State v. Schimanski

344 Conn. 435

280 A.3d 92

STATE of Connecticut

v.Anastasia SCHIMANSKI

SC 20550

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 23, 2022

Officially released August 23, 2022

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, chief state's attorney, and Sean P. McGuinness, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

KELLER, J.

The defendant, Anastasia Schimanski, appeals¹ from the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1).² The defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the forty-five day license suspension period imposed by General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1)³ on persons who refuse to submit to a chemical analysis of their blood, breath, or urine, as required by § 14-227b (b), does not terminate upon the expiration of the forty-five days specified in the statute but, rather, continues indefinitely until such time as the persons subject to the suspension install an ignition interlock device (IID) on their vehicles. The defendant contends that, because the conduct underlying her conviction occurred after the expiration of the forty-five day suspension period authorized by § 14-227b (i) (1), the state could not lawfully charge her pursuant to § 14-215 (c) (1).⁴ We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "On September 18, 2017, the defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of General Statutes [Rev. to 2017] § 14-227a.⁵ Pursuant to ... § 14-227b (i), the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) suspended the defendant's license for a period of forty-five days, beginning on October 18, 2017, and ending on December 2, 2017, as a result of the defendant's refusal to take a chemical alcohol test. On December 4, 2017, the trial court, Spader , J. , granted the defendant's application for the pretrial alcohol education program. See General Statutes § 54-56g. In connection with its consideration of the application, the court engaged in the following colloquy with the defendant:

" ‘The Court: One of the key things about the alcohol education program is if you violate the [department's] interlock device program, that's a violation of the alcohol education program. So just—don't be operating a motor vehicle unless you have the interlock device attached to it.

" ‘[The Defendant]: Yes. Sir—I'm sorry—I don't own a vehicle.

" ‘The Court: No—yeah, well, the thing is, don't borrow a vehicle either that doesn't have an interlock device on it—you know—if there's—once your license is restored, once your privileges are restored, okay?

" ‘[The Defendant]: Yes, sir.’

"That same day, shortly after leaving the courthouse following the hearing, the defendant operated a motor vehicle, which did not have an IID installed in it, and allegedly struck another motor vehicle. As a result of that incident, the defendant was issued a misdemeanor summons and complaint, giving rise to the present case, charging her with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 .... On February 23, 2018, the state filed its first substitute information. In count one, the state charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). In count two, the state charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an IID in violation of [General Statutes (Rev. to 2017)] § 14-227k (a) (2).⁶ In count three, the state charged the defendant with evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of [General Statutes] § 14-224 (b) (3).

"On March 5, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts one and two of the first substitute information. With respect to count one, the defendant argued that she could not properly be charged with having committed a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December 4, 2017, because, at such time, her license was not under suspension on account of § 14-227b (i) (1). According to the defendant, the forty-five day suspension of her license pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) had expired on December 2, 2017. With respect to count two, the defendant argued that she was not obligated on December 4, 2017, either by direction of the department or by order of the trial court, to operate a motor vehicle with an IID installed, and, thus, she could not properly be charged with having violated § 14-227k (a) (2) on that date.⁷

"On March 19, 2018, after having heard argument on March 9, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision denying the defendant's motion to dismiss in its entirety. As to count one charging the defendant with a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1), the court determined that, pursuant to §§ 14-227a and 14-227b, the installation of an IID is a ‘mandatory statutory requirement implemented by the state legislature that must be fulfilled to "unsuspend" a suspended license.’ The court further determined that the defendant did not have an IID installed on December 4, 2017, and that the department did not lift her suspension and restore her privilege to operate a motor vehicle until January 2, 2018, by which time the defendant had installed an IID.... In light of the foregoing, with respect to count one, the court concluded that the state could prosecute the defendant for a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). With respect to count two, the court determined that, during the hearing held on December 4, 2017, it unequivocally and directly had ordered the defendant not to operate any motor vehicle without an IID installed. Thus, the court concluded, the state could prosecute the defendant for a violation of § 14-227k (a) (2).

"On May 9, 2018, the state filed a second substitute information charging the defendant solely with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). On May 25, 2018, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to that charge, conditioned on her right to take an appeal from her conviction on the basis of the court's denial of her motion to dismiss. After a canvass, the court accepted the conditional plea, entered a finding of guilty, and sentenced the defendant to a term of one year of incarceration, execution suspended, with one year of probation." (Footnote added; footnote in original.) State v. Schimanski , 201 Conn. App. 164, 167–70, 242 A.3d 119 (2020). "The thirty day mandatory minimum term of imprisonment was suspended in light of mitigating circumstances determined by the court. See General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1)." State v. Schimanski , supra, at 170 n.2, 242 A.3d 119.⁸

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that, under State v. Jacobson , 31 Conn. App. 797, 627 A.2d 474 (1993), aff'd, 229 Conn. 824, 644 A.2d 331 (1994), and State v. Cook , 36 Conn. App. 710, 653 A.2d 829 (1995), "her failure to have installed an IID did not extend the suspension of her license under § 14-227b (i) (1) beyond the forty-five day period, which expired on December 2, 2017, and, as a result, she could not have been charged with having committed a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December 4, 2017." State v. Schimanski , supra, 201 Conn. App. at 170, 242 A.3d 119. The Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that "the legislature clearly and unambiguously created a statutorily mandated condition—i.e., the installation of an IID ... that must be satisfied before an individual may have his or her license restored and thereupon legally operate a motor vehicle. Stated differently, § 14-227b (i) (1) does not contemplate an interim period between suspension and restoration, whereby an individual whose license or operating privilege has been suspended thereunder could operate a motor vehicle, while escaping the responsibility of installing an IID ... and avoiding exposure to criminal liability under, inter alia, § 14-215 (c)." Id., at 174, 242 A.3d 119. To conclude otherwise, the court reasoned, "would incentivize an individual, whose license or operating privilege has been suspended pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1), not to install an IID and complete the restoration process"; (emphasis in original) id., at 174–75, 242 A.3d 119 ; leading to "an absurd result and not one intended by the legislature." Id., at 175, 242 A.3d 119.

In reaching its determination, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's contention that Jacobson and Cook , which held that the license suspension periods imposed for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ( Jacobson ) and for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test ( Cook ) do not continue beyond the fixed time periods specified by statute until the person whose license was suspended completes the administrative steps required for restoration of the license, supported her claim. Id., at 175–77, 242 A.3d 119. The court reasoned that, "[i]n deciding Jacobson and Cook , [it] analyzed prior revisions of §§ 14-227a and 14-227b.⁹ As the trial court in the present case observed in its memorandum of decision, although Jacobson and Cook have not been overruled, §§ 14-227a and 14-227b have been amended since those decisions were published. The [1989] revision of § 14-227a at issue in Jacobson specified a fixed one year license suspension without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration, and the 1991 revision of § 14-227b at issue in Cook contained a fixed six month license suspension, also...