State v. Scheffelman

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STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICKY DEAN SCHEFFELMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 50427

Court of Appeals of Idaho

August 28, 2024

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Benjamin J. Cluff, District Judge.

Judgment of the district court, affirmed.

Ricky D. Scheffelman, Boise, pro se appellant.

Hon Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Ricky Dean Scheffelman appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction. Scheffelman claims the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and motion to reconsider. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Law enforcement stopped Scheffelman for speeding. Scheffelman claimed he was coming from Salt Lake City, through Nevada and heading north towards Montana but ended up in Twin Falls. Scheffelman stated he was lost and stopped in the hospital parking lot looking for a map. Scheffelman was unable to produce his driver's license, a valid registration, or proof of insurance. The officer contacted dispatch and requested a drug dog. Scheffelman claimed the car belonged to his girlfriend, and he provided a temporary registration and an identification card. The officer returned to his patrol car and asked if dispatch heard his request for a drug dog, then relayed Scheffelman's information using the identification card provided. The officer learned Scheffelman had a non-extraditable warrant out of California and prior drug charges. Scheffelman could not provide a phone number for the registered car's owner and stated his license was suspended. While waiting for dispatch to confirm Scheffelman's suspension, the officer asked to search the vehicle. Scheffelman agreed. Subsequently, the officer discovered a pipe on the passenger seat and placed Scheffelman in the patrol car. The officer told Scheffelman he was not under arrest and continued to search the vehicle. The officer then discovered a large quantity of methamphetamine.

The State charged Scheffelman with trafficking in methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(4)(B), possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A(1), and driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001(1)(a). Scheffelman filed a motion to suppress, arguing the stop was illegally extended and his consent to search was involuntary. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that Scheffelman's abnormal driving, nervous demeanor, and responses were indicative of a person involved in criminal activity. The officer described seeing a basket of laundry in the front seat, Scheffelman, a dog in the backseat, and a temporary Utah registration on the vehicle. The officer explained these items are indicia of criminal activity, and Scheffelman appeared to be missing several teeth and his face appeared to be sunken in, both of which are indicators of drug use. Following the suppression hearing, the district court denied Scheffelman's motion, holding that the stop was not unlawfully extended even though the officer deviated from the purpose of the stop for eleven seconds to call for a drug dog, Scheffelman's consent was voluntary and, alternatively, that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Scheffelman filed a motion to reconsider asserting the original purpose of the stop ended before the officer obtained consent to search. The district court denied Scheffelman's motion for reconsideration.

Scheffelman entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine and driving without privileges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and motion to reconsider. The State dismissed the possession of paraphernalia charge. Scheffelman appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo. State v. Bonner, 167 Idaho 88, 93, 467 P.3d 452, 457 (2020).

III. ANALYSIS

Scheffelman asserts the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and motion to reconsider. Scheffelman argues the traffic stop was unlawfully extended, his consent was involuntary, and the inevitable discovery rule was inapplicable. The State argues the district court did not err in finding the traffic stop was not prolonged and that Scheffelman provided valid consent to search. In addition, the State asserts the district court did not err by determining the contraband would have been inevitably discovered through an inventory search.

A. Traffic Stop

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The stop of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607-08, 389 P.3d 150, 15253 (2016). The reasonableness of such a stop is analyzed as an investigative detention. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). An investigative detention does not require an officer to have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but the detention must be based on something more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 673, 450 P.3d 315, 321 (2019). The detention must be supported by specific, articulable facts, that the detained party has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Randall, 169 Idaho 358, 363, 496 P.3d 844, 849 (2021). Whether an officer's suspicion is reasonable is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Further, the detention must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).

Where a detention is justified by a traffic infraction, "[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are--or reasonably should have been--completed." State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). An officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions, such as checking for outstanding warrants, in order to complete his mission safely. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356. The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984, 88 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Ct. App. 2003); accord Hale, 168 Idaho at 868, 489 P.3d at 455 ("[A] traffic stop may be permissibly extended if, during the course of effectuating the stop's mission, officers develop reasonable suspicion of some unrelated criminal offense."). The Idaho Supreme Court noted in Linze the broad holding in Rodriguez that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d at 153. It concluded that this rule is both broad and inflexible and applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those that could reasonably be considered de minimis. Id. Interpreting Rodriguez, the Court ruled:

The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related. However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions. Indeed, when an officer abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of the original seizure. In other words, unless some new reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the seizure's new purpose, a seized party's Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original purpose of the stop is abandoned (unless that abandonment falls within some established exception).

Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154. However, the Court distinguished Linze on two bases. First, the Court recognized that "Linze never addressed what would happen if the traffic stop led to reasonable suspicion that the driver was engaged in another crime." State v. Warren, 169 Idaho 588, 593, 499 P.3d 423, 428 (2021). Where there is reasonable suspicion of another crime, a detention may be prolonged to confirm or dispel that suspicion. See Hale, 168 Idaho at 868, 489 P.3d at 455.

Waiting for a drug dog to arrive and conduct a drug sniff is not part of the purpose or mission of a traffic stop. Hale 168 Idaho at 867, 489 P.3d at 454. Thus, the dog must arrive, and the sniff must be conducted, before the tasks tied to the stop are--or should have been--reasonably completed. The critical question is whether the dog sniff prolonged or added time to the traffic stop. State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 227, 509 P.3d 1148, 1156 (2022). ...