State v. Saylor

117 S.W.3d 239

STATE of Tennessee v. Gerald E. SAYLOR.

No. E2001-00604-SC-R11-CD.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.

May 6, 2003 Session.

September 30, 2003.

Clifton Corker, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gerald E. Saylor.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Braden H. Boucek, Assistant Attorney General; Joe C. Crumley, Jr., District Attorney General; and Victor J. Vaughn, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined. ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, Jr., J., filed a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

We granted review to determine (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the defendant's confession on the ground that he did not invoke his right to counsel; (2) whether the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of a witness as to an uncommunicated threat made by the victim; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying a mistrial based on the admission of statements regarding the defendant's parole status. We conclude that the trial court properly refused to suppress the defendant's confession; that the trial court committed harmless error when it excluded proof of an uncommunicated threat; and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by not declaring a mistrial.

Background

The defendant, Gerald Saylor, was charged with second degree murder for the killing of the victim, John Case. The evidence at trial is summarized as follows:

On November 3, 1999, Gerald Saylor and his girlfriend, Brenda Hull, were drinking alcohol with Kenneth White and John Case at around 11:00 a.m.¹ Hull testified that she and Saylor left the house at around 1:00 p.m. to buy more alcohol and returned to the house with half a gallon of vodka. Hull stated that she, White, Saylor, and Case proceeded to drink "heavily." Hull testified that at one point she went into the kitchen and saw Case hit Saylor with a hatchet or hammer. According to Hull, Saylor staggered and fell, got back up, picked up the hatchet, and hit Case several times while she begged him to stop.

Kenneth White testified that he had spent the afternoon of November 3, 1999, drinking with Hull, Case and the defendant Saylor. White stated that later in the day, Case and Saylor got into an argument in the kitchen that escalated into a scuffle. White said that Case hit the side of Saylor's head with a hatchet or hammer, causing him to fall down. Saylor then got up, grabbed the hatchet or hammer from Case, and hit him several times in the face and head. Case fell onto the couch in the living room and stopped moving. White testified that he ran next door and called the police.

When the Johnson City police officers and the emergency medical crew arrived in response to the call, they found Case barely alive, lying face down on the floor in a puddle of his own blood. Case was breathing but unresponsive; he was covered in blood and had a large cut across his nose and deep lacerations to his head. Case also had cuts to the back of his hands and across the palm of his right hand. A hatchet and an open pocketknife were found in the back of Case's pants. Blood and brain matter covered the couch, walls, floor, and ceiling of the living room. In the kitchen, the officers also found an overturned table, a broken shelf, and other signs that there had been a scuffle.

Case died later that day. According to Dr. Ellen Wallen, the medical examiner, Case died from "multiple chop wounds" which caused skull fractures, brain lacerations, and brain contusions. Dr. Murray Marks, a forensic anthropologist, testified that the victim had been struck in the head and face at least six times.

At the police station, Saylor made several comments about an attorney in the presence of the officers, which he described as an unequivocal request for an attorney and which the State deemed as equivocal. After the comments, Saylor signed a Miranda waiver and gave a videotaped statement in which he told an officer that Case hit him with the hammer. He stated that he "snapped," took the hammer, and hit Case with it. Saylor was arrested and charged with second degree murder. A jury convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter, and the court sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment as a Range III, persistent offender.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence.

We granted Saylor's application for permission to appeal.

ANALYSIS

Motion To Suppress

Prior to trial, the defendant Saylor moved the trial court to suppress the confession he made to an investigating officer. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the defendant made an equivocal request for counsel and that the officers were under no duty to clarify his request.

Saylor argues in this Court that he made four unequivocal requests for an attorney that, either considered separately or together, invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and precluded the officers from asking any further questions. Saylor also contends that his right to counsel under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution was violated because the officers did not limit their later questions to clarifying his desire for an attorney. See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 548 (Tenn.1994).

The State contends that Saylor did not effectively invoke his right to counsel and that the investigating officers were under no legal obligation to limit the scope of their interrogation under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions.

The following evidence was introduced at the trial court suppression hearing on Saylor's motion. After Saylor was arrested, he was brought to the Johnson City Police Station where he was detained in a police interview room. A video recording revealed the following exchange between an unnamed officer and Saylor:²

Officer: You're arrested ain't you?

Saylor: For what?

Officer: We'll let you know in a minute.

Saylor: People, I haven't done nothing. Only thing I can figure is that I've violated my parole. That's the only thing I can figure. That's about the only thing I can figure.

Officer: What are you on parole for?

Saylor: Well . . . I guess it don't matter until I can get a lawyer present.

Officer: It don't make any difference to me.

Saylor: I'm supposed to have a lawyer though, don't I?

Officer: Hmm?

Saylor: I have to have a lawyer present, I reckon. Before you ask me. That's the story, isn't it?

Officer: What's that?

Saylor: You have to have a lawyer present before questioning.

Officer: I ain't asked you any questions!

Saylor: That's right.

(emphasis added). About ten minutes later, Lieutenant Debbie Baron entered the interview room and read Saylor his Miranda rights, reaffirming his right to an attorney. She then asked Saylor to sign a waiver of rights form, and the following exchange occurred:

Saylor: But I'll talk to you, but I don't want to waive my rights. I'll sign it, but what I'm saying is . . .

Baron: Well, you basically, if you sign that you are waiving your rights.

Saylor: But I haven't done nothing is what I'm trying to tell you.

Baron: Well if you haven't done anything, then you don't need a lawyer, right?

Saylor: No, I might need a lawyer because somebody might try to accuse me of something I didn't do.

Baron: Well, I will too. I don't know. I can't make any promises. If you sign that, you're waiving your rights. I mean, that's what it says right there.

Saylor: No, I don't need to do that, do I? Of course, I haven't done anything, but ... and I can stop at any time, right?

Baron: You can stop anytime you want to.

[Saylor appears to sign the form.]

Saylor: I shouldn't have done that really. Of course, I haven't done anything.

Saylor then told Lieutenant Baron that Case hit him with a hammer, that he "snapped," and that he took the hammer away from Case and hit him with it.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress on the grounds that the defendant's requests for counsel were equivocal and thus did not require clarification under either the federal or state constitutions. Moreover, the court held that regardless of whether the defendant effectively invoked his right to counsel, he subsequently waived this right before making a statement to Lieutenant Baron.

It is well-settled that a trial court's determination at a suppression hearing is presumptively correct on appeal. State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tenn.1986). The presumption of correctness may only be overcome on appeal if the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court's findings. Id.; see also State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tenn.1980); State v. Johnson, 717 S.W.2d 298, 304-05 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986).

We begin our analysis by examining the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]" The corresponding provision of the Tennessee Constitution provides "[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. Encompassed within these constitutional provisions is the right to counsel, which is applicable whenever a suspect requests that counsel be present during police-initiated custodial interrogation.³ When a suspect invokes that right to counsel, police must cease questioning until counsel is present. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct....