "the continued detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as the seizure was not justified solely by the stop sign issue, but...