State v. Satoafaiga

482 P.3d 566 (Table)

STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Victoria I. SATOAFAIGA, Defendant-Appellant

NO. CAAP-20-0000067

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i.

March 11, 2021

On the briefs:

Hayden Aluli, for Defendant-Appellant.

Richard B. Rost, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, County of Maui, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Victoria I. Satoafaiga ( Satoafaiga ) appeals from the January 22, 2020 Judgment; Conviction and Sentence; Notice of Entry ( Judgment ) entered against her by the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit ( Circuit Court ). ¹ Satoafaiga pleaded no contest to, and was convicted of, one count of Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS ) § 707-733 (2014), ² and one count of Custodial Interference in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-727 (2014). ³

Satoafaiga raises a single point of error on appeal, contending that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in denying Satoafaiga's March 25, 2019 Motion to Defer; [acceptance of her] No Contest Plea ( Motion for DANC ).

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve Satoafaiga's point of error as follows:

Satoafaiga argues that she met each of the requirements for deferral under HRS § 853-1 (2014). In addition, Satoafaiga contends that the Circuit Court "exceeded the bounds of reason by finding that Satoafaiga is likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct"; inappropriately considered uncharged and irrelevant conduct, used Satoafaiga's failure to admit guilt against her; and improperly "exclud[ed] Satoafaiga from that class of first-time or situational offenders whom the legislature found deserving of the opportunity to keep their record free of a felony conviction."

HRS § 853-1 provides, in pertinent part:

§ 853-1 Deferred acceptance of guilty plea or nolo contendere plea; discharge and dismissal, expungement of records. (a) Upon proper motion as provided by this chapter:

(1) When a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty or nolo contendere, prior to commencement of trial, to a felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor;

(2) It appears to the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct; and

(3) The ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law,

the court, without accepting the plea of nolo contendere or entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant and after considering the recommendations, if any, of the prosecutor, may defer further proceedings.

(Emphasis added). ⁴

The grant or denial of a motion for a DANC plea is within the discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Tom, 69 Haw. 602, 603, 752 P.2d 597, 597 (1988). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or has disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant." State v. Davia, 87 Hawai‘i 249, 253, 953 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

State v. Klie, 116 Hawai‘i 519, 521-22, 174 P.3d 358, 360-61 (2007).

When ruling on a motion for DANC, a trial court acts within its discretion where the court (1) considers the HRS § 853-1(a) factors in light of the circumstances of the offense, Presentence Diagnosis and Report ( PSI ), statements of defendant's counsel and defendant, and available alternatives; and (2) articulates relevant and significant findings based in the record to support its decision. See State v. Buchanan, 59 Haw. 562, 564, 584 P.2d 126, 127 (1978) (per curiam); State v. Karwacki, 1 Haw. App. 157, 159-60, 616 P.2d 226, 228-29 (1980) (per curiam).

Here, at the January 22, 2020 sentencing hearing, the Circuit Court considered Satoafaiga's Motion for DANC with specific reference to, inter alia , the HRS § 853-1(a) factors, the submissions of the parties, and the circumstances of the offense as set forth in the PSI. The court found that the first factor was satisfied by Satoafaiga's voluntary plea.

The Circuit Court looked very closely at the second criteria, whether it appears that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct, and the third criteria, that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law, and stated:

Ms. Satoafaiga at the time of the offense was 27 years old. The child victim was 12. So she was double her age, twice her age, should have known twice as much. Twice as mature, allegedly.

I agree, Ms. Satoafaiga has a lot of support of family and friends. She has countless letters from family members, from coworkers, from people from the Guard that you work with, people from the farm that you work at right now. And they're, yes, lovely, lovely letters, lots of letters, and all speak very glowing of you.

But it's interesting because all these letters know you in a different relationship. They know you as adult to adult. They know you as coworker to coworker. They know you as employer to employee or family member to family member.

In this case, it was a different kind of relationship. It was a child with an adult. It was someone who's supposed to be her mentor, someone who's her supervise -- not supervisor -- is like teacher/student, is mentor/mentee, is like adult and child, someone that's in your care.

So the relationship was totally different than all these letters that were written on your behalf because the relationship with the people who wrote these very nice letters are different. They're not children. They're not someone that is under your care, someone that you're responsible for. Totally, totally different situation.

Have you truly taken responsibility and apologized? I guess does it appear that you're unlikely to engage in such a criminal course of conduct again?

Well, you do admit in your letter that you engaged in inappropriate text messages. But this was more than text messaging. It was penetration with a finger to a vagina. And the problem is, is that inappropriate text messaging might be a few messages here and there or maybe even a couple of messages here and there, but 15,978 messages were exchanged. That means it wasn't just the child sending you 15,978 messages. It means there was an exchange going on between the two of you. So talk about some inappropriate behavior.

Some of these message were totally sexually explicit and some not so. "I'll put my big dick on your mouth if I had one. Might just leave them on and move your panties to the side. You want to feel me in you? I can't take it slow. I'm so frustrated -- I'm too frustrated. I'd black out. Turn off the light, lock the door behind you. Pick you up. Rub your thighs, kiss your neck, grab your ass, let you grind on me. Put my tongue in your mouth and let you do your thing. Pick you up and put you on my bed. Take off my shirt, crawl into the bed with you. Take off your shirt and your pants," and so on and so forth and so on and so forth.

So does this appear like someone that's not likely to engage in a criminal course of conduct? I think if this was a one-time incident -- and I understand it's only two counts that she's pleading to, but the 15,978 -- well, not all were inappropriate, obviously. But this is over a four-month period, so by my simple math calculations, over 4,000 messages that were going back and forth. So obviously I don't think -- I think this was definitely more than inappropriate text messaging.

Do the ends of justice and welfare of society dictate that you suffer the penalty imposed by law?

I'm really concerned because I looked up the Boys & Girls motto, and it talked about how one should be a mentor, be a role model, improve the lives of the youth, you know, counter -- counter -- counter any kind of negative influences on a youth's life and keep them engaged.

I think the behavior here is totally just the opposite of what the Boys & Girls Club is supposed to be -- you're supposed to be. I mean, you were the director of the Central Maui Boys & Girls Club. This little 12-year-old was coming to the Boys & Girls Club to –- to engage in activities, to look up to role models, to be mentored by a female or a male, but something to improve her life. You know, that's why she was going to the Boys & Girls Club.

And I think everything you did to her, besides the digital penetration and the custodial interference, dealing with taking her out to the breakwater when she was supposed to be going home, and her guardians come to pick her up from the Boys & Girls Club and she's not there, and they're going crazy, where's my kid, where's my daughter, looking all over for her. And at two o'clock or four o'clock the next morning, finally a phone call comes in from your partner, Noe, letting Ms. Matsuda know that the child is at your house. So she's gone for, I don't know, 4:30 in the afternoon the day before to like 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. the next morning. She's in your -- she's in your trust, she's in your care this whole time. You were responsible for her, and she ends up with hickeys on her chest during this time. I mean, talk about a negative influence on a child.

So the Court does find -- it appears to the Court that the defendant is likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society, especially the welfare of our children, our little girls, our female children, do not -- do require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law. So the Court is going to deny the motion for the deferred acceptance. This matter should and will be on your

...