State v. Sarrabea

126 So.3d 453

STATE of Louisiana

v.Alexis SARRABEA.

No. 2013–K–1271.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 15, 2013.

Preempted

LSA–R.S. 14:100.13

Department of Justice, State of Louisiana, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Colin Andrew Clark, Assistant Attorney General, District Attorney's Office, Fifteenth Judicial District, Michael Harson, District Attorney, Mark Thomas Garber, Assistant District Attorney, for Applicant.

Public Defender's Office, Fifteenth Judicial District, Chad Michael Ikerd, for Respondent.

WEIMER, Justice.

In response to the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana legislature enacted a series of laws under the title “Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways.” 2002 La. Acts, 1st Ex.Sess. 46, § 1. Among other stated aims, the purpose of the enactment was “to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime.” La. R.S. 14:100.11(B). To that end, La. R.S. 14:100.13 was passed. The statute proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien who does not possess documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. La. R.S. 14:100.13(A). Violation of the statute is a felony which carries with it a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year, with or without hard labor. La. R.S. 14:100.13(C).

Following a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating La. R.S. 14:100.13, in which he reserved the right to appeal the claim that the statute is preempted by federal law, the defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Upon review, the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that La. R.S. 14:100.13is preempted by federal law. We granted certiorari to assess the correctness of that determination.

After review of the relevant law, both statutory and jurisprudential, and despite its laudable goal aimed at preventing acts of terrorism, we are constrained to find, based on the Supreme Court case of Arizona v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012), that La. R.S. 14:100.13 operates in the field of alien registration and is, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 12, 2012, defendant Alexis Sarrabea was charged by bill of information with being an alien student and/or a nonresident alien who, on February 12, 2012, operated a motor vehicle in the parish of Lafayette without documentation demonstrating that he is lawfully present in the United States, a violation of La. R.S. 14:100.13. Defendant, a thirty-year-old non-English speaking male, initially pleaded not guilty. However, after spending more than three months in the parish jail, he entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge and, in accordance with a plea agreement with the State, was sentenced to time served. Although erroneously characterizing defendant's plea as an “ Alford plea,” ¹ defense counsel nevertheless expressly reserved the right to appeal the claim that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law, that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause, that it is over-broad and vague, and that it violates the Eighth Amendment. The district court accepted the plea in accordance with the stated conditions and the defendant appealed.

On appeal, a panel of the Third Circuit reversed and set aside defendant's conviction and sentence. State v. Sarrabea, 12–1013 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/13), ––– So.3d ––––, 2013 WL 1810228. Concluding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law, the court found the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona, supra, to be both dispositive and binding, particularly that portion of the decision rejecting the state of Arizona's attempt to punish failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements. The Third Circuit panel reasoned that, like Arizona, Louisiana has attempted to regulate in a field—alien registration—preempted by federal law where even complementary legislation is not permitted:

We are satisfied that the decision in Arizona is controlling in this case. In Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court clearly held where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even a complementary state regulation is impermissible. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2503. We find La. R.S. 14:100.13 is an impermissible attempt by Louisiana to regulate matters in a field already preempted by federal law.

Sarrabea, 12–1013 at 9, ––– So.3d ––––.

The court additionally found that, by enacting laws and administrative provisions in tandem with La. R.S. 14:100.13 that seek to determine what forms of documentation are acceptable proof of lawful presence, Louisiana has undermined and disregarded federal law in an area that is already extensively regulated by a complex scheme requiring the exercise of executive discretion in light of national foreign policy concerns. Id. at 10–11, –––So.3d ––––. Noting that La. R.S. 14:100.13 conflicts even more egregiously with federal law than its counterpart in the Arizona act, further intruding upon the federal scheme, the court explained:

Louisiana's statute makes actions by an alien present in this country a felony offense while the same action by such an alien visitor is but a misdemeanor offense under federal law.... We note Section 3 of the Arizona statute, rejected by the United States Supreme Court, only made the offense a misdemeanor, but, because it imposed stricter penalties than the federal laws, it was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court under the Supremacy Clause. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:100.13, which makes failure to carry proof of lawful presence in the United States while driving in Louisiana a felony offense, impermissibly usurps federal authority.

Id. at 12, ––– So.3d ––––.

Finally, the court pointed to uncertainties in the Louisiana law, particularly in identifying what constitutes probable cause for an arrest under La. R.S. 14:100.13, and in the definitions of “alien student,” “nonresident alien,” and “lawfully present in the United States,” explaining that the very existence of such uncertainties underscores the reason states cannot act in this area, which is already occupied by federal law. Id. at 14–15, ––– So.3d ––––. “To put it plain and simple,” the court succinctly concluded, “La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law; and the State of Louisiana lacks Constitutional authority to enforce it.” Id. at 17, ––– So.3d ––––.

From this adverse ruling, the State applied for supervisory review to this court.² We granted the State's application and consolidated the case for argument with two additional cases emanating from the Third Circuit in which, in unpublished writ decisions, a different panel of the court found no error in district court rulings concluding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is not preempted by federal law, resulting in an intra-circuit split.³See, State v. Marquez, 12–1316 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/13) (unpub'd), writ granted,13–0315 (La.5/3/13), 112 So.3d 851; State v. Ramirez, 12–1245 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/13) (unpub'd), writ granted,13–0276 (La.5/3/13), 112 So.3d 851. We granted certiorari to resolve that split and to put to rest the issue of whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law. State v. Sarrabea, 13–1271 (La.6/26/13), 118 So.3d 428.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The statute at issue in this case, La. R.S. 14:100.13, was enacted as part of a series of laws passed by the legislature in 2002 in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.⁴ Entitled “Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways,” the stated purpose of the laws is to “complement federal efforts to uncover those who seek to use the highways of this state to commit acts of terror” by creating “a comprehensive framework for punishing those who give false information in order to obtain drivers' licenses or identification cards from the office of motor vehicles ... and to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime.” La. R.S. 14:100.11(B). Enacted pursuant to this mandate, La. R.S. 14:100.13 provides:

A. No alien student ^{[ 5} or nonresident alien ^{[ 6} shall operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person is lawfully present in the United States.

B. Upon arrest of a person for operating a vehicle without lawful presence in the United States, law enforcement officials shall seize the driver's license and immediately surrender such license to the office of motor vehicles for cancellation and shall immediately notify the INS of the name and location of that person.

C. Whoever commits the crime of driving without lawful presence in the United States shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, imprisoned for not more than one year, with or without hard labor, or both.

The question presented to this court for resolution is whether this provision, which the legislature clearly intended to operate in a counter-terrorism context as a complement to federal law, is instead preempted by federal law.

While the question is one of first impression in this court, it has been the subject of examination in the appellate courts. The Fourth Circuit was the first court to directly address the issue. In State v. Lopez, 05–0685 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06), 948 So.2d 1121,writ denied,07–0110 (La.12/7/07), 969 So.2d 619, the appellate court concluded that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law. Acknowledging that the “state of Louisiana is vested with the authority to regulate public roads and highways within the state under its police power, provided that the legislation does not ‘prove repugnant to the provisions of the state or national constitutions,’ ” ⁷ the appellate panel determined that, while on its face La. R.S. 14:100.13 “does not appear to run afoul of any particular...